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ABSTRACT
Many of the world’s most valuable companies adopt the online
platform business model to bring together different groups of
customers—suppliers and customers—seeking to transact with one
another. This Article aims to establish the correct legal
characterization of these platforms and the implications thereof for
competition law purposes. To do so, it explores two related questions:
first, whether platforms are agents of their suppliers; and, second,
whether the competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements
should apply to agreements between platforms and suppliers, which
restrict competition on the relevant market for the products/services
regarding which the platform facilitates a transaction. The first
question arises because the platform business model resembles an
agency arrangement more than any other, and many platforms selfproclaim to be agents of their suppliers. Yet, the decisional practice
and commentary have developed on the premise that they are not
agents. The second question arises due to the “agency rule” under the
“single economic entity doctrine,” according to which restrictive
agreements between an agent and a principal take place within the
same “undertaking” and are consequently immune from the
competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements between
separate undertakings. After applying concepts of agency and similar
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delegation models found in different areas of law to the standard
contracts of six major platforms—Amazon Marketplace, Apple App
Store, Uber, eBay, Booking.com, and, Airbnb—this Article finds that,
as a matter of positive law, all of these platforms are agents of their
suppliers. Consequently, platforms’ agreements with their suppliers
that restrict competition on the relevant products/services market
cannot be scrutinized due to the agency rule under the “single
economic entity doctrine” as currently conceived. This represents a
significant “platform gap” in the application of competition law in
digital markets. Following these findings, this Article conducts a
normative assessment to demonstrate that in the context of platforms
that not only intermediate transactions for, but also compete with their
suppliers on the relevant market, the “single economic entity doctrine”
should be (re)interpreted. The “agency rule” should not apply to
agreements of such platforms and suppliers that contain restrictions of
competition on the relevant market. This is because the conflict of
commercial and competitive interests between a “principal” (supplier)
and an “agent” (platform) that competes with its principal
fundamentally violates the principles of agency and the reasoning
underlying the single economic entity doctrine. This Article develops a
“competitive neutrality” principle to inform and underlie this proposed
(re)interpretation of the “single economic entity doctrine.” This
(re)interpretation fills the “platform gap” identified in this Article by
subjecting the agreements of platforms that are not in a competitively
neutral position with their suppliers to the full application of the
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements.
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INTRODUCTION

Many of the world’s most valuable companies, such as Amazon
and Apple, conduct much of their business using the “platform” model.
A “platform,” for the purposes of this Article, can be defined as an
online marketplace which “provides a discrete set of services to the
parties using it, facilitating their efforts to transact effectively and
efficiently, including searching for potential transacting partners,
agreeing to terms with them, and performing the contract.”1 This is a
factual definition of a platform based on what a platform does in
bringing together suppliers and customers who would like to transact
with one another. Although this definition is useful for conceptual
1. FED. TRADE COMM’N STAFF REPORT, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING
PLATFORMS,
PARTICIPANTS
&
REGULATORS
3
(Nov.
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platformsparticipants-regulators-federal-trade-commissionstaff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2XR-WTYC]
[hereinafter FTC Report]. Although the Federal Trade Commission report’s definition has been
offered in the context of the sharing economy, it is broad enough to cover platforms of all types
that are relevant to this article’s inquiry. David Evans and Richard Schamelensee aptly define
what platforms do as “matchmaking” because platforms operate physical or virtual places where
members of different groups of customers are brought together. See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD
SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 1-2
(2016). As such platforms bring together different groups of customers, they operate as twosided or multi-sided businesses. The seminal paper by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole
provides a technical, economic model of the two-sided platform business and platform
competition. See generally Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in TwoSided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003).
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delineation and for distinguishing between different types of online
commercial enterprises, it is not a legal definition of what a platform
is. The question of what a platform is and the implications of this
characterization for legal purposes—and in particular, for EU
competition law purposes—are the focus of this Article.
Platforms that operate in digital markets raise two fundamental
questions regarding their legal characterization for the purposes of this
Article. First, whether platforms are agents of the suppliers for whom
the platforms enable transactions with customers. Second, how the
scope of the competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements
should be drawn in relation to agreements between platforms and
suppliers, which restrict competition on the market for the
products/services, for which the platform facilitates a transaction
between a supplier and a customer (hereinafter, the “relevant market”).2
These questions arise out of the fact that the platform business model,
in the way that it functions through the facilitation of contracts between
suppliers and customers, displays the qualities of an agency
relationship more than any other commercial arrangement. In fact,
many of the platforms self-proclaim to be agents of their suppliers in
their agreements with them and with customers.3 Further, agreements
between platforms and suppliers can contain clauses which restrict
competition in relation to price, quantity, availability, etc. of the
products/services supplied to customers on the relevant market. Yet,
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
2. This Article does not pursue an inquiry as to whether platforms are also agents of the
“customers” (buyers) who enter into transactions with the suppliers on the platform to the extent
that such customers are “consumers” (i.e. end users). This is because for competition law to
apply to an agreement/practice at all, both of the parties to the agreement have to be
“undertakings.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 101, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C115) 89 [hereinafter TFEU]. For the competition law
definition of undertaking, see accompanying text to infra note 118. Similarly, such an inquiry
requires examination of the particular formation details of the contract facilitated by the platform
under the relevant contract law, which goes beyond the scope of this Article. Where the buyers
on the platform are also “undertakings,” namely the platform facilitates business-to-business
transactions (and the contract is formed, indeed, in such a way that the platform acts as an agent
for both parties to the contract), the legal assessment of the relationship between the platform
and the supplier should equally apply to the assessment of the relationship between the platform
and the buyer. However, where the platform is found to be an agent for both of these parties,
one pertinent question will be whether the platform can act for two parties with conflicting
interests in a given transaction. For the legal position on this under the common law, see infra
note 53 below.
3. See text after infra note 197.

2019]

ONLINE PLATFORMS

213

(TFEU) (hereinafter, “Article 101”) which prohibits anticompetitive
agreements, concerted practices and decisions of association of
undertakings, which have the object or effect of restricting, distorting
or preventing competition within the internal market, does not apply to
agreements between principals and agents where such an agreement
restricts, distorts or prevents competition on the relevant market.4 This
stems from the doctrine according to which Article 101 does not apply
to agreements between two or more legal persons that form a “single
economic entity” (e.g. an agent and a principal) since the application
of the provision requires an agreement between separate undertakings.5
The implication of finding platforms to be agents of their suppliers and
thus, part of the same “single economic entity” as their suppliers is that
anticompetitive agreements between a platform and suppliers would
fall outside the scope of, and cannot be scrutinized by, EU competition
law, and any other competition law system modelled thereon. The same
goes for all jurisdictions whose competition law includes a similar
doctrine that prevents the application of competition law to agreements
between a principal and an agent.6 This is a matter of scope of
4. Art. 101 TFEU. Although occasionally reference is made to “genuine agents” regarding
this limitation of scope in competition law, a “genuine” agent is simply an agent who satisfies
the criteria for agency as provided for by competition law. Therefore, it does not further the
inquiry beyond distinguishing agents from entities that are not agents (but may appear as such)
and will not be used as a term of significance in this Article. For a comparison between
“genuine” and “sham” agents, see Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21-22 (1964)
(clarifying that it is the substance of the relationship between two entities and not its form or
description that determines antitrust liability).
5. See Case C-73/95, Viho Europe VB v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-5457 [hereinafter Viho];
Case 30/87, Bodson v. Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées SA, 1988 E.C.R. 2479; Case
15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147; Case 22/71, Béguelin Import v.
GL Import Export, 1971 E.C.R. 950. On the single economic entity doctrine, see Okeoghene
Odudu & David Bailey, The Single Economic Entity Doctrine in EU Competition Law, 51
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1721 (2014). See also EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 814-816 (2d ed. 2011) and the case law cited therein.
6. This includes, for example, the United States where the “intra-enterprise conspiracy”
doctrine can exclude the possibility of liability for infringement of Sherman Act, Section 1
(equivalent to art. 101) where there is an agreement between a principal and an agent, and the
agreement does not “deprive the marketplace of … actual or potential competition.” Am. Needle,
Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010) [hereinafter American Needle]. See
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (holding that elimination of
the intra-conspiracy doctrine with respect to corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries
will not cripple antitrust enforcement). See also American Needle, 560 U.S. at 192. Compare
U.S. v. Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) (holding that the per se prohibition against resale
price maintenance does not apply in cases where there is a genuine relationship of principal and
agent) with Online-Booking Platforms for Hotels, 2016 (Swiss Competition Comm’n) (stating
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application. Further, under Regulation 1/2003, EU Member States are
obliged not to prohibit agreements and concerted practices by their
national competition laws if the same practice is not prohibited in EU
competition law provided that there is an “effect on trade between
Member States.”7 This obligation is likely to apply to the agreements
of some of the largest global platforms such as Amazon, Apple’s App
Store, and Uber. Consequently, this inquiry into the scope of
application has significant implications for applying competition law
in digital markets, and in particular for e-commerce, given the ubiquity
of the platform model. Thus, the agency rule under the single economic
entity doctrine can immunize a large part of the business model of these
undertakings from the application of EU competition law, as well as
Member State competition laws depending on the legal
characterization of platforms under the single economic entity doctrine.
Therefore, there is a potentially significant “platform gap” in the
application of competition law in digital markets. An exploration and
critical analysis of this “platform gap,” and how it may be filled, if
necessary, is what this Article aims to conduct.
The overall research question of this Article concerns the correct
scope of the application of competition law to agreements between a
platform and its suppliers, which restrict competition on the relevant
market. To that end, this Article first conducts a positive assessment of
the law to explore whether platforms are agents of the suppliers on the
that Swiss competition law does not contain any provisions that would exclude the application
of the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements to those agreements between principals and
agents).
7. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 3, 2002 O.J. (8 (EC) L1). Art. 3(2) stipulates that: “[t]he
application of national competition law may not lead to the prohibition of agreements, decisions
by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States but which do not restrict competition within the meaning of art. 81(1) of the Treaty, or
which fulfil the conditions of art. 81(3) of the Treaty or which are covered by a Regulation for
the application of art. 81(3) of the Treaty.” Id. The question of whether platforms are agents is
a question of scope in determining whether art. 101(1) applies to an agreement at all. Where EU
competition law would find a lack of applicability due to the single economic entity doctrine,
argumentum a fortiori, there cannot be a restriction of competition within the meaning of art.
101(1). Thus, Member States cannot find infringement under those circumstances either, where
there is an effect on trade between Member States and Regulation 1 is applicable. This Author
has argued elsewhere in this context that the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt)
proceedings concerning the most-favored-customer clauses of certain online travel agents were
possibly, as a result of this provision, in violation of Regulation 1/2003, due to their prohibition
of an agreement which would not have been prohibited under art. 101 were the single economic
entity doctrine correctly applied as per the EU competition rules. Pınar Akman, A Competition
Law Assessment of Platform Most-Favored-Customer Clauses, 12(4) J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 781, 806 (2016).
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platform. After an exploration of the concepts of agency found in
different areas of law including competition law, this Article answers
that question in the affirmative and posits that as the law stands,
platforms are the agents of their suppliers. This is the first contribution
of this Article. The implication of this finding is that because platforms
are agents, under the single economic entity doctrine, their agreements
with their suppliers which restrict, distort or prevent competition on the
relevant market cannot be scrutinized under Article 101. This
competition law “immunity” means that potentially substantial
restrictions of competition in digital markets fall outside the scope of
the competition law prohibition. Thus, an assessment of the
appropriateness of this “immunity” becomes necessary. Subsequently,
this Article conducts a normative assessment to explore whether, and
if so how, the single economic entity doctrine and the agency rule
thereunder should be (re)interpreted to apply to the agreements of these
platforms with their suppliers. This Article identifies the common
thread between the general principles of agency and the single
economic entity doctrine to be that of an alignment of commercial and
competitive interests between the principal and the agent.
Consequently, this Article posits that there is one particular scenario in
which the single economic entity doctrine should be (re)interpreted to
include within the scope of Article 101 those restrictive agreements
between platforms and suppliers that currently fall outside of its scope
of application: where the platform in question competes with the
suppliers on the relevant market. The proposed (re)interpretation is
based on the premise that in circumstances where the platform
competes with suppliers, there is a conflict of commercial and
competitive interests between the agent (platform) and the principal
(supplier). This conflict fundamentally goes against the principles of
agency and the reasoning underlying the single economic entity
doctrine.8 This Article advances this proposed (re)interpretation of the
single economic entity doctrine based on a concept of “competitive
neutrality,” which it develops.9 This proposal to (re)interpret the single
8. See text around infra note 345.
9. The concept of “competitive neutrality” is traditionally used to refer to the principle that
state-owned and private businesses compete on a level playing field. See Achieving Competitive
Neutrality,
ORG.
FOR
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
&
DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/achievingcompetitiveneutrality.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). This
Article’s concept of “competitive neutrality” is similar in substance to the traditional use of the
concept but transposes that concept to the context of competition between private businesses.
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economic entity doctrine for the agreements of platforms that compete
with their suppliers using the concept of “competitive neutrality” is the
second contribution of this Article. With this (re)interpretation, this
Article fills the “platform gap” by making the prohibition of
anticompetitive agreements, which is currently inapplicable, applicable
to those restrictive agreements of platforms and suppliers to the extent
that the platform competes with the suppliers on the relevant market.
This assessment of platforms’ legal characterization and how
competition law does and should apply to their agreements with their
suppliers is fundamental to correctly assessing the business practices
of major platforms such as Amazon, Apple App Store, Booking.com,
Uber and others, some of which have already been scrutinized by
competition authorities around the world for their various
agreements.10 The literature and decisional practice thus far have either
proceeded on the premise that these platforms are not agents of their
suppliers or have not engaged with this legal question at all.11 The EU
The proposal is one of reinterpreting the single economic entity doctrine because the doctrine
has not yet been interpreted by the EU Courts in the context of platforms, although it has been
interpreted in the context of other agency agreements.
10. See cases cited in infra notes 11 and 12.
11. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., VERTICAL RESTRAINTS FOR ON-LINE
SALES,
DAF/COMP(2013)13,
30
(2013),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/VerticalRestraintsForOnlineSales2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67WL-DBKR] (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). See, e.g., U.S. v. Apple, Inc., 791
F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016) (representing decisional practice
with no explicit discussion of agency in the context of the single economic entity doctrine/intraenterprise
conspiracy
doctrine);
Bundeskartellamt
[Federal
Cartel
Office],
Meistbegünstigstenklauseln bei Booking.com, 9th Decision Division B 9-121/13, Dec. 22, 2015
(Ger.) [hereinafter Booking.com]; Konkurrensverket [Swedish Competition Authority],
Decision Ref. no. 596/2013, Apr. 15, 2015 (same); Hotel online booking: Decision to accept
commitments to remove certain discounting restrictions for Online Travel Agents 2014,
OFT1514dec (UK) [hereinafter Booking/Expedia/IHG]; Comm’n Decision Case
COMP/39.847/E-BOOKS, C(2013) 4750 (EC). See also Online-Booking Platforms for Hotels,
supra note 6 (representing decisional practice which discusses single economic entity
doctrine/intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine but rules it out); Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel
Office], HRS Bestpreisklausel, 9th Decision Division B 9-66/10, Dec. 20, 2013 (Ger.)
[hereinafter HRS]. Notably, these decisions relate to more or less identical conduct by similarlysituated/identical platforms and apply similar/identical legal provisions, so it is curious that some
authorities have engaged with the issue whilst others have not. Academic commentary
considering the possibility that platforms and suppliers may be part of the same economic entity
for the purposes of competition law is sparse, but some of the existing literature discusses the
question in the context of sharing economy platforms. See Niamh Dunne, Competition Law (and
its Limits) in the Sharing Economy, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON LAW AND REGULATION OF
THE SHARING ECONOMY 91-107 (Nestor M. Davidson et al. eds., 2018); Mark Anderson & Max
Huffman, The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, A Cartel, or Something
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Courts have not yet dealt with this particular legal issue, but given the
prevalence of the platform model and the ongoing scrutiny of platforms
by the EU Commission and national competition authorities, it is
highly likely that they soon will need to determine the application of
the single economic entity doctrine and the agency rule to restrictive
agreements between platforms and their suppliers.12 This Author has
argued elsewhere that, in particular, the various competition authority
proceedings in Europe concerning most-favored-customer clauses
adopted by certain platforms have proceeded on the erroneous basis

in Between?, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 860 (2018); Margherita Colangelo & Mariateresa
Maggiolino, Uber in Europe: Are There Still Judges in Luxembourg?, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON. 6 (2018); Julian Nowag, When sharing platforms fix sellers’ prices,
6 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 382 (2018). See also Andrei Gurin & Luc Peeperkorn, Vertical
Agreements, in THE EU LAW OF COMPETITION 1363, 1363-81 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay
eds., 2014) (discussing the issue more generally in the context of platforms, but arguing that it
is difficult to find platforms to be agents).
12. Other than an E-commerce Sector Inquiry (2015-2017), in the last few years, the EU
Comm’n has pursued investigations and reached infringement decisions in relation to Google
Search (AdSense) (European Comm’n Press Release, Antitrust: Comm’n fines Google €1.49
billion for abusive practices in online advertising (March 20, 2019)); Google Android (Comm’n
Decision 1/2003 of July 18, 2018 relating to a proceeding under art. 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and art. 54 of the EEA Agreement (AT.4099 – Google
Android) (EC)); Google Search (Shopping) (Comm’n Decision 1/2003 of June 27, 2017 relating
to proceedings under art. 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article
54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping)
(EC)); Apple (State Aid) (Comm’n Decision of August 30, 2016 On State Aid SA.38373
(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple (EC)); online vertical
restraints of electronics manufacturers (Comm’n Decision of July 24, 2018 relating to a
proceeding under art. 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (AT.40465 –
Asus (vertical restraints)) (Sept. 21, 2018)); Comm’n Decision of July 24, 2018 relating to
proceedings under art. 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (AT.40469
Denon & Marantz) (EC); Comm’n Decision of July 24, 2018 relating to proceedings under art.
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (AT.4018 – Philips) (EC); Comm’n
Decision of July 24, 2018 relating to proceedings under art. 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union and art. 53 of the EEA Agreement (AT.40182 – Pioneer) (EC)). It also
adopted commitment decisions in relation to e-books, Amazon MFNs and other matters; see
Comm’n Decision of May 4, 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union and art. 54 of the EEA Agreement (AT.40153 – E-Book
MFNs and related matters) (EC). See Final Report from the Comm’n to the Council and the
Parliament, Final report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry (COM (2017) 229 final) (EC). Most
recently, it has been reported that the European Commission is to launch a formal competition
inquiry into Apple’s position in relation to Apple App Store following a complaint by Spotify
alleging that Apple App Store abuses its dominant position to favor Apple Music over rivals
such as Spotify; see Rochelle Toplensky, Brussels poised to probe Apple over Spotify’s fees
complaint, FIN. TIMES, (May 6, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/1cc16026-6da7-11e9-80c760ee53e6681d [https://perma.cc/R9XR-D4GP].
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that these platforms are not agents of the suppliers.13 This Article takes
this work further by investigating the publicly available terms and
conditions of the relevant standard contracts of six major platforms
operating in different business sectors—Amazon Marketplace, eBay,
Apple App Store, Uber, Airbnb, and Booking.com. This is done with a
view to attaining a robust understanding of the operation of the
platform business model in relation to agreements between platforms
and suppliers. This Article is not concerned with the examination of a
particular type of contractual clause, but with the legal characterization
of platforms in their dealings with their suppliers and third parties. Its
findings have implications for all clauses of agreements between
platforms and suppliers, which restrict, distort, or prevent competition
on the relevant market. Other than most-favored-customer clauses,
examples of contract clauses which would fall outside the scope of
Article 101 if platforms are agents of suppliers, include many vertical
restraints14 such as restrictions on pricing, including the fixing of the
price;15 discounting restrictions;16 non-discrimination clauses;17
restrictions on output, and imposition of supply conditions. Any such
13. See Akman, supra note 7, 805 et seq. The author argued therein that proceedings and
decisions against, for example, Booking.com should have been pursued on the basis of TFEU
art. 102 prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position (assuming that the conditions of that art.
would have been fulfilled) rather than on the basis of art. 101 because Booking.com is the agent
of the hotels and their agreements fall outside the scope of art. 101.
14. A “vertical agreement” is an agreement between two or more undertakings each of
which operates, for the purposes of the agreement, at a different level of the
production/distribution chain, and relates to the conditions under which the parties may
purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services; Comm’n Regulation 330/2010 of Apr. 20, 2010
on the application of art. 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, 2010 O.J. (L 102) 1, 1 [hereinafter
VBER]. A “vertical restraint” is a restriction of competition found in a vertical agreement. Id.
15. For a case in the United States which dismissed a claim against twelve major hotel
chains and nine online travel agents on the basis that, inter alia, the liability arising out of a
resale price maintenance agreement cannot be made out because the agency defence has not
been overcome, see In Re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litig., No. 3:2012cv-03515-B (N.D. Tex. 2014). The author has not used the term “resale price maintenance” in
the text corresponding to this footnote since technically, if the intermediary in question is an
agent, there is no “resale” but only a “sale” (because any “sale” is being made on behalf of/for
the principal by the agent). In the context of a platform (e.g. Uber) setting the price for suppliers
on the platform and the competition law treatment of this, see Nowag, supra note 11.
16. See, e.g., Booking/Expedia/IHG, supra note 11; ACCC v. Flight Centre [2016] HCA
49 (Austl.).
17. See Ohio et al. v. Am. Express Co. et al., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2293 (2018) (where the
vertical restraint imposed by Amex on merchants required them not to discriminate against
purchases made using an Amex card through the steering of customers to use other cards).
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restrictions imposed by the platform on the supplier or vice versa in
relation to the transaction facilitated by the platform between the
supplier and third parties (i.e. customers) would be implicated by the
findings of this Article. 18
The findings of this Article are timely and important in several
aspects. First, the EU rules applicable to vertical restraints, which cover
agreements between agents and their principals, are due to expire in
2022, and the current review period presents an opportunity to revisit
the agency rule in the context of platforms.19 Indeed, the Commission
has already emphasized the importance of online sales and the
emergence of new market players as factors that need to be taken into
consideration regarding future legislative steps.20 Second, there is
growing global concern and litigation in relation to how competition
law should apply to platforms that compete with their suppliers on the
relevant market.21 Third, there is a real possibility that different areas
18. This Author has argued elsewhere that the source and direction of the competitive
restraint being imposed (i.e. whether it is the putative agent or the principal imposing the
restriction on the other) is not relevant to establishing the nature of the relationship between the
two parties (i.e. the existence or absence of agency) since the assessment of the restraint in
question only becomes possible if the relationship is identified not to be one of agency; Akman,
supra note 7, 807. Thus, it is irrelevant to the legal assessment of agency whether it is the
platform that is imposing the restraint on the supplier or vice versa. This position is in contrast
to the Bundeskartellamt decision in HRS where because the restriction in question was imposed
by the platform on the supplier rather than the other way around, the platform was found not to
be the agent of the supplier; see HRS, supra note 11, ¶ 147. Same goes for Online Booking,
supra note 6, ¶ 99 where the Swiss COMCO noted that the contractual clauses at issue—mostfavoured-customer clauses—were “clearly at odds with the primacy of principal,” which was a
factor justifying the finding that the relationship was not one of agency. Again, the nature of the
imposed restraint should not matter for the legal characterisation of the arrangement, which is
independent of the types of restrictions that such an arrangement may ensue.
19. The EU VBER came into force on June 1, 2010 and is due to expire on May 31, 2022.
See VBER, supra note 14, at 7. The VBER exempts vertical agreements that satisfy certain
criteria from the application of the prohibition of art. 101(1) through the mechanism of art.
101(3) without the need for individual assessment of agreements. Namely, those agreements
which satisfy the criteria of VBER are assumed to fall within the scope of the exception rule
found in art. 101(3). At the time of writing, the Commission is reviewing the VBER to decide
the course of action to take in relation to the Regulation. The Commission can decide to prolong
the duration of the existing VBER or revise it or allow it to lapse. See Comm’n Consultation
Strategy for the Evaluation of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2018_vber/consultation_strategy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JAT5-BT9R] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Comm’n Consultation
Strategy].
20. See Comm’n Consultation Strategy, supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., EU: Vestager Opens Probe into Amazon, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Sept.
19, 2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/eu-vestager-opens-probe-into-
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of law (most notably, agency, employment, tax, and, competition law)
and different jurisdictions may develop contradictory approaches to the
legal characterization of platforms with the consequence of
diminishing legal and business certainty, as well as threatening the
internal coherence of the legal system. Given the significance of the
digital economy and its increasing share in commerce and economic
growth, such an outcome should be avoided to the extent possible.
Unfortunately, such divergence can already be observed, leading to
undesirable fragmentation of the legal treatment of such platforms. For
example, in the context of free movement, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (“CoJ”) held that Uber is a transport service provider
amazon-use-of-data-about-merchants/ [https://perma.cc/5H5W-FVR6] (articulating concerns
regarding Amazon’s dual role as a competitor and host to third-party merchants in relation to
Amazon Marketplace). Soon after the Commissioner’s statement, the Bundeskartellamt opened
abuse of dominance proceedings against Amazon in relation to the same concerns regarding
Amazon Marketplace. See Bundeskartellamt Initiates Abuse Proceeding Against Amazon,
BUNDESKARTELLAMT
(Nov.
29,
2018),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/29_11_2
018_Verfahrenseinleitung_Amazon.html [https://perma.cc/KE8N-MJTS]. These proceedings
were closed after Amazon voluntarily agreed to make changes to its terms of business for
Amazon Marketplace worldwide. Case Summary (Online Sales, B2-88/18),
BUNDESKARTELLAMT
(July
17,
2019),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Missbrauchsaufsi
cht/2019/B2-88-18.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 [https://perma.cc/M8S7-7KZ5]. In the
United States, Senator Elizabeth Warren has expressed a similar view in relation to platforms
participating as sellers on their own platforms in a call to break up some technology companies.
Colin Lecher, Elizabeth Warren says she Wants to Break up Amazon, Google, and Facebook: A
Proposal
to
Unwind
Big
Tech,
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/8/18256032/elizabeth-warren-antitrust-google-amazonfacebook-break-up [https://perma.cc/4BCJ-V8KK]. See also Nilay Patel, Elizabeth Warren
Wants
to
Break
up
Apple,
too,
THE
VERGE
(Mar.
9,
2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/9/18257965/elizabeth-warren-break-up-apple-monopolyantitrust [https://perma.cc/5PYS-9R4G]. Spotify, a competitor of Apple, has recently lodged a
complaint to the EU Comm’n that Apple is infringing the competition rules through its role in
App Store by “essentially acting as both a player and referee to deliberately disadvantage other
app developers.” Daniel Elk, Consumers and Innovators Win on a Level Playing Field, FOR THE
RECORD (Mar. 13, 2019), https://newsroom.spotify.com/2019-03-13/consumers-andinnovators-win-on-a-level-playing-field/ [https://perma.cc/6GEB-QUQU]. See also Toplensky,
supra note 12 (indicating that the EU Commission may, indeed, launch an investigation into this
alleged practice by Apple); see generally Lina Khan, The Separation of Platforms and
Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2019) (suggesting structural separation for platforms).
For a critique of the proposal that platforms should not be allowed to sell their own goods
alongside third-party sellers’ goods, and why the proposal might hurt consumers and labour, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust Proposals, UNIV. OF PA. L. SCH. INST.
FOR L. & ECON., Research Paper No 19-14, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353716
[https://perma.cc/X7BE-7X4N] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
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(and not an information society services provider).22 In the United
Kingdom, there is growing employment jurisprudence concerning
Uber—currently at the Supreme Court—finding Uber to be an
employer of their drivers.23 These two legal findings together would
mean that agreements between Uber and its drivers, which may restrict
competition on the market for services provided to customers (i.e.
riders) through, for example, fixing of the fares, are completely
22. Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of Dec. 20, 2017 C-434/15, Asociación
Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL, ECLI:EU:C:2017:981, ¶ 40 [hereinafter Uber
Spain]. In contrast, for example, the US FTC notes that such platforms are often referred to as
“transportation network companies”; FTC Report, supra note 1, 13. In Uber Spain, the CoJ held
that the intermediation service which Uber provided was an “integral part of an overall service
whose main component is a transport service and, accordingly, must be classified not as “an
information society service” . . . but as “a service in the field of transport.” Id. ¶ 40. The
distinction is significant because, inter alia, freedom to provide information society services
from another Member State cannot be restricted, but the rules facilitating the exercise of the
freedom of establishment for service providers and the free movement of services do not apply
to transport services. In contrast, a first instance commercial court in Spain has found a platform
similar to Uber, namely Blablacar, to constitute a platform offering an information society
service rather than a transportation company. See Judgment of Feb. 2, 2017, Confebus v.
Comuto
Iberia
S.L.
and
Comuto
S.A.,
(Mar.
2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/79537ac5-cd17-4261-836aa8ebe7fe7274.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA5N-8ZVX]. Interestingly, Advocate General (AG)
Szpunar in his Opinion in AIRBNB Ireland found that Airbnb, in contrast to Uber, does offer a
service that corresponds to the definition of “information society services,” which would benefit
from the free movement of services; see Opinion of AG Szpunar in Case C-390/18, Criminal
proceedings against YA and AIRBNB Ireland UC — other parties: Hotelière Turenne SAS, Pour
un hébergement et tourisme professionnel (AHTOP), Valhotel, ECLI:EU:C:2019:336.
23. Aslam v. Uber B.V., (2016) No. 2202550/2015 (Employment Trib.) (U.K.) [hereinafter
Uber (ET)]; Uber B.V. v. Aslam, (2017) Appeal No. UKEAT/0056/17/DA (appeal taken from
ET) (U.K.) [hereinafter Uber (EAT)]; Uber B.V. v. Aslam, [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2748 (appeal
taken from UKEAT) (Eng.) [hereinafter Uber (CA)]. In the ongoing litigation, Uber argues that
it is an agent of the drivers; Uber (CA), id. ¶ 33. The Court of Appeal (CA) judgment has been
appealed to the Supreme Court. Employment Tribunal Result – Wednesday 19 December, UBER
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www.uber.com/en-GB/blog/employment-tribunal-uk/
[https://perma.cc/PRM5-JYKU]. The CA (in similar fashion to CoJ in Uber Spain, supra note
22) in agreeing with the Employment Tribunal’s findings, noted that Uber does not work for the
drivers but the drivers work for Uber, and Uber runs a transportation business. Uber (CA), id. ¶
95. Notably, the dissenting opinion of Underhill LJ in Uber (CA) aptly describes the issue being
not that of whether Uber provides transportation services—because it all depends on what one
means by that term and in one sense, Uber obviously provides transportation services—but
rather that of “whether it does so by providing the services of the drivers itself or by providing
a service for booking (and paying for) them.” Id. ¶ 137. See also the recently enacted California
Assembly Bill No. 5 Chapter 296 (approved by Governor on Sept. 18, 2019) which could be
interpreted to give employee status to “gig economy” workers including, e.g. Uber drivers. AB5 Worker Status: Employees and Independent Contractors, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5
[https://perma.cc/G56N-DDFB] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
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immunized from competition law scrutiny. This is because the
competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements is not
applicable to agreements between employers and employees under the
single economic entity doctrine, in similar fashion to agreements
between agents and principals.24 Yet, it is conceivable that a national
competition authority or court may find drivers on a platform such as
Uber, or sellers on a platform such as Amazon Marketplace, to be
competing undertakings and the platform a common intermediary
between competitors as parties to a possible cartel.25 In fact, in a case
concerning a competitor of Uber, the Luxembourg competition
authority found there to be a horizontal cartel agreement between the
drivers operating on the platform.26 In other proceedings, the
Bundeskartellamt similarly opined that Amazon Marketplace is
effectively a horizontal cartel agreement between Amazon and the
suppliers (i.e. third-party sellers).27 Yet, some of these findings
24. On art. 101 not applying to agreements between employers and employees, see Case
C-22/98, Criminal Proceedings against Jean Claude Becu, Annie Verweire, Smeg NV, Adia
Interim NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-5682. Technically, in the UK, there is a distinction between
“employees” and “workers” under the Employment Rights Act 1996, which is the applicable
Act in question relevant to the dispute in Uber (CA), supra note 23. This distinction does not
make a difference in terms of the competition law assessment as both concepts denote someone
being in an employment relationship with another party, which is the relevant factor in
competition law.
25. See, e.g., the class action in the United States against Uber alleging that the company
has orchestrated and facilitated an illegal price-fixing conspiracy between the drivers using an
algorithm that sets the prices for rides in violation of Sherman Act, Section 1. Meyer v. Uber
Tech., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2017); Meyer v. Kalanick, 291 F. Supp. 3d 526, 530
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). This dispute is likely to go to arbitration for resolution after the Second
Circuit’s finding that the compulsory arbitration clause in the standard contract is valid. Uber
Tech., 868 F.3d at 80; Kalanick, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 535. For the argument that if Uber’s drivers
are deemed to be in agreement with each other to price according to Uber’s algorithm, Uber’s
entire business model would be a violation of Sherman Act, Section 1, see Anderson & Huffman,
supra note 11, at 908. See Nowag, supra note 11, for an exploration of the possible antitrust
treatments of centralised, platform-driven price-fixing.
26. See Webtaxi – Luxembourg Competition Council (2018-FO-01) (June 8, 2018)
available at https://concurrence.public.lu/dam-assets/fr/decisions/ententes/2018/decision-n2018-fo-01-du-7-juin-2018-version-non-confidentielle.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TNS6-6RHH]
(last visited Mar. 18, 2019). The Authority has exempted the agreement due to the benefits it
brings to consumers, which outweigh the restrictive effects on competition; id.
27. Although no infringement decision was taken in this case as the proceedings were
terminated when Amazon voluntarily removed the price parity (most-favoured-customer)
clauses which it had imposed on the retailers selling on the Marketplace, in the relevant Case
Report, the Bundeskartellamt expressed its finding that Amazon Marketplace was a “horizontal
trade cooperation between Amazon and third-party sellers that has as its object and effect various
restrictions of competition,” and that the price parity clauses in question were horizontal price-
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concerning the legal characterization of these platforms by different
authorities in different contexts are legally mutually exclusive.28 For
example, although the CoJ finding in Uber Spain does not preclude a
finding that a business model, such as Uber’s, represents a horizontal
cartel between competitors, it does exclude a finding that the same
business model represents both an employment relationship between
the platform and suppliers, and, a cartel. This is because the latter
requires the suppliers of the relevant products/services (e.g. drivers) to
be “undertakings” competing with one another, and not “employees”
of another undertaking (i.e. the platform) regarding the relevant
economic activity.29 In contrast to the various authority findings,
interestingly, Uber itself argues that its relationship with drivers is
legally one of agency.30 This is identical to what Apple had argued in
Apple (iPhone), recently decided by the United States Supreme Court
in a 5-to-4 split, where Apple was held to be a “retailer” selling the
apps of app developers directly to iPhone owners through the App
Store.31 A finding of agency, as this Article posits to exist, places
fixing agreements. Case Report: Amazon Removes Price Parity Obligation for Retailers on Its
Marketplace Platform, Ref. B6-46/12, BUNDESKARTELLAMT 1, 2-3 (Dec. 9, 2013) (Ger.),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/20
13/B6-46-12.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc/PQH5-2EHC] (last visited
Mar. 19, 2019). Notably, the Bundeskartellamt does not appear to distinguish between the
different entities involved as regards their position in this arrangement: it does not distinguish
Amazon, the retailer, which may (or may not) be in competition with third-party sellers
depending on the relevant range of products, from Amazon Marketplace, the platform (i.e.
marketplace) which brings together the suppliers (including Amazon, the retailer, and the thirdparty sellers). Id. Technically, Amazon Marketplace is not a competitor to the third-party sellers
as it is Amazon (the retailer) which may be in competition with them if Amazon (the retailer)
has its own product range which it sells alongside third-party sellers’ products on Amazon
Marketplace. Having said that, as the Bundeskartellamt also notes in the Case Report, these two
segments are presented by Amazon as a “single integrated platform that makes no distinction
between Amazon’s own retail business and the Marketplace business.” Id. at 1.
28. On the need to appreciate the different business models and competition concerns that
may arise with different types of technology platforms, see D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust’s Curse
of Bigness Problem, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
29. A finding that drivers are employees, by definition, excludes the possibility that they
are undertakings. This appears also to be part of the underlying reasoning of the employment
cases which found Uber to be the drivers’ employer where the Tribunals found that Uber drivers
did not “operate businesses on their own account” in explaining why the drivers were employees.
See e.g., Uber (EAT), supra note 23, ¶ 109.
30. See accompanying text to infra note 200.
31. Pepper v. Apple Inc., 846 F.3d 313, 324 (9th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Apple (iPhone)].
The correct legal characterization of this relationship is, indeed, of fundamental importance not
just in Europe, but also in jurisdictions such as the United States, where standing to sue in private
actions is limited to direct purchasers, and identifying the exact role of the platform in a
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platforms somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of competition law
applicability. This is because the agency rule only “immunizes” those
agreements between platforms and their suppliers that restrict
competition on the relevant (products/services) market from the
application of the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements.32 Other
restrictions of competition arising out of the agreement between a
platform and suppliers (e.g. restrictions of competition on the platform
market or the supplier market), as well as any unilateral practices which
may constitute abuse of dominance, would continue to be subject to
competition law.33 If the (re)interpretation of the single economic entity
transaction which takes place over the platform is, therefore, essential to establishing the
existence or absence of an antitrust cause of action. The legal characterization of a platform as
an agent, as opposed to, for example, a distributor has immediate bearing on who the “supplier”
and the “direct purchaser” are, with consequences in relation to standing for a private right of
action in the United States. This was exactly the pertinent legal issue in Apple (iPhone) litigation
in which a class of consumers who purchased iPhone apps sued Apple for monopolization and
attempted monopolization of the market for iPhone apps. Id. at 315. The legal question was
whether the consumers are direct purchasers of iPhone apps from Apple, rather than from app
developers, which the Ninth Circuit answered in the affirmative (in disagreement with the Eighth
Circuit’s analysis in a similar case), with the implication that the plaintiffs had standing to sue
under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Apple (iPhone), id. at 322-24. The
Ninth Circuit found that Apple was a distributor of iPhone apps, selling them directly to
purchasers through its App Store. Id. at 324. The alternative legal characterization would have
involved a finding that it was the app developers who sold the apps to consumers through
Apple’s agency, in which case the consumers would have had no standing to sue Apple. In the
United States, standing to sue for antitrust damages is reserved for the direct purchasers of the
alleged infringer of competition law. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 729. The judgment of the Eighth
Circuit with which the Ninth Circuit disagreed is Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166
(8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 865 (1999), which is discussed in the accompanying text
to infra notes 371-75. The US Supreme Court majority held, without discussing Campos or the
particular issue of agency, that iPhone users were direct purchasers who may sue Apple for
alleged monopolization and their claim is not barred by Illinois Brick. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No.
17-204, slip op. at 14 (2019) [hereinafter Pepper].
32. This is the case for EU competition law as established by CoJ in Suiker Unie in that
the agency exception is only relevant in relation to (restrictions of competition found in) agency
agreements concerning the relevant market where the contracts are entered into with third
parties, and not in relation to the agreement between the agent and the principal more generally.
See Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 113 & 114/73, Cooperatieve Vereniging “Suiker Unie”
UA and others v. EC Comm’n, 1975 E.C.R. 1668, ¶¶ 482-83 [hereinafter Suiker Unie]. See also
Case C-217/05, Confederacion Espanola de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v. Compania
Espanola de Petroleos SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-12018, ¶ 62 [hereinafter CEPSA]. It is in the context
of these contracts with third parties on the relevant market that the agent is deemed to be part of
the same “undertaking” as the principal.
33. The single economic entity doctrine limiting the application of art. 101 is not
applicable in case of art. 102 because the application of art. 102 does not require an agreement
between undertakings and concerns unilateral conduct adopted by an undertaking in a dominant
position. The CoJ has explicitly held that a practice to which art. 101 is not applicable due to
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doctrine and the agency rule as proposed in this Article is adopted, then
those restrictions of competition on the relevant market arising out of
agreements of platforms that are not in a competitively neutral position
with regard to their suppliers would also be subject to the application
of Article 101. Given the developing state of conflicting legal
assessments of the platform model and the current opportunity to
review the applicable rules at the EU level, the correct legal assessment
of the relationship and agreements between such platforms and their
suppliers is of fundamental practical, legal and commercial importance.
This Article comprises seven sections. In Section II, this Article
presents the relevant concepts of agency and similar business models
recognized in common law and commercial law, whilst also
distinguishing agency from similar contractual arrangements. The
purpose of this inquiry is to identify the main characteristics of agency
found in these areas of law and to establish what distinguishes agency
from other similar delegation models, to inform a more robust
understanding of agency in competition law. This is necessary because
these other areas of law are more advanced than competition law in
relation to assessing such different business models. Thus, identifying
the general principles underlying the delegation model of agency in
these other areas of law can inform the construction of the concept of
agency in competition law. Section III sets out the single economic
entity doctrine and the operation of the agency rule thereunder in
competition law to discuss the conditions under which competition law
would treat intermediaries as agents. Section IV exposes the relevant
terms and conditions of the standard contracts of the platforms under
study. Section V applies the agency principles established in Sections
II and III to the terms and conditions set out in Section IV to
demonstrate how, when the general principles of agency and the agency
rule within the single economic entity doctrine are applied to the
contracts of platforms under study, the application leads to the finding
that these platforms are, as a matter of positive law, agents of their
suppliers. This inquiry encompasses findings on agency from different
areas of law, not just from competition law, to ensure consistency in
the way different areas of law treat identical business models, which is
desirable for legal and business certainty. As the finding of agency
implies immunity from competition law scrutiny of anticompetitive
the single economic entity doctrine may still be challenged as an abuse under art. 102. Case
66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs, 1989
E.C.R. 82, ¶ 35; Viho, supra note 5, ¶ 17.
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agreements for potentially substantial restrictions of competition in
digital markets, Section VI normatively assesses the appropriateness of
this immunity and proposes a (re)interpretation of the agency rule
within the single economic entity doctrine based on the concept of
“competitive neutrality.” It argues that the single economic entity
doctrine and the agency rule should not apply to agreements between
platforms and suppliers restricting competition on the relevant market
to the extent that the platform competes with the suppliers on that
relevant market. Thus, these agreements should be made subject to full
scrutiny by competition law. Section VII concludes.
II. AGENCY AND SIMILAR DELEGATION MODELS
Although “agency” within the “single economic entity” doctrine
is a concept of EU law, and, compliance with national law governing
the relationship is not determinative when assessing whether the
agreement is caught by EU competition law,34 there is limited guidance
on the general concept of agency in EU competition law. This is
because the competition law jurisprudence has developed in piecemeal
fashion, responding to legal disputes concerning whether a given
intermediary is an agent or not, to answer the question of whether that
entity is part of another “undertaking” under the “single economic
entity” doctrine. This inquiry method has led to case-by-case
assessments without robust theoretical or conceptual foundations
concerning the component elements of an agency agreement, which
could be used as guidance for future cases in which the question of
agency may arise.35 Further, as will be demonstrated here, the EU
concept of agency is one that broadly reflects the same underlying
principles found in different areas of law. Consequently, this Section
outlines the constituent elements of agency, and how they differ from
other common means of delegation in common law and commercial
law, whilst also explaining how agency can be distinguished from
similar delegation arrangements such as independent contracting and
34. Suiker Unie, supra note 32, ¶ 478.
35. Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. (C130) 1 [hereinafter Verticals
Guidelines], accompanying the EU VBER, supra note 14, contains the most detailed expressions
of agency for EU competition law purposes. Yet, the entire discussion of agency in the
Guidelines—although helpful—takes up around 3 pages in total, and beyond providing a
definition and some factors in relation to when an agreement will constitute an agency
agreement, only deals with the question of when agency agreements will be deemed to fall within
or outside of the prohibition of art. 101. Id. It does not offer any detailed principles concerning,
for example, the factors that distinguish agency from other delegation and distribution models.
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employment. The principles and findings from this Section provide
essential guidance in terms of setting out the relevant criteria for
agency, which can aid to fill in the “gaps” in competition law
concerning aspects of an agency arrangement where competition law
has not yet established its own criteria.
A. The Common Law (and Equity) Principles Relating to Agency
Agency is a common means of delegation in commerce where the
“agent” acts on behalf of a “principal” in return for payment, normally
a “commission.” Put more formally, agency is the (fiduciary)
relationship that exists between two persons, “one of whom expressly
or impliedly manifests assent that the other should act on his behalf so
as to affect his relations with third parties, and the other of whom
similarly manifests assent so to act or so acts pursuant to the
manifestation.”36
There are two aspects of agency: internal and external. The
internal aspect is the relationship between the principal and the agent,
which imposes special duties (arising out of the fiduciary liability) on
the agent vis-à-vis the principal.37 In contrast, the external aspect is that
under which the agent has powers to affect the principal’s legal position
in relation to third parties.38 To an agent in the full sense, both aspects
are relevant, but some persons (e.g. “introducing agents”) may be
agents by virtue of their internal relationship despite having no external
powers.39
The typical, internal features of agency which distinguish it from
other relationships are that: first, the agent undertakes to use due
diligence on behalf of the other (as opposed to undertaking strict duties
36. PETER G. WATTS & FRANCIS M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS ON AGENCY
¶ 1-001 (21st ed. 2018) [hereinafter BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS]. The fiduciary nature of the
relationship is subject to debate and appears to be a matter of degree. Id. See EWAN
MCKENDRICK, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW ¶ 5.23 (5th ed. 2016). The justification for the
agent’s power is the idea of a unilateral manifestation by the principal of willingness to have his
legal position altered by the agent. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no requirement for a contract
to achieve this creation of power. It is sufficient for the principal to manifest to the agent that he
is willing for the agent to act and that the agent does so in circumstances which indicate that her
acts arise from the manifestation of the principal. Id. 1-006.
37. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-019. The duties arising out of the internal
aspect “follow from the need to control the agent’s opportunities to exploit his position . . . .” Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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to the other in a situation commercially adverse to that other); she is
subject to fiduciary duties; and she is remunerated by commission or
an equivalent (as opposed to making her own profit).40 Bowstead and
Reynolds note that agency situations should first be viewed from the
point of view of the third party.41
A person who has a fiduciary relationship with a principal so that
she acts on behalf of the principal, but has no authority to affect the
principal’s relations with third parties may still be an agent because of
the fiduciary relationship.42 This type of agent may be an example of
“incomplete agency” (e.g. an “introducing agent” or “canvassing
agent”) in that the internal parts of agency law apply to these agents,
but they are not agents in the full sense of the word due to the limited
nature of their external powers to affect their principals’ legal
positions.43 These intermediaries do not conclude contracts and do not
dispose of property, but are hired as an employee or an independent
contractor, to introduce parties who would like to contract and leave
them to contract between themselves.44 Estate agents are obvious
examples of this type of agent.45 Such canvassing agents have very
limited powers to alter their principals’ legal relations.46 Nevertheless,
by virtue of the fact that they may have the authority to receive and
communicate information on their principals’ behalf, they may have

40. Id. ¶ 1-024.
41. Id. ¶ 1-025.
42. Id. ¶ 1-001. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST.
2006) only refers to “acting on behalf” of the principal for an intermediary to be an agent without
also requiring the agent to act so as to affect the principal’s relations with third parties. Thus,
under that wider definition of agency, the intermediary’s not having authority to change the legal
position of the principal would not render the position one of “incomplete” agency.
43. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-020. Under this reasoning, an agent in a
strict sense, is someone who has the power to affect her principal’s legal relations. Id. ¶ 1-019.
Legal rules attach to such an agent relating to internal and external aspects of agency. Id.
44. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-020. Notably, such agents do not
undertake any duties, but are entitled to certain contractual rights if they do certain things and
may be liable for misconduct. Id. ¶ 6-001.
45. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-020. Another type of “incomplete
agency” can be found in so-called “indirect representation” “whereby a principal appoints a
person, who may be called an agent, to deal on his behalf on the understanding that the agent
will deal with any third party in her own name as principal . . . .” Id. ¶ 1-021. Again, in such a
situation, “the internal aspect of agency [exists] . . . but not the external . . . .” Id. ¶ 1-021.
Bowstead and Reynolds find no doctrinal objection in common law to the creation of such a
situation of indirect representation. Id. ¶ 1-022.
46. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-020.
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the capacity to alter the principals’ legal position.47 Similarly, they are
also subject to typical rules, mostly developed in estate agency cases,
as to entitlement to commission and they may sometimes hold money
for their principals.48 Another relevant distinction is that between
“general agent,” and “special agent,” where the former has authority to
act for her principal in all matters concerning a particular trade
business, etc. and the latter has only authority to do some particular act,
or to represent her principal in some particular transaction.49
Where the power to create legal relations exists (i.e. the agent not
only acts on behalf of the principal, but acts so as to affect the
principal’s relations with third parties), the normal implications of
agency are likely to follow “even if the parties’ contract expressly
disavows one being the ‘agent’ of the other.”50 Conversely, the mere
use of the label “agency” in the parties’ contract may not lead to the
application of agency law if there is no authority to alter the principal’s
legal position.51 The rules of agency will apply, in common law, even
if the existence of the principal or his connection with the transaction
is unknown, if there is preceding authority to act for the principal.52
Bowstead and Reynolds point out a particular feature of agency
resulting from the agent’s fiduciary duties in that
47. Id. Similarly, they may be subject to the fiduciary duties of agents to their principals
because they may act in a capacity which involves the repose of trust and confidence. Id. In fact,
even an agent, properly defined, may owe fiduciary duties in some respects, but not others. Id.
¶ 6-037.
48. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-020.
49. Id. ¶ 1-039.
50. Id. ¶ 1-004 (referencing South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd. v
News Ltd. [2000] FCA 1541 (3 November 2000) (Austl.), aff’d, [2003] HCA 45 (13 August
2003) (Austl.).
51. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-004 (citing Alliance Craton Explorer
Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 29 (12 March 2013) (Austl.)); see also UBS
AG (London Branch) and another v. Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig GmbH [2017] EWCA
(Civ) 1567, [91] (Eng.) [hereinafter UBS AG].
52. See BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-009. Such a principal whose
existence or connection with the transaction is not known is referred to as an “undisclosed”
principal. Id. Note that in some jurisdictions (e.g. France) even though the principal need not
actually be named, agency rules would normally only apply in the case of an agent who when
acting purported (or at least was understood) to do so on behalf of or “in the name of” a principal,
even though the principal need not actually be named. Id. They also note that regarding
undisclosed agents, the results in some civil law systems now approach some of the results in
common law. Id. Mere economic interdependence between two parties does not create a
relationship of agency. Id. ¶ 1-012 (referencing inter alia, UBS AG, supra note 51, and Plevin
v. Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61, [33] (Eng.)).
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[i]t is inconsistent with those duties that an agent should act in
respect of h[er] relationship with the principal for h[er] own profit
(unless [s]he discloses this to the principal and the principal
consents). H[er] relationship with h[er] principal is commercially
related rather than commercially adverse. Thus, [s]he should be
remunerated by commission in respect of the services [s]he has
rendered, and not take h[er] own undisclosed profit as an
independent intermediary. The commission need not however be
related to the value of the transaction: it can be by a mark-up. The
essence of the payment received by the agent is that it is not an
independent profit taken by the agent, but rather a fee paid to h[er]
by the principal in return for acting on his behalf.53

Thus, in the heart of the agency relationship lies the fact that the
agent and the principal have commercial interests that are aligned,
rather than adverse. This is directly reflected in the way agency is
conceptualized as a mode of delegation where the agent provides a
service to its principal and is remunerated for that service by
commission, in contrast to an intermediary who pursues profit from its
commercial relation with the other party independently of the
commercial interests of that other party. As explained more fully
below,54 the criterion of absence of risk-taking by the agent on the
relevant market under the “single economic entity doctrine” in
competition law can be conceptualized as similarly requiring an
alignment of (competitive) interests between the agent and the
principal. This alignment of commercial and competitive interests will,
indeed, be used to inform the criterion of “competitive neutrality” in
Section VI, which this Article proposes to be adopted in the
(re)interpretation of the single economic entity doctrine to apply to
platforms.
A useful example in relation to this issue of commercial interest
alignment is that of distributors, concessionaires and franchisees, all of
which are arrangements that differ from agency for the same reason.
53. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-016. The agent of one party can act as
the agent of the other party (including the other party to the transaction) (e.g. solicitors), but the
rules of equity would apply: equity presumes that a person in a fiduciary position must avoid
conflicts of interest unless the parties assent to the conflict. Id. ¶ 2-013. The fact that commission
is paid by one party is not inconsistent with the agent’s acting for the other party as well. Id. ¶
2-033. RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, §8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stipulating that “an agent
has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the
agency relationship”).
54. See text around infra note 143.
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With these arrangements, the relationship is an adverse commercial
relationship, and the analogy of agency is normally not pursued where
a purchase for resale exists.55 Nevertheless, the contractual restrictions
sometimes imposed on distributors, such as a non-compete clause, can
place them under the manufacturer’s control in such a way that the
relation may resemble that of agency.56 The underlying principle is that
a person cannot be an agent if she is a seller or buyer to her principal
and vice versa because a sale is a commercially adverse relationship,
whereas agency involves a fiduciary relationship of trust and
confidence.57 The distinction normally turns on whether the person
concerned acts for herself to make such profit as she can or whether
she is remunerated by pre-arranged commission.58 Similarly, whereas
a seller answers for defects in description and quality, an agent may not
do so because she is not a party to the contract.59 Much also turns on
the extent to which the principal can call for an account because the
duty to account is a typical feature of an agent’s position.60
A further distinction can be drawn between agents and persons
supplying services (e.g. a repairer, painter, etc.) who do so normally on
a commercially adverse basis.61 Such persons normally owe a duty of
best endeavors only, owe no fiduciary duties, and are not remunerated
by commission.62 There is, however, also an intermediary category
where their work is directed toward a fixed target which may be valued
and they may be remunerated by commission (e.g. travel agents, patent
agents), as well as those who offer personal services and charge fees
55. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-035.
56. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-035. See, e.g.,Hospital Products Ltd. v.
United States Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41 (Austl.); Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods
Ltd. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142 (Can.).
57. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-036 (arguing that if in a
manufacturer/supplier relationship, if the supplier, on true construction of the contract, is a buyer
from the manufacturer, then the manufacturer may be in breach of contract if he sells the goods
himself, but if the supplier is a genuine agent, the manufacturer would usually be entitled to sell
himself, too). See id. (referencing WT Lamb & Sons v. Goring Brick Co. [1932] 1 KB 710 (Eng.)
and Bentall, Horsley & Baldry v. Vicary [1931] 1 KB 253 (Eng.)).
58. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-036. Yet, the fact that the resale price is
fixed by the manufacturer does not necessarily make the supplier an agent and exceptionally, a
buyer for resale may also be paid commission or an agent remunerated by being allowed to keep
the excess over a stipulated price. Id. ¶ 1-036. See, e.g., the cases cited therein.
59. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-036.
60. Id.
61. Id. ¶ 1-038.
62. Id.
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rather than commission (e.g. solicitors) who may attract some, but not
all, of the features of agency law.63 Having said that, in general, an
agent does not normally warrant success in what she does, but only to
use reasonable endeavors.64
In sum, there are some fundamental features of agency in common
law, which distinguish it from other arrangements. These include the
agent’s warrant to use due diligence (as opposed to warrant success or
a particular outcome), and the alignment of commercial interests
between the agent and the principal. The alignment of commercial
interests implies, inter alia, that the agent’s remuneration is comprised
of fees for her services to the principal rather than of profit generated
from the activity (e.g. through resale). Beyond these, there are several
grey areas in agency law, including the scope and boundaries of the
agent’s fiduciary duties, as well as the line between those
intermediaries who are agents and those who are otherwise not on the
basis of the (lack of) completeness of the internal and external aspects
of agency in a given arrangement. All in all, it appears that—outside of
the clear-cut cases—establishing whether a given intermediary is an
agent requires a balancing of the factors some of which may suggest
the presence and some of which may suggest the absence of agency.
This is also a feature of the analysis adopted in competition law, which
ultimately requires an assessment of the relevant factual and
commercial context in qualifying an arrangement as agency or
otherwise.65
B. The Concept of the “Commercial Agent”
A particular notion of agency is that of a “commercial agent”
which has certain legal implications due to the Commercial Agents
Regulations transposing the EU Directive on the same subject.66 The
term stems from continental European law and is not known to the
63. Id. Yet, some travel agents may supply services as principal and not merely as agent;
see Wong Mee Wan v. Kwan Kin Travel Services Ltd [2011] EWCA (Civ) 1569, ¶ 16; Moore
v. Hotelplan Ltd (t/a Inghams Travel) [2010] EWHC 276 (QB).
64. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 6-001.
65. See accompanying text to infra note 152.
66. The Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (SI 1993 No 3053)
[hereinafter Regulations] transposing Council Directive on the Coordination of the Law of the
Members States Relating to Self-Employed Commercial Agents, 1986 O.J. (L382) 17
[hereinafter Directive].
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common law.67 Importantly, the Directive and Regulations only cover
agents who intermediate the sale/purchase of products as opposed to
provision of services.68 Although every commercial agent in the sense
of the Regulations is an agent (under common law), not every agent is
a commercial agent, but can still be an agent for legal (i.e. common
law) purposes, despite not being able to benefit from the protection of
the Regulations. Much of the commercial case law in the United
Kingdom has revolved around establishing whether a given party is a
“commercial agent” for the purposes of the Regulations. Although the
Regulations only apply to the internal aspects of the relationship
between the principal and agent,69 the case law concerning commercial
agents is particularly illuminating for competition law purposes in its
establishing of relevant criteria for agency as distinct from other
methods of delegation.
A commercial agent does not trade on her own account; thus, she
is not a distributor.70 The most important question to ask regarding this
distinction has been noted to be that of the title to the products being
sold: if the agent never owns the products, but simply finds customers
for the supplier, “no matter how extensive the agent’s role otherwise is,
then the agent will be in all probability a commercial agent of the
supplier.”71 In this context, to “negotiate” a contract means more than
simply negotiating a sale, as established in Fryer where the Court held
that an agent who introduced customers, suggested indicative prices
and encouraged a customer to place orders at the prices agreed or
specified by the principal comes “well within the ordinary meaning of
‘negotiate.’”72 In fact, one commentator has likened the operator of an
67. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-044. According to the Directive and
Regulations, “commercial agent” means a self-employed intermediary who has continuing
authority to negotiate the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of another person (the “principal”),
or to negotiate and conclude the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of and in the name of that
principal; Regulations, supra note 66, art. 2(1); Directive, supra note 66, art. 1(2).
68. See Regulations, supra note 66, art. 2(1); Directive, supra note 66 art. 1(2).
69. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 11-005.
70. SUSAN SINGLETON, COMMERCIAL AGENCY AGREEMENTS: LAW AND PRACTICE 2
(4th ed. 2015).
71. Id. at 2.
72. Nigel Fryer Joinery Services Ltd v. Ian Firth Hardware Ltd. [2008] EWHC 767 (Ch),
¶ 20. For the position that what matters in establishing whether the agent satisfies the
Regulations’ requirement to “negotiate” is whether the agent has the authority to negotiate rather
than whether the agent actually negotiates, see FERGUS RANDOLPH AND JONATHAN DAVEY,
THE EUROPEAN LAW OF COMMERCIAL AGENCY 42 (3rd ed. 2010). The authors note that the
reality in many mature commercial agencies is that the agent does little day-to-day negotiating
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internet site for various principals such as a “virtual shopping mall,”
which facilitates the contract between principals and consumers, but
sets up the website itself and receives the money from the customer to
deduct commission before sending the money to the principal to an
“agent walking from shop to shop with [her] bag of samples.”73 The
online platforms studied in this Article are some obvious examples of
such virtual shopping malls.
In fact, even the intermediary’s charging a mark-up of its own
choosing on top of the input price it pays to the principal to establish
the price to the third party (rather than charging a commission) does
not render the intermediary a non-agent. Thus, the way in which the
final product is priced for the consumer is not determinative in
establishing agency. In Mercantile International Group PLC v. Chuan
Soon Huat Industrial Group (“MIG”), the principal was content for the
agent to retain an undisclosed margin on contracts made with third
parties.74 In this case, the contracts with third parties had stipulated that
the contracts were made with the principal and the intermediary was
acting as agent only.75 The putative agent received no commission (or
other remuneration), but simply charged more to customers than it
confirmed to the putative principal which the latter did not mind as it
was receiving the price that it stipulated to the agent.76 The agent was
keeping for itself an undisclosed margin.77 The Court of Appeal held
and long-established customers communicate their repeat orders via different media on the basis
of a published price list. Although this involves no meaningful negotiation as such, the agent
undeniably has authority to negotiate, which is what matters; id. 42.
73. SINGLETON, supra note 70, at 35. The question whether the Regulations (or the
underlying Directive) applies to such websites to protect these agents is not directly relevant to
this work and will not be discussed further. Whether the Regulations protect such websites as
agents does not have any bearing on the question whether these websites are agents since the
Regulations explicitly only cover certain types of agents (e.g. notably only those who
intermediate sale of goods as opposed to services; and, where customers select the goods
themselves and merely place their orders through the agent, etc.). See Regulations, supra note
66, art. 2(1). Singleton, in fact, argues that the fact that the website invests substantial efforts to
ensure customers find the right page for the item and the website is attractive, etc. may mean
that the Regulations will provide protection despite customers technically choosing what they
would like to purchase themselves on such websites.
74. Mercantile International Group Plc v. Chuan Soon Huat Industrial Group Ltd [2002]
1 All ER (Comm) 788, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 288 [Hereinafter MIG].
75. MIG, supra note 74, ¶¶ 5, 13, 15.
76. Id. ¶ 5.
77. Id. In MIG, when the agent had an order, it would send the details to the principal who
would confirm the feasibility of the order or suggest changes. Id. ¶ 12. However, it is noteworthy
that the products at issue in the case were timber products such as door and window frames,
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that that documentation had to be conclusive unless it could be shown
to be a sham; other factors allegedly inconsistent with the claimant’s
being an agent (e.g. the mark-up) could not be relied on to displace that
documentation.78 The Court noted that the test of whether the
intermediary was an agent or distributor “was one of substance rather
than form.”79 Interestingly, on the facts, the agent was receiving
payment for the products from the customer after paying the principal
itself and thus, in the interim bearing the commercial risk (even if it
charged interest to the buyer).80 Further, the agent had signed some
important contracts with purchasers “for and on behalf” of itself;
negotiated a refund in its own discretion with purchasers who
complained of defective products and sometimes bore the cost of such
refunds; negotiated its own marketing support, rebate or discount
arrangements with important purchasers; and, did not account to the
principal for any sale proceeds obtained from the purchasers.81 It was
argued by counsel that the contracts between the alleged agent,
principal and customers were “contracts in chain” and the agent bore
financial risks incompatible with agency which suggested that the
contract, in reality, was essentially a distributor/resale contract.82 The
Court of Appeal rejected this contention (as well as the contention that
the existence of a mark-up, which is how the agent gets paid, is in
conflict with agency).83 This case is important for demonstrating that
even in situations where the intermediary appears close to a retailer in
which were made to order and would have required such confirmation from the principal (the
manufacturer) regarding specifications, etc.
78. MIG, supra note 74, ¶ 36. In AMB Imballaggi Plastici SRL v. Pacflex Ltd. [1999]
EWCA (Civ) 1618, the CA held that the intermediary in question was not a commercial agent
in consideration of the fact that the trade between the putative principal and agent was conducted
on the basis of a sale by the principal to the agent who resold the goods to the end users after
adding a mark-up of her own choosing, namely on the basis of a resale model. Thus, the
intermediary was a distributor and not an agent (despite the goods being delivered by the
principal to the end users directly). The CA distinguished MIG from Pacflex on the basis that in
the latter, there was no documentation that described the relationship between the manufacturer
and the intermediary as one of agency; MIG, supra note 74, ¶ 31.
79. MIG, supra note 74, ¶ 6.
80. Id. ¶ 16.
81. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
82. Arguments of defendant’s counsel at MIG, supra note 74, ¶ 20.
83. MIG, supra note 74, ¶ 36 citing Ex parte Bright, re Smith (1879) 10 Ch D 566 on the
issue of mark-up. According the CA, this mark-up also justified the fact that the agent was
prepared to offer customers rebates, credit customers in case of defective goods, etc.; MIG, supra
note 74, ¶ 36. On the point that mark-up is not conclusive against commercial agency, see also
Sagal (Trading as Bunz UK) v. Atelier Bunz GmbH [2009] EWCA (Civ) 700, ¶ 15.
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terms of the commercial risks which it takes, and the way in which it
operates (e.g., negotiating and bearing the costs of refunds for defective
performance), there may still be agency, in particular where the
contract between the supplier and the intermediary stipulates it to be
so, and the contract is not a sham.
An interesting question, particularly for platforms under
discussion here, is whether the fact that a platform acts for potentially
competing principals is: (i) a feature that would prevent a finding of
agency, or (ii) an infringement of an agent’s duty to act in good faith
or fiduciary duty. Although good faith is not normally implied into
commercial relationships in English law, the Regulations explicitly
imply a duty of good faith which obliges the agent to look after the
interests of her principal and act dutifully and in good faith.84 In fact,
in one case, the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that such acting
for competing principals may breach an agency agreement by falling
foul of the fiduciary position of the agent vis-à-vis the principal without
any reference to the duty of good faith in the Regulations.85 Thus, the
issue of acting for competing principals is directly relevant to
establishing the existence or infringement of an agency agreement in
English law even for those agents that do not fall within the scope of
the Regulations. In RML, the Court of Appeal held that an agent
occupies a fiduciary position and owes her principal the single-minded
duty of loyalty, so that she must not place herself in a position where
her duty and her interest conflict, and she may not act for the benefit of
a third party without the informed consent of her principal.86 The Court
84. SINGLETON, supra note 70, 45. See Regulations, supra note 66, arts. 3(1) and 4(1),
and Directive, supra note 66, arts. 3 and 4.
85. SINGLETON, supra note 70, 46. See UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (2016) art. 2.2.7 stipulating that a contract concluded with a third party,
which involves the agent in a conflict of interest with the principal, may be avoided by the
principal. See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2016),
UNIDROIT
(May
2016),
https://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2016/principles2016-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DRE7-T9VF] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
86. Rossetti Marketing Ltd v. Diamond Sofa Company [2012] EWCA (Civ) 1021, ¶ 20
(referencing to Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch1, 18A-B) [hereinafter
RML]. In Mothew, a solicitor was acting for the bank as well as the purchaser in the purchase of
a property, but the bank knew that the solicitor was acting for the purchaser and in fact, appointed
the solicitor to act for itself for this very reason. Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew
[1998] Ch1,19A. Id., ¶ 18 (noting that the “distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary” is the
obligation of loyalty, and that the principal “is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his
fiduciary”).
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of Appeal went further to note that, as held by the Privy Council in
Kelly, it is normally a “breach of an agent’s duty to act for competing
principals.”87 However, crucially for the purposes of this work, the
Court of Appeal decided that an agent can act for two principals with
conflicting interests in two types of cases: first, where both principals
give fully informed consent for this; and, second, where “the principal
must have appreciated that the nature of the agent’s business [i.e. a
residential estate agent] is ‘to act for numerous principals.’”88 In the
second case, despite the conflict of interest, such agents must be free to
act for several competing principals since otherwise they will be unable
to perform their function.89 Although in Kelly it was held that the
starting point is that agents appointed to sell a particular type of product
are not expected to be acting for competing principals in the same
market, in the case of estate agents and travel agents, it may be expected
that they will be acting for competing principals in the same market.90
Thus, in cases where the nature of the business so requires, acting for
competing principals does not prevent the qualification of the
intermediary as an agent (or breach the agent’s fiduciary duty), which
is a point directly relevant to platforms studied in this Article, as
discussed below.91 The Court of Appeal’s findings in RML are also
noteworthy in establishing that the fiduciary nature of agency implies
that the agent must not place herself in a position where her duty and
interest conflict vis-à-vis the principal. This ties in directly with the
feature of agency, discussed above,92 concerning the commercial
interest alignment between the agent and the principal, and also
underlies the concept of “competitive neutrality” proposed in this
Article to distinguish those platforms which should be treated as agents
87. RML, supra note 82, ¶ 20 (referring to Kelly v. Cooper [1993] AC 205, 214).
88. Id. ¶ 23, with reference to Kelly for the second case, supra note 87.
89. See RML, supra note 86, ¶¶ 23, 25. In Kelly, the Privy Council implied a term into
estate agent contracts that the agent was entitled to act for competing principals (and that her
keeping confidential information obtained from different principals was not a breach of her
fiduciary duty to any principal) since it was the business of estate agents to act for numerous
principals. The Privy Council suggested that stockbrokers would also be categorized in this way.
Kelly, supra note 87.
90. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 6-015. In a Scottish case, namely Lothian,
an agent (perhaps, technically, a distributor) was also found to be entitled to deal in competing
products. Id. ¶ 6-015 with reference to Lothian v. Jenolite Ltd 1969 SC 111 (Scot.).
91. See text after infra note 356. See also comment on UNIDROIT Principles, supra note
85, art. 2.2.7 (noting that a relevant conflict of interests does not exist where “the agent’s acting
for two principals may be in conformity with the usages of the trade sector concerned”).
92. See accompanying text to supra note 53.
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and those which should not for the purposes of competition law, as will
be seen below.93
C. Agency Distinguished from Other Relationships: Independent
Contracting and Employment
A relevant distinction for the purposes of this Article is the
relationship between an agent, an employee, and an independent
contractor, which originates from tort law, but is also significant in
employment law and tax law.94 As will be seen below,95 there have
already been cases in relation to platforms in employment law and tax
law where this distinction was instrumental in the outcome of the
dispute. The difference turns on the degree of control exercised.96
Indeed, a major reason for imposing liability on one person (e.g. the
principal) for the torts of another is the degree of control exercised over
the latter.97 In agency, despite usually referring to control by the
principal as a defining characteristic, such control plays a more limited
role than in, for example, employment law.98 In fact, agents will often
not accept control by their principals as to the manner they act in and
some will only accept instructions to act which are in line with usages
of their own market.99 An employee (a “servant”) works for the other
on terms that the employee is under the control and directions of her
employer regarding the manner in which the work is to be done.100 In
contrast, an independent contractor undertakes to produce a given
93. See infra Part VI.
94. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-034 (this is because liability for the torts
of one’s employees is more readily established than liability for one’s independent contractors;
id. ¶ 1-034). See generally Mark Loewenstein, Agency Law and the New Economy, 72(4) BUS.
LAW. 1009, 1012 (2017).
95. See text after infra note 107.
96. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-034; Loewenstein, supra note 94, 1015.
97. See generally, BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-026 (a principal will
usually not be prevented from suing an agent for breach of duty owed to principal, including
that which results from the agent’s having exposed the principal to liability to a third party). Id.
¶ 1-028 with reference to Bilta (UK) Ltd v. Nazir (No 2) [2015] UKSC 23; HKSAR v. Luk Kin
[2016] HKCFA 81, [41].
98. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-018.
99. Id. In many cases, the principal’s only control will be his power to revoke the authority
of the agent. Id. Yet, the authors note that if the principal gives up all control of his supposed
agent, the relationship is only doubtfully one of agency. Id. (referencing CFTO-TV Ltd v Mr
Submarine Ltd (1994) 108 DLR (4th) 517; aff.d (1997) 151 DLR (4th) 382); Alliance Craton
Explorer Pty Ltd. v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 29, [74] (Austl.).
100. Hewitt v. Bonvin [1940] 1 KB 223, 224.
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result, but is not under the orders or control of the person for whom she
does it in the actual execution of the work and may use her discretion
for things not specified in advance.101 If the employer lacks the right to
control the worker, the worker is likely to be an “independent
contractor.”102
In relation to agency, “independent contractor” as a category
covers those who are agents and those who are technically not agents;
the distinction is pertinent in relation to whether a person is an
employee or not.103 Thus, although an agent may be an employee, the
typical agent is not and “acts in an independent manner.”104 Bowstead
and Reynolds note that an agent may still be an employee even when
she is rewarded principally by commission.105 An independent
contractor who has authority to change another person’s legal relations
is likely to be an agent, and one who does not is unlikely to be so.106
Thus, the common law categorizations of agent, employee, and
independent contractor cut across each other and are not mutually
exclusive, and the specific characterization is dependent arguably on
the degree of control exercised by the “principal.” This makes it
difficult to clearly demarcate, for competition law purposes, between
these different persons. Yet, the distinction, for example, between an
employee and independent contractor is fundamental for the
101. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-034 referring to PHILIP A. LANDON,
POLLOCK’S LAW OF TORTS 63 (15th ed. 1951) and Honeywell & Stein Ltd v. Larkin Bos Ltd.
[1934] 1 KB 191, 196.
102. Loewenstein, supra note 94, at 1015. See e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 7.07.
103. See e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 7.07.
104. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-026. If the agent is an employee, she
may be entitled to compensation for unfair dismissal, etc. under employment law. Id. ¶ 10-040.
If the agent is engaged not as an employee but as an independent contractor, her rights will turn
on whether she acts under a bilateral or unilateral contract. Id. ¶ 10-042.
105. Id. ¶ 1-034 n. 204 with reference to Hanna v. Imperial Life Assurance Co. of Canada
[2007] UKPC 29. They also note that some employees have agency powers (e.g. managers) and
many agents could be called independent contractors (e.g. brokers) whilst other independent
contractors (e.g. repairers) are unlikely to have agency powers; id. If the agent undertakes duties
towards her principal, e.g. to use her best endeavours (usually found in exclusive agency), etc.,
the contract is a bilateral one involving reciprocal obligations; id. In other cases, the agent’s
rights will be based on a single or continuing offer of a unilateral contract (under which the agent
is not obliged to do anything, but is entitled to commission if she does); id. ¶ 10-043. According
to Bowstead and Reynolds, estate agents and possibly other canvassing agents fall under this
latter category. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 10-043. The platforms examined in
this Article are notably similar to estate agents in this sense. For the analogy with estate agents,
see also Nowag, supra note 11, 384, 386, 395.
106. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-034.
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competition law doctrine of single economic entity, as discussed in
Section III below.
The distinction in cases which straddle the boundary between
employment, agency and independent contracting appears to be
essentially that between a contract of service (employment) and a
contract for services (independent contractor).107 For example, in Hong
Kong Golf Club, the Privy Council held that a golf caddie who worked
at a golf club was not an employee on the basis of facts such as that the
caddie could decide whether to turn up at the golf course and how long
to stay if he turned up; the club made no guarantee that there would be
work for him; where the caddie did get to work, the payment would be
made by the club at a rate fixed by the club which debited the amount
from club members, etc.108 The Privy Council noted that even if the
caddies entered into individual contracts with club members for their
services, this would not be inconsistent with the finding that the club
acted as members’ agent in collecting the fees and making payments to
the caddies.109 Notably, in Hong Kong Golf Club, the club was not
making any money through caddie fees and arguably was making a loss
due to the administration costs of the arrangement. Thus, the Privy
Council held the relationship to be one of agency despite the agent’s
not necessarily receiving remuneration for its agency.110 The Privy
Council further held that even though it is the club that establishes
certain terms of conduct (e.g. to wear uniform, behave well on
premises, etc.), and pays the caddies, it would be the player who availed
of the caddies’ actual work/ services and who would be in control.111
Similarly, in Mingeley, the Court of Appeal held that the
relationship between a private hire taxi driver and the taxi company
was not one of employment despite the fact that the driver was required
to wear the company uniform and the company enforced a scale of
107. See Stringfellow Restaurants Ltd. v. Nadine Quashie [2012] EWCA (Civ) 1735, ¶ 51
(where the CA held that it would be unusual to find a contract of service (employment) where
the putative worker takes the economic risk and is paid exclusively by third parties); Cf. Uber
(EAT), supra note 23 (where the EAT found Uber to be an employer of the drivers despite the
fact that the drivers are exclusively paid by third parties (i.e. riders) and it is, in fact, the drivers
who pay the “employer” (i.e. Uber). This is discussed further infra in Section V).
108. Cheng Yuen v. the Royal Hong Kong Golf Club [1997] UKPC 40, ¶¶ 20-21
[hereinafter Hong Kong Golf Club]. See also Cheng Yuen v. the Royal Hong Kong Golf Club,
Hong Kong Court of Appeal, 1996, No 146 (Civil) (further facts established).
109. Hong Kong Golf Club, supra note 108, ¶¶ 21-22.
110. Id. ¶ 6.
111. Id. ¶¶ 20-21.
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charges for the rides, which could not be amended by the driver, as well
as the fact that the company sought to impose a code of conduct on the
drivers and had power to order a refund to the customer in case of
complaints, etc.112 Although this arrangement between the taxi driver
and the taxi company was not identified as one of agency—as this was
not relevant to the dispute at hand—the Employment Appeal Tribunal
(EAT) (whose characterization the CA did not take issue with)
described the arrangement as a contract whose dominant purpose was
the supply of services by the taxi company to the taxi driver in return
for a fixed fee “to enable him to ply his trade as a self-employed taxi
driver.”113 Thus, the way in which the contractual arrangement is
described is very similar to an agency arrangement where the taxi
company provides the drivers a service in enabling them to reach
customers. The agency relation was explicitly accepted in a case
concerning VAT liability, which held that the taxi company that was
paid rent for the use of its base by “self-employed drivers” (which the
Tribunal equated to “commission”) was an agent of the drivers.114 The
rental fee was essentially the commission of the agent and the agency
nature of the business was also justified by the fact that there was no
other generation of profit through the difference between the
remuneration received from customers and the cost of acquiring the
services in question.115 The transport service was supplied by the
drivers for whom the taxi company was the agent in arranging the
jobs.116 Finally, in another case concerning a taxi company, the EAT
held, obiter, that the relation between a private hire taxi driver and the
taxi company was analogous to the relation between the golf caddy and
the golf club in Hong Kong Golf Club (as well as that in Mingeley),
namely one of agency.117 As will be discussed in Section V, the facts
of these cases are very similar to the operation of the agreements
between platforms and suppliers studied in this Article, and thus, these
112. John Mingeley v. Anthony Pennock and Frederick Ivory (t/a Amber Cars) [2004]
EWCA (Civ) 328. The finding was based on the holding that the driver was never under an
obligation to personally execute any work or labour under his contract with the taxi company.
Id. ¶ 14.
113. Mingeley v Pennock & Anor (t/a Amber Cars) [2003] UKEAT 1170_02_0906, ¶¶
22, 29. The contract between the driver and the taxi company was not in writing. Id. ¶ 13.
114. See Mahmood v. Revenue & Customs [2016] UKFTT 0622 (TC).
115. Id. ¶¶ 43-45. The FTT interestingly found that “account customers” (as opposed to
cash customers) were contracting with the taxi company. Id. ¶ 7.
116. Id. ¶¶ 23-26, 34, 38. See also Lafferty & Anor v. Revenue & Customs [2014] UKFTT
358 (TC).
117. Khan v. Checkers Car Ltd. [2005] UKEAT (unreported), ¶ 32.
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findings are illuminating for assessing the legal characterization of
platforms. The application of these principles to platforms is left for
Section V.
III. SINGLE ECONOMIC ENTITY DOCTRINE AND THE AGENCY
RULE IN COMPETITION LAW
This Section sets out the application of the single economic entity
doctrine to agents in competition law. To do so, first, it explains the
concept of “undertaking” in competition law. Then, it discusses the
operation of the agency rule within the single economic entity doctrine
as the case law currently stands. Both of these are necessary
preliminary steps before the application of the single economic entity
doctrine and the agency rule to platforms can be discussed, which is
left for Section V after an exposé of the terms and conditions of the
standard contracts of platforms in Section IV.
For the purposes of EU competition law, the concept of an
“undertaking”—which is the subject of the application of the rules—
encompasses “every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless
of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.”118
As clarified by the CoJ in CEPSA, in EU competition law, the concept
of “undertaking” must be understood as designating an economic unit
“for the purpose of the subject matter of the agreement in question”
even if in law the economic unit consists of several natural or legal
persons.119 The reason for the concept’s being centered around
economic activity rather than legal personhood is because not all
economic interactions between separate legal entities are capable of
having competitive significance, whereas it is possible that economic
interactions within the same legal entity can have competitive
significance.120 According to the General Court (GC), the prohibition
in Article 101 is “aimed at economic units which consist of a unitary
organization of personal, tangible and intangible elements which
pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term basis and can
118. Case C-41/90, Höfner & Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. I-01979, ¶ 21.
“Economic activity,” in turn, is “any activity consisting in offering goods or services on a given
market.” Cases C-180/98 etc., Pavel Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische
Specialisten, 2000 E.C.R. I-06451, ¶ 75.
119. CEPSA, supra note 32, ¶ 40. See also Case 170/83, Hydrotherm Geraetebau GmbH
v. Compact del Dorr. Ing. Mario Andreoli & C. SAS, 1984 E.C.R. 2999, ¶ 11.
120. Odudu & Bailey, supra note 5, at 1725.
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contribute to the commission of an infringement of the kind referred to
in that provision.”121 Thus, where the agreement is not between
“undertakings” understood as separate economic entities, the
prohibition of Article 101 does not apply, and this is known as the
“single economic entity doctrine.” Odudu and Bailey interpret the case
law to mean that it is the impossibility of competition between different
natural or legal persons, which determines whether separate legal
entities are to be treated as a single economic entity.122 Namely, the
constituent elements of an economic entity are the minimum necessary
to exert a single competitive force on the market.123 Although the most
obvious application of the single economic entity doctrine is in the
context of an agreement between a parent and a subsidiary company,
the relationships between an employer and an employee, and a
principal and agent are similar.124
For the purposes of competition law, an “agent” is defined in
almost identical manner to the common law concept discussed
above.125 Namely, an “agent” is a “legal or physical person vested with
the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of another
person (the principal), either in the agent’s own name or in the name of
the principal” for the purchase (sale) of products/services (supplied) by
the principal.126 The agency rule within the single economic entity
doctrine is that where “ . . . an agent works for the benefit of h[er]
principal [s]he may in principle be treated as an auxiliary organ forming
an integral part of the latter’s undertaking, who must carry out h[er]
principal’s instructions and thus, like a commercial employee, forms
an economic unit with this undertaking.”127 Notably, this is to be
distinguished from a situation where the agreement between the
intermediary and the principal confers upon the intermediary, or allows
121. Case T-11/89, Shell Int’l Chemical Company Ltd v. EC Comm’n, 1992 E.C.R. II00757, ¶ 311.
122. Odudu & Bailey, supra note 5, at 1726.
123. Id.
124. RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 93-94 (9th ed. 2018).
125. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
126. Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶ 12. For the assessment of whether an
intermediary is an “agent,” it is not material how the parties or national legislation qualify the
agreement between the parties in question, see id. ¶ 13. See also Comm’n Notice of 18 December
1978 concerning its assessment of certain subcontracting agreements in relation to art. 85 (1) of
the EEC Treaty, 1979 O.J. (C1) 2, ¶ 1 (for the Comm’n’s definition of a “subcontracting
agreement,” which can cover agency).
127. Suiker Unie, supra note 32, ¶ 480.
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the intermediary to perform duties, which are approximately the same
as those carried out by an “independent dealer,” because it provides for
the intermediary’s accepting the “financial risks of the sales or of the
performance of contracts entered into with third parties.”128
The importance of the existence or absence of an agency
relationship between two entities is that, agreements between them are
covered by Article 101 only where they can both be regarded as
independent economic operators, and there is, thus, an agreement
between two separate undertakings.129 In CEPSA, the CoJ noted that
the prohibition of Article 101 TFEU does not apply to the relationship
between the intermediary and the principal, despite the intermediary’s
having separate legal personality where an intermediary (such as a
petrol-station operator) does not independently determine its conduct
on the market.130 This is so where the intermediary depends entirely
on the principal (such as the fuel supplier) because the principal
assumes the financial and commercial risks as regards the economic
activity concerned (i.e. sale of fuel to third parties). The Court noted
that the formal separation between two parties resulting from their
separate personality is not conclusive, the decisive test being the unity
of their conduct on the market.131 In contrast, where the agreement
between the principal and the intermediary confers on or allows the
intermediary functions which—from an economic viewpoint—are
broadly the same as those performed by an “independent economic
operator,” because they provide for the intermediary to “assume the
financial or commercial risks linked to sales or the performance of
contracts entered into with third parties,” then such an intermediary
cannot be regarded as an auxiliary organ “forming an integral part of
the principal’s undertaking.”132 In that case, a clause restricting
competition may be an agreement between separate undertakings for
the purposes of Article 101.133 Notably, the agency rule applies only to
128. Id. ¶ 482.
129. CEPSA, supra note 32, ¶ 38.
130. Id. ¶¶ 44, 47. Cf. Simpson where the US Supreme Court held the dependence of the
petrol station on the oil company and its not having another business (which demonstrates the
“coercive power” of the principal over the agent) to be the main factor for its finding that the
entity is a retailer rather than an agent. Simpson, supra note 4, at 24.
131. CEPSA, supra note 32, ¶ 41.
132. Id. ¶ 45. See also Case C-279/06, CEPSA Estaciones de Servicio SA v. LV Tobar e
Hijos SL, 2008 E.C.R. I-06681.
133. CEPSA, supra note 32, ¶ 45.
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the obligations imposed on the intermediary in the context of the
provision of the products/services to third parties on behalf of the
principal, and not to clauses (such as non-compete and exclusivity
requirements) concerning the relationship between the principal and
the agent in the context of which the agent continues to be an
“independent economic operator.”134 Thus, for example, an obligation
to sell the product at a specific price in the agreement between the
supplier and the intermediary (e.g. “resale” price maintenance) would
fall outside the provision of Article 101, and would be inherent in the
supplier’s ability to delimit the scope of the activities of its agents.135
It is important at this point to distinguish between two markets, as
done by Advocate General Kokott in CEPSA: the market on which the
agent offers her agency services to potential principals, and the other
market on which she offers her principal’s products/services to
potential customers (i.e. third parties).136 On the first market, in relation
to the agency services that the agent offers, the agent is normally an
independent economic operator and thus, an undertaking for
competition law purposes.137 This continues to be the case even when
on the second market (i.e. the relevant (product/services) market in
which the agent negotiates/concludes transactions on behalf of the
principal for the sale/provision of the principal’s products/services), the
agent is not an “undertaking” because she is deemed to constitute an
economic unit with the principal on that second market.138 It is the risks
which the agent undertakes on this second market (i.e. the relevant
134. Id. ¶ 62.
135. Id. ¶ 63. Cf. Simpson where the US Supreme Court’s objection to the resale price
agreement in question (i.e. the anticompetitive conduct itself) as an “evil . . . destroying
competition” essentially leads the Court to “pierce the veil” of the agency contract (the
consignment agreement) between the parties (which the Court deemed to be a “cloak” to avoid
antitrust liability) to find liability under Sherman Act, Section 1; Simpson, supra note 4, at 18,
21. In contrast to the US approach, in the EU, the focus of the inquiry is on the entity itself (i.e.
the single economic entity as an “undertaking”) and at the point of assessing whether the entity
in question is an “undertaking,” the conduct or its restrictive nature does not come into play. If
the entity in question is not an “undertaking,” the assessment never reaches the point of
examining the practice in question, and therefore, the issue of whether the entities have the
capacity to restrict competition by their agreement is not part of the inquiry. See supra note 15,
explaining why the practice in question is technically not “resale” price maintenance.
136. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-217/05, Confederacion Espanola de
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v. Compania Espanola de Petroleos SA, 2006 E.C.R. I11987, ¶¶ 43-46 [hereinafter AG Opinion].
137. Id. ¶ 44.
138. Id. ¶ 46.
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market) that determine whether the intermediary in question falls
within the agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine, and
thus, is part of the same “undertaking” as the principal. For example,
in DaimlerChrysler, the GC reiterated that “where an agent, although
having separate legal personality, does not independently determine his
own conduct on the market, but carries out the instructions of his
principal,” Article 101 does not apply to the relationship between the
agent and the principal.139 According to the GC, where the principal
sells the product and takes, “on a case-by-case basis, the decision to
accept or reject the orders negotiated by the agent,” the agent has
extremely limited commercial freedom in relation to the sale of
products.140 The agent is, thus, not in a position to influence
competition on the market in question, which in DaimlerChrysler was
the retail market for Mercedes passenger cars.141
The issue of the agent’s ability to influence competition on the
market where the principal’s products/services are provided to third
parties (i.e. the “relevant market”) was, thus, a central point in the
findings. As will be discussed below, this is also a crucial factor in
relation to the legal characterization of platforms under competition
law and the concept of “competitive neutrality” developed in this
Article in pointing out the necessity of distinguishing between the
“agency market” and the “relevant market” in the legal assessment.142
Despite the fact that the case law does not explicitly acknowledge
this or specify it as the underlying reasoning for the single economic
entity doctrine, the reference in the jurisprudence to “assumption of
risks by the agent” on the “relevant market” can be linked to the
possibility of competition on the relevant market between the agent and
the principal. Consequently, the underlying assumption in the case law
is possibly that where the intermediary assumes risks on the relevant
market, it acts as an economic entity for its own account with potential
competitive consequences on that market.143 Namely, it is the
139. Case T-325/01, DaimlerChrysler AG v. EC Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-03319, ¶ 88.
140. Id. ¶ 100.
141. Id.
142. See text around infra note 370.
143. See also Odudu & Bailey, supra note 5, at 1734. In that vein, Odudu & Bailey argue
that the principal and its agent are unable to compete when the principal bears the financial and
commercial risks related to the agent’s trading on the relevant product/service market. However,
they also argue that there is a second condition which precludes competition, which is when, in
addition to the first condition concerning risk, the agent is integrated into the principal’s
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assumption of risks on the relevant market which puts the agent in a
position to influence competition on the relevant market. Thus, it may
be possible to rationalize the case law in the following way: where the
agent and the principal act as one competitive unit on the relevant
market, they are a single undertaking, despite the agent’s continuing to
be a separate undertaking in its own right on the separate market for
agency services. Where on the relevant market, the agent undertakes
such commercial and financial risks in that it acts as a market actor that
can affect the competitive conditions on that market, then it is no longer
part of a single undertaking with the principal.144 What the case law
does not recognize is that in those circumstances where the agent
assumes such risks that it can affect competition on the relevant market,
something else also happens: the agent’s and the principal’s
commercial interests are no longer aligned because they are no longer
in a competitively neutral position in relation to one another. This
results from the fact that in that case, the putative agent and the
principal essentially become competitors of one another. The
alignment of commercial interests is, as noted above,145 a central factor
in agency law, in establishing whether an intermediary is an agent or a
retailer, etc. As will be seen below in Section VI, the “competitive
organization for the purposes of the transactions with the third parties. This author has argued
elsewhere that the case law on agency does not have such a separate criterion in relation to the
nature of the agent’s position being an “auxiliary organ” forming part of the principal’s
undertaking. Akman, supra note 7, at 807 n. 142. Rather, this author has remarked that the
agent’s being an “auxiliary organ” is part of the assessment of whether the agent bears any
significant risks resulting from the contracts concluded with third parties, as opposed to a
separate criterion in addition to the assessment of risk. It appears that AG Kokott also agrees
with this understanding that there are not two, cumulative criteria, but a single criterion, under
which the agent’s operating as an auxiliary organ forming an integral part of the principal’s
undertaking and the principal’s bearing of the transactional risks are “two sides of the same
coin”; AG Opinion, supra note 136, ¶ 48 n. 52.
144. In the literature, it has been suggested that the key economic question is whether the
agent will make the same decision as the principal, or whether it will make its own decisions
independently of the principal, i.e. to what extent are the principal’s and agent’s incentives
aligned. Matthew Bennett, Online Platforms: Retailers, Genuine Agents or None of the Above?,
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, 5 (2012). Offering a different perspective, Zhang remarks that the
appropriate inquiry when discerning (genuine) agency should focus on the business justifications
for the parties’ adoption of the agency model: the real question is whether agency rather than
distribution is a more efficient contractual form for the parties, i.e. whether they would choose
the contractual form of agency instead of distribution in the absence of a desire to get around the
competition rules. Angela H. Zhang, Toward an Economic Approach to Agency Agreements,
9(3) J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 553, 576-90 (2013).
145. See accompanying text to supra note 53.
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neutrality” criterion, which this Article proposes to use to (re)interpret
the single economic entity doctrine and the agency rule in relation to
platforms is built precisely upon this underlying premise of commercial
(and competitive) interest alignment in agency relations.
In competition law, agents can lose their character as independent
traders only if they do not bear any of the risks resulting from the
contracts negotiated on behalf of the principal and they operate as
auxiliary organs forming an integral part of the principal’s
undertaking.146 Thus, the key issue is whether the agent assumes the
financial and commercial risks linked to sales or the performance of
contracts entered into with third parties (i.e. risks on the relevant
market).147 Examples provided by the CoJ are the risks relating to costs
of distributing the products; maintaining stock at the agent’s expense;
assuming responsibility for any damage caused to/by the products by/to
third parties; investments specifically linked to the sale or advertising
of products, etc.148 In short, to determine whether Article 101 is
applicable, the allocation of the financial and commercial risks between
the principal and the agent has to be analyzed on the basis of such
criteria concerning the relevant market as stipulated by the CoJ.149 The
Court also noted that the fact that the intermediary bears only a
negligible share of risks does not render Article 101 applicable.150
The Court further remarked that the decisive factor (to determine
whether a petrol-station operator is an independent economic operator)
is to be found in the agreement between the principal and the
intermediary, and particularly, the implied or express clauses of that
agreement relating to assumption of the financial and commercial risks
146. CEPSA, supra note 32, ¶ 43. In relation to agents’ operating as auxiliary organs
forming an integral part of the principal’s undertaking not being a separate criterion to that
concerning assumption of risks, see supra note 143.
147. CEPSA, supra note 32, ¶¶ 44-46.
148. Id. ¶¶ 51-59.
149. Id. ¶ 60.
150. Id. ¶ 61. See Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶ 15 which stipulates that the
intermediary may bear some insignificant risks but still be considered an “agent.” Recently, in
FNV, the CoJ paraphrased its earlier findings in CEPSA to remark that “a service provider can
lose h[er] status of an independent trader, and hence of an undertaking, if [s]he does not
determine independently h[er] own conduct on the market, but is entirely dependent on h[er]
principal, because [s]he does not bear any of the financial or commercial risks arising out of the
latter’s activity and operates as an auxiliary within the principal’s undertaking.” Case C-413/13,
FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411, ¶ 33.
Thus, the key is whether the intermediary bear risks arising out of the activity of the putative
principal in question.
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linked to sales of products to third parties.151 The question of risk has
to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account “the real
economic situation” rather than “the legal classification of the
contractual relationship in national law.”152 In the context of risks, the
CoJ distinguished between two types of risks: first, those risks linked
to the sale of the products (e.g. financing of fuel stocks); and, second,
those risks linked to investments specific to the market (i.e. those
necessary to enable the intermediary to negotiate or conclude contracts
with third parties).153 In the context of the relationship between the
petrol-station operator and the supplier of fuel, the CoJ noted that, for
example, if the payment made by the station operator to the supplier
corresponds to the quantity of fuel actually sold and the period of
payment to the supplier reflects the actual turnover period for the
products at the service-station, then it would have to be concluded that
the commercial risk is borne by the supplier.154 However, the CoJ also
noted (regarding the second type of risks which are “linked to
investments specific to the market”) that if the petrol-station operator
makes investments specifically linked to the sale of the products, such
as premises or equipment such as a fuel tank, or commits itself to
investing in advertising campaigns, such risks are transferred to the
operator.155 It is noteworthy that both types of risk relate to risks on the
relevant market (arising specifically out of contracts with third parties
in relation to the provision of the principal’s products/services to third
parties), and not to risks arising out of the intermediary’s activities on
the separate agency market.
The European Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints,
which accompany the Verticals Block Exemption Regulation, similarly
note that the determining factor in defining an agency agreement for
the application of Article 101 is the financial or commercial risk borne
by the agent in relation to the activities for which it has been appointed
as an agent.156 For the purposes of applying Article 101, the agreement
will be qualified as an agency agreement if the agent does not bear any
or bears only insignificant risks in relation to: the contract concluded
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

CEPSA, supra note 32, ¶ 46.
Id.
Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶ 58.
Id. ¶ 59.
Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶ 13.
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and/or negotiated on behalf of the principal; market-specific
investments for the field of activity; and, other activities required by
the principal to be undertaken on the same product market.157 The risks
that relate to the activity of providing agency services in general, such
as the risk of the agent’s income being dependent upon its success as
an agent or general investments in premises or personnel, are not
material to this assessment.158 Thus, an agreement will be generally
considered an agency agreement where property in the contract goods
does not vest in the agent or the agent does not herself supply the
contract services and where the agent does not contribute to the costs
relating to the supply of goods/services. The same applies where the
agent does not maintain at her own cost or risk stock of the contract
goods; does not undertake responsibility towards third parties for
damage caused by the product; and, does not take responsibility for
customers’ non-performance of the contract, with the exception of the
loss of the agent’s commission. Similarly, the agreement will be
considered an agency agreement, where the agent is not obliged to
invest in sales promotion; does not make market-specific investments
in equipment, premises, personnel, etc.; and, does not undertake
activities within the same product market required by the principal,
unless they are fully reimbursed by the principal; etc.159 According to
the Guidelines, since the principal bears the commercial and financial
risks related to the selling and purchasing of the contract goods and
services, all obligations imposed on the agent in relation to the
contracts concluded and/or negotiated on behalf of the principal fall
outside the prohibition of Article 101.160 As one of the obligations that
will be considered an inherent part of an agency agreement, the
Guidelines note “the prices and conditions at which the agent must sell
or purchase” the contract goods/services.161 Such obligations relate to
the ability of the principal to fix the scope of activity of the agent in
relation to the contract goods/services, which is essential if the
principal is to take the risks, and therefore, to be in a position to
determine the commercial strategy.162 It is noteworthy that the
157. Id. ¶ 15.
158. Id.
159. Id. ¶ 16.
160. Id. ¶ 18.
161. Id. Other similar restrictions include restrictions on the territory where the agent may
sell the goods/services, and, limitations on the customers to whom the agent may sell the
goods/services.
162. Id.
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Guidelines do not recognize the possibility that the obligations in
relation to the contracts with third parties may be found in standard
contracts of the agent to which the principal agrees (as opposed to being
“imposed” by the principal on the agent). Where the agent is a business
acting for more than one principal and operating on the basis of
standard contracts, as is common in many areas of commerce including
the platforms, such conditions and obligations may be contractually
“imposed” by the agent on the principal. Yet, such a contractual setting
between the agent and the principal does not imply that the principal
no longer takes the financial or commercial risks arising out of the
separate contract with the third party facilitated by the agent for the
principal on the relevant market. As will be seen below in Sections IV
and V, this is exactly the case regarding the standard terms and
conditions of platforms studied here.
A look at the case law on the issue of risk suggests that the
criterion of risk is not interpreted rigidly, but with a view to balancing
the various components in relation to the risks involved in the relevant
activity. For example, in Peugeot, a dispute which concerned an
intermediary (Eco System) acting as an agent on behalf of French final
consumers wishing to purchase (through parallel imports) Peugeot and
Talbot vehicles, an assessment of risks involved was undertaken by the
GC with the ultimate conclusion that the intermediary was an agent.163
Eco System offered final consumers a service by purchasing vehicles
in countries where the price was most advantageous.164 The GC had to
decide whether such an intermediary was essentially carrying on an
activity equivalent to that of a reseller or an activity as a provider of
services.165 It is notable that the GC put the relevant legal question in
very similar terms to the common law assessment provided above,
which also inquires into whether the contract is one of providing
services to another party or one of making independent profit.166 On the
facts, Eco System did not offer a guarantee service; an after-sales
service; take customers’ used cars in part-exchange, or keep a stock of
cars owned by it.167 Eco System was remunerated by commission,
163. Case T-9/92, Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA v. Comm’n, 1993 E.C.R. II493, ¶ 1 [hereinafter Peugeot 2].
164. Id. ¶ 2.
165. Id. ¶ 47.
166. See accompanying texts to supra notes 55 and 107.
167. Peugeot 2, supra note 163, ¶ 2.
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which was calculated as a percentage of the invoice price, and this was
found to be a normal form of remuneration in this type of contracts.168
Yet, Eco System itself initially payed the approved reseller who
supplied the vehicles, the basic price with VAT and the costs of
importing the vehicle.169 Namely, at face value, Eco System was buying
the vehicle first to then resell it, which could have been interpreted to
constitute activities of a retailer, thus a separate undertaking in its own
right. The GC found that in doing so, Eco System was essentially
providing in each transaction a credit to the consumer equal to the
amount over and above the deposit it received (since it was seeking
reimbursement for the price and the costs from the purchaser).170
The Court considered that such grant of credit did not alter the
legal designation even if such credit is not inherent in the activity of an
agent.171 According to the Court, such incurring of expenses, which the
principal had to repay was a normal part of activities of an agent.172 Eco
System’s undertaking the storage risk by indemnifying the principal in
the event of loss of or damage to the vehicle during the period between
the receipt of the vehicle by Eco System and delivery to the final
consumer was also found to be a normal activity for an agent.173 This
is notable since in this case, Eco System was essentially undertaking
risks in relation to the supply of the specific product on the relevant
market, which is a risk noted in CEPSA to suggest absence of agency.174
Furthermore, in this case, Eco System was also arguably involved in
promotional activities on the relevant market.175 The GC noted that
168. Id. ¶ 55.
169. Id. ¶ 51.
170. Id. ¶ 51. The facts of this case are remarkably similar to MIG, supra note 74, and it
is striking that the GC’s legal interpretation of the arrangement as one of agency is also in line
with the commercial law approach to the same legal question.
171. Id. ¶ 51.
172. Id.
173. Id. ¶ 54.
174. See text around supra note 132. This case predates CEPSA, supra note 32, but see
text around infra note 182, where the agent’s incurring expenses in relation to the activities
entrusted to her was also not seen as a factor to render her a non-agent in a judgment rendered
after CEPSA.
175. It was argued by Peugeot that Eco System had displayed a number of Peugeot cars in
the Carrefour chain of stores and used an advertising brochure issued by Carrefour which
according to Peugeot created confusion in the public mind regarding Eco System’s activity and
was bound to lead the consumers to consider that Eco System was carrying on an activity
equivalent to that of a reseller (i.e. a distributor or dealer) rather than a party providing services;
Peugeot 2, supra note 163, ¶ 22. Carrefour had issued a brochure under its own name, repeating
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such an intermediary’s activity may entail promotional measures aimed
at the public as well as accepting the risks inherent in any undertaking
providing services.176 The Court found that Eco System was acting as
an agent in that it was “providing a service consisting in establishing
contact between a customer and . . . a reseller” in “creating the
necessary direct contractual relationship between the two parties and in
carrying out the associated formalities.”177 The Court noted that Eco
System, as agent, was not a party to the contract of purchase and sale,
which it concluded with a reseller on behalf and for account of the final
consumer, and consequently, never acquired ownership of the vehicle
which was the subject of the transaction.178 Another factor noted was
the fact that Eco System never bore any risk arising from this (double)
transfer of ownership including the risk of having to sell the vehicle if
the final consumer withdrew, etc.179 It must be noted that in this case,
the agent in question was acting on behalf of numerous principals (i.e.
final consumers). Relying on Binon, Peugeot argued that this factor
should mean that Eco System was not an agent. The GC noted that, “a
purely quantitative criterion based on the number of authorizations
received by an intermediary” cannot by itself alter the nature of the
intermediary’s operations.180 This finding of the GC is significant and
the contents of the brochure published by Eco System during a temporary collaboration between
two companies. Id. ¶ 58. The Court held that because any misunderstanding could only arise
from the cover of the brochure and the true nature of Eco System’s activity was clearly indicated
in the brochure, the legal assessment did not change. Id. ¶ 59. Interestingly, similar arguments
were made in litigation against Uber in relation to Uber’s alleged creation of confusion in
consumers’ minds in that consumers were under the impression that it was Uber providing the
transportation services; see, e.g., Uber (ET), supra note 23, ¶ 67.
176. Peugeot 2, supra note 163, ¶ 43.
177. Id. ¶ 48.
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 50.
180. Id. ¶ 61. The GC also made note of the factual difference in that Eco System acted
on behalf of final consumers rather than as a distribution agent for producers, id. In Binon, the
CoJ held that art. 101(1) applies to a set of agreements between an agency specializing in the
distribution of newspapers and periodicals in one Member State and a number of publishers in
that and another Member State whose products are distributed in the first Member State, if the
effect of that set of agreements is that the approval of retail sales outlets is a matter for that
agency (or a body set up by it) within the framework of those agreements. Case 243/83, SA
Binon & Cie v. SA Agence et messageries de la presse, 1985 E.C.R. 284. However, it is
noteworthy that in this case, the CoJ proceeded on the basis that the contractual relationship
between the distribution agency and the publishers is closer to a relationship binding the
publishers to an independent distributor. The Court did not conduct any further assessment of
the relationship as this was a preliminary ruling reference and the factual analysis had to be
conducted by the national court, see supra note 157, ¶ 21. Notably, the distribution agency in
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appears to be in contradiction with the CoJ’s earlier holding in
Reisbureaus where the CoJ held that a travel agent was not an agent of
the tour operator due to the multiplicity of tour operators the agent
worked for and the multiplicity of the agents through which the tour
operator sold travel.181 The relevance of multiple principals for the
assessment of platforms as agents will be returned to in Sections V and
VI.
In voestalpine, another case in which the assumption of risks by
the agent was analyzed, the GC elaborated on the relevant case law and
held that where according to the terms of the contract between the
intermediary and the putative principal, a sale is concluded between the
customer and the principal, rather than between the agent and the
customer, then “[t]hat contract is . . . to be [analyzed] as an agency
agreement.”182 The GC also noted that where there is no provision in
the contract which makes the “agent” responsible for financing stocks
or which requires her to make specific investments to represent that
particular principal, the economic risk associated with sales negotiated
by the putative agent and concluded with the principal is essentially
borne by the principal, and not the agent.183 This finding was not
contradicted by the fact that the agent may assume certain expenses,
which may be regarded as ancillary to the activities entrusted to the
agent or covered by the fixed nature of remuneration in the form of
commission (e.g. expenses linked with the incidental obligations
associated with the conclusion of contracts, costs of legal advice,
etc.).184 Regarding the exclusive nature of the relationship between the
agent and the principal, the GC noted in this case (where the agent did
work for more than one principal) that it was necessary to determine
whether the agent was in a position, “as regards the activities entrusted
to h[er] by [the] principal, to act as an independent trader free to
determine h[er] own business strategy.”185 Interestingly, in this case,
question was active on the market in the retail sale of the products in question (newspapers and
periodicals) through its holding in another entity. Id. ¶ 22.
181. Case 311/85, VZW Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. VZW Sociale Dienst
van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten, 1987 E.C.R. 516., ¶ 20. It appears that
AG Kokott also agrees with the GC on the possibility of the agent acting for more than one
principal when the AG interprets both Reisbureaus and Binon to relate to the market for agency
services rather than the relevant goods/services market. AG Opinion, supra note 136, ¶ 46.
182. Case T-418/10, voestalpine AG v. European Comm’n, 2015 E.C.R., ¶¶ 144-45.
183. Id. ¶ 146.
184. Id. ¶¶ 146-47.
185. Id. ¶ 153.
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the GC ultimately concluded that the same intermediary can be acting
as the agent, and thus be part of a “single economic entity” with two
different members of the same cartel at the same time.186 Importantly,
the GC related this point on exclusivity back to the factor of risk, and
remarked that the “decisive factor” in establishing a single economic
entity that covers the principal and the agent lies in the assessment of
the financial risks associated with sales or the performance of the
contracts concluded with third parties through the agent.187 Notably for
the purposes of this Article, the issue of exclusivity can also be related
to the alignment of commercial interests between the principal and the
agent in the context of the fiduciary duties of an agent, as noted in
common law above.188 This will be returned to in Section VI in
discussing the role of such exclusivity under the “competitive
neutrality” concept of this Article.
In the Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, two
occasions are envisaged where an agent would no longer be deemed to
be part of the same economic entity with the principal and their
agreement would no longer be immune from the application of Article
101. Thus, the Guidelines stipulate there to be two exceptions to the
agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine. The first
exception is where because “the agent is a separate undertaking from
the principal” (on the agency market), the relationship between the
agent and principal may infringe Article 101 due to, for example,
provisions preventing the agent from acting as an agent or distributor
to undertakings that compete with the principal, and post-term noncompete provisions.189 The second exception is where the agency
agreement facilitates collusion.190 This can happen where, for example,
multiple principals use the same agent to collude on marketing strategy
186. Id. ¶ 163. Further, in this case, it was held that even if the principal was not aware of
the agent’s participation in a cartel, where the agent acted on behalf and on account of the
principal (without assuming the economic risk of the activities entrusted to her), the
anticompetitive conduct of that agent in the context of those activities can be imputed to the
principal. Id. ¶ 175. See FLORENCE THÉPOT, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 74 (2019) for the argument that such an application of the
single economic entity doctrine to extend liability for the conduct to a separate legal entity is
problematic for corporate law reasons as well as for the absence of an available defense to the
principal.
187. voestalpine, supra note 182, ¶ 154.
188. See text around supra note 53.
189. Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶¶ 19-20.
190. Id. ¶ 20.
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or to pass on sensitive information to one another. Neither of these
exceptions have implications for the subject matter of this current
Article, namely for establishing the presence or absence of agency
regarding platforms (i.e. the first research question) or for determining
the scope of competition law application to restrictions of competition
found in agreements between platforms and suppliers on the relevant
market (i.e. the second research question). In some ways, both
exceptions in the Guidelines are non sequitur because the agency rule
as established in the case law only immunizes the agency agreement
from the application of Article 101 in relation to restrictions of
competition concerning the sale/provision of products/services to third
parties on the relevant market, anyway.191 The first exception relates to
“provisions which concern the relationship between the agent and the
principal” and not to “conditions of sale or purchase of the contract
goods or services by the agent on behalf of the principal.”192 Neither
the findings of this Article nor the agency rule have any bearing on the
assessment of such restrictions of the former type as they fall outside
of scope, which is limited to restrictions of competition on the “relevant
market,” so this exception is irrelevant to the subject matter at hand. As
for the second exception, if the agent facilitates collusion between
principals, then as stipulated in the Guidelines, Article 101 can be
applied to the agreement which facilitates that collusion. Yet, this
would not necessarily render that intermediary a non-agent for other
purposes including that of assessing whether it is, nevertheless, part of
the same undertaking as the principal in relation to restrictions of
competition on the “relevant market” for products/services provided to
third parties. Where the agent facilitates collusion between principals,
this is normally conducted through the agent’s activities on the agency
market—where the agent acts as a common intermediary between
competing principals—rather than the agent’s activities on the market
concerning the relevant products/services where it acts on behalf of
and/or for a given principal in relation to contracts concluded with third
parties.193 Facilitating collusion between principals as an
191. It is notable that the Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, does not provide any
authority from the case law (or elsewhere) in support of the explanation concerning the
facilitation of collusion.
192. Id. ¶ 19.
193. This is in line with the case law, such as findings in, see, e.g., Case C-194/14 P, ACTreuhand AG v. European Comm’n, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 37, concerning an intermediary (a
consultancy firm) being found to be a member of a cartel despite not having any operations on
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anticompetitive activity is not an activity concerning restrictions of
competition concerning the products/services in the contracts with third
parties, so is already not excluded from the full application of Article
101 due to the agency rule. Consequently, even where the agency
agreement can be scrutinized for facilitating collusion between
principals, and the agent can be treated as an “undertaking” facilitating
or participating in that collusion, for restrictions of competition on the
“relevant market” resulting from the agency agreement, the agent may
still be part of the same undertaking as the principal.194 Thus, the
second exception does not have any bearing on the assessment of this
Article, either, as the findings of this Article would continue to be
applicable to the assessment of whether the intermediary is an agent on
the relevant market in relation to the restrictions of competition found
in the contracts with third parties. Consequently, the exceptions will
not be further elaborated on in this Article.
IV. RELEVANT TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PLATFORMS’
STANDARD CONTRACTS
After an overview of the fundamental concepts of agency and its
operation in different areas of law in Section II and of the position of
agency under the single economic entity doctrine in competition law in
Section III, this Section sets out the relevant terms and conditions of
six major platforms—Uber, Amazon Marketplace, eBay, Apple App
Store, Airbnb, and Booking.com—on the basis of their publicly
available standard contracts.195
the cartelized market (the heat stabilizers market). See also Gurin & Peeperkorn, supra note 11,
¶ 9.56 (referring to this exception in the Guidelines as one concerning facilitation of “horizontal
collusion between competing principals”). Thus, the exception relates to horizontal competition
between principals, and not to vertical restraints imposed by the contract between the principal
and the agent.
194. As noted in voestalpine, the agent can, in fact, be an agent for multiple principals
which are parties to a cartel agreement and be part of a single economic entity with those
different cartel members at the same time. voestalpine, supra note 182, ¶ 160.
195. Unless otherwise stated, terms and conditions relate to UK operations of the
platforms studied. The findings of the Article are limited to the publicly available standard terms
and conditions, and the possibility of there being privately negotiated versions of these terms
and conditions with different clauses is acknowledged. Due their confidential nature, any such
terms and conditions—if/where they exist—cannot be studied. Similarly, some of the terms and
conditions (e.g. in the case of Uber) relate to the contract between users (i.e. riders) and the
platform (i.e. Uber) rather than the suppliers (i.e. drivers) and the platform (i.e. Uber) due to lack
of public availability of any other terms and conditions. This is not deemed to be detrimental for
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This is done with a view to later assessing in Section V whether
these platforms are agents of their suppliers on the basis of the relevant
contractual terms given the elements of agency exposed in Sections II
and III above. The platforms chosen represent a variety of business
activities all of which are organized around the platform model and are
some of the most popular platforms used by millions of consumers
around the world. As also revealed in this Section, their contracts
contain very similar clauses, reflecting the similarity of the essential
activity in which they are engaged (i.e. facilitating transactions
between suppliers and customers), despite the platforms’ operating in
very different business sectors. The relevance of the terms and
conditions studied in this Section is that although none of the areas of
law examined above are bound by the wording of the contracts in
question when assessing whether a given relationship between parties
is that of agency, and all are guided by the “real economic situation,”
they all start by examining the relevant contract in assessing the legal
nature of the relationship between two parties.196 In establishing the
nature of an entity, it also makes commercial sense to start with the
terms and conditions which the entity stipulates to be applicable to
dealings with that entity as these terms and conditions reveal the
parameters of those dealings.
This Section is structured along the lines of pertinent factors
concerning agency as established in Sections II and III, and examines
the standard terms and conditions of the platforms under three
categories in three subsections. The first subsection examines the
contractual stipulations concerning the legal nature of the agreement
found in platforms’ standard contracts because the legal nature of the
the subject matter of this Article because the Article’s focus is on the relevant market for
products/services provided to third parties and its inquiry concerns the position of platforms in
relation to the transactions facilitated on that market in relation to third parties, namely
users/customers (e.g. riders). This is also in line with agency law where what matters foremost
is the point of view of the third party. Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 36, ¶ 1-025. Notably,
in the employment litigation concerning Uber in the UK, the courts have also used terms of
Uber’s agreement with riders in assessing Uber’s legal relationship with its drivers; see, e.g.,
Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶ 13. In fact, Uber itself argues in this litigation that there is no
contract between Uber London Ltd and drivers (despite an “agreement” between Uber’s parent
company and drivers), so that the relation is governed by the agreements applicable to riders,
which create a contract between riders and drivers (for whom Uber London Ltd is an agent). See
id. ¶¶ 33, 53-54. Finally, on occasions this Article refers to contractual statements found outside
of the standard terms and conditions where such statements are found on different parts of the
platform website.
196. See accompanying text to supra note 78, for commercial law, and CEPSA, supra note
32, ¶ 46, for competition law.
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agreement between two parties as stipulated in their contract represents
the starting point for the assessment of the relationship between them
in all areas of law studied. The second subsection studies the terms and
conditions regarding price-setting and remuneration because the power
to set price and the mode of remuneration are informative in relation to
the real operation of the business arrangement, as well as for
identifying any risk-taking on the relevant market, and, in particular,
for distinguishing between intermediaries such as retailers and agents.
Finally, the third subsection focuses on ownership, investments,
liability, and risks undertaken on the relevant market because the
ownership of contract goods as well as any investments, liability, and
risks undertaken on the relevant market are fundamental factors in all
the areas of law studied above in establishing a position of agency. A
diagram summarizing the findings of this Section can be found at the
end of the Section.
A. Contractual Stipulations Concerning the Legal Nature of the
Agreement
According to Uber’s terms and conditions, Uber “is not a
Transportation Provider and does not provide transportation
services.”197 Transportation services are provided to the passenger
under a contract (the “transportation contract”) between the passenger
and the “transportation provider” that is identified to the passenger in
the booking confirmation which Uber provides.198 According to the
terms that passengers agree to when logging onto the app, Uber accepts
bookings as the agent for the transportation provider and Uber’s
acceptance gives rise to a contract between the passenger and the
transportation provider for the provision to the passenger of
transportation services.199 According to these terms, “Uber UK is not a
197. Uber
UK
Terms
and
Conditions
(pt.
1
§
4),
UBER,
https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/gb/ [https://perma.cc/C4CM-3NCQ] (last visited Nov. 30,
2019).
198. Id. “Transportation Provider” means a provider of transportation services, including
any drivers licensed to carry out private hire bookings in accordance with the legislation. Id. at
Part 1 Section 1.
199. See Uber (ET), supra note 23, ¶ 28. Elsewhere in the agreement, Uber identifies itself
as a “disclosed payment collection agent” of the transportation provider (who is the principal).
Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 197, at Part 2 Section 4. In the ongoing employment
litigation concerning Uber, the CA raises questions as to the accuracy of Uber’s terms in relation
to when and between whom a contract is formed. See Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶¶ 76-82.
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party to the Transportation Contract and acts as a disclosed agent for
the Transportation Provider in communicating the Transportation
Provider’s agreement to enter into the Transportation Contract.”200
Further, Uber describes itself as a platform that facilitates users to
contract with “independent third party providers” of various
services.201 The agreement also requires users to agree to the condition
that Uber does not provide any of the transportation, etc. services, and
that these are provided by independent third-party contractors who are
not employed by Uber.202 Some of Uber’s terms and conditions
stipulate rules for the contract between the passenger and the driver—
despite Uber’s not being a party to it—such as the one relating to the
responsibility of the passenger for the cost of repair or damage to the
vehicle in excess of normal wear and tear.203
According to Amazon’s standard terms and conditions applicable
to the relation between Amazon and third-party sellers on Amazon
Marketplace,204 Amazon and the sellers selling on its Marketplace “are
independent contractors, and nothing in this Agreement will be
construed to create a partnership, joint venture, agency, franchise, sales
representative, or employment relationship between the parties.”205
According to the same terms, Amazon is not an intermediary between
the buyer and the seller, either.206 Nevertheless, “[a] buyer’s obligation
to pay for an item purchased . . . is satisfied when the buyer properly
200. Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 197.
201. Id. pt. 2 § 2.
202. Id. pt. 2 § 2. The term also covers other services that Uber intermediates such as
logistics, delivery, etc. Id.
203. Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 197, pt. 2 § 4. It also appears that on
occasions (e.g. where passenger claims to be overcharged) Uber may be making refunds to
passengers without necessarily referring to the driver, which may or may not lead to a deduction
from the payment made by Uber to the driver. Uber (ET), supra note 23, ¶ 23.
204. Amazon Marketplace is the platform owned and operated by Amazon where thirdparty suppliers sell their products on Amazon, sometimes, but not always, alongside Amazon’s
own products (for which Amazon is the retailer). Therefore, Marketplace is the legally relevant
aspect of Amazon’s business model for the purposes of this Article since it is the “platform”
where Amazon acts as an intermediary between suppliers and consumers (rather than as a retailer
selling its own products for its own profit). For a brief overview of how Amazon Marketplace
works,
see
About
Ordering
from
a
Third-Party
Seller,
AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201889310
[https://perma.cc/R7QA-VEJS] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
205. Amazon Services Europe Business Solutions Agreement (§ 13), AMAZON,
https://sellercentral.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/external/201190440?language=en_GB&ref=efph_2
01190440_cont_521 [https://perma.cc/NZW6-8GAB] (last updated Oct. 1, 2019).
206. Id.
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pays [Amazon] in full for that item . . . .”207 Thus, Amazon not only
receives and holds funds on behalf of/for the supplier, it also imposes
into the contract between the supplier and the buyer the clause that
receipt of payment by Amazon discharges the contractual obligation of
the customer (i.e. third party) to pay the seller. eBay’s standard terms
and conditions are similar to Amazon’s in stating that “[n]o agency,
partnership, joint venture, employee-employer or franchiser-franchisee
relationship is intended or created” by the agreement.208 Moreover,
eBay “is not involved in the actual transaction between buyers and
sellers.”209 Further, the agreement notes that the “contract for the sale
is directly between buyer and seller.”210 Yet, similar to Amazon, eBay
can automatically charge the seller’s account to collect fees and
charges, including reimbursements to buyers where a dispute is
resolved in favor of the buyer, etc.211 Thus, eBay also clearly has access
to, and authority to dispose of, the seller’s funds on the seller’s behalf.
Further, it is notable that the buyer “enter[s] into a legally binding
contract to purchase an item when [she] commit[s] to buy an item, or
if [she has] the winning bid (or [her] bid is otherwise accepted).”212
Hence, in practically all purchases, there is no further “negotiation”
between the buyer and the seller beyond the facilitation of the contract
provided by eBay; the contract of sale is concluded by the
intermediation of eBay through the interaction of the third party merely
with the platform. Further, the clause establishing when the contract is
formed is inserted into the contract of the supplier and the customer by
eBay.
In the Apple “iPhone Developer Program License Agreement,” it
is stipulated that the app developer

207. Amazon Payments – Selling on Amazon User Agreement (§ 1.3), AMAZON,
https://sellercentral.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/external/help.html?itemID=201190410&language=e
n_GB&ref=efph_201190410_relt_201190440 [https://perma.cc/8X7K-CUSG] (last updated
Aug. 16, 2019). Notably, according to the same section, Amazon is not a fiduciary or trustee of
either the seller or the buyer. Id.
208. eBay User Agreement, EBAY, https://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/policies/useragreement.html [https://perma.cc/MGV6-2DE3] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). The agreement
applies to sellers as well as buyers on eBay. Id.
209. Id. According to the user agreement, “eBay is a marketplace that allows users to offer,
sell and buy just about anything in a variety of pricing formats and locations.” Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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appoint[s] Apple and Apple Subsidiaries (collectively “Apple”) as
[his] worldwide agent for the delivery of the Licensed
Applications to end-users, during the Delivery Period. [The
developer] . . . acknowledge[s] that Apple will deliver the
Licensed Applications to end users in Apple’s own name, through
one or more App Stores, but for [the developer] and on [the
developer’s] behalf.213

Indeed, Apple’s Media Services Terms and Conditions, which are
aimed at users, also stipulate that “Apple acts as an agent for App
Providers in providing the App Store and is not a party to the sales
contract or user agreement between [the user] and the App Provider.”214
Apple charges the user’s account automatically for any paid
transactions.215 Given that the majority of the payment in relation to an
app purchase is due to the app developer since Apple only retains a
certain percentage of that amount as its commission, this clause
demonstrates that Apple holds funds for the app developers and has the
ability to impose contractual terms into the contract between the app
developer and the third party.216
According to Airbnb’s terms, Airbnb is “an online marketplace
that enables registered users (‘Members’) and certain third parties who
offer services . . . to publish . . . Host Services on the Airbnb Platform
(‘Listings’) and to communicate and transact directly with Members
that are seeking to book such Host Services . . . .”217 Airbnb’s terms
213. iPhone Developer Program License Agreement (Schedule 1, 1.1), ELE. FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/20100302_iphone_dev_agr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA76SFET] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). Note that the agreement is from 2010 and has been acquired
and made available on the internet using a Freedom of Information Request Act, and may no
longer be up-to-date. In contrast, according to the separate Apple Developer Agreement, which
a developer has to agree to be bound by, “no legal partnership or agency relationship is created”
between a developer and Apple. Apple Developer Agreement, APPLE ¶ 1,
https://developer.apple.com/terms/apple-developer-agreement/Apple-Developer-AgreementEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5F2-ZWED] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
214. Apple
Media
Services
Terms
and
Conditions,
APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html
[https://perma.cc/26EEJBNW] (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
215. Id.
216. Cf. Pepper, supra note 31, where the US Supreme Court found Apple to be the
“retailer” of apps, which implies that the sale of contract takes place between Apple and the
iPhone owner (i.e. customer) rather than the app developer and iPhone owner.
217. Airbnb Terms of Service for European Users (§ 1.1), AIRBNB
https://www.airbnb.co.uk/terms [https://perma.cc/S3NH-XH9S] (last visited Aug. 3, 2018)
[hereinafter Airbnb Terms of Service]. Members and third parties who offer services on the
platform are referred to as “Hosts” and the services which they offer are referred to as “Host
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stipulate that “[w]hen Members make or accept a booking, they are
entering into a contract directly with each other. Airbnb is not and does
not become a party to or other participant in any contractual
relationship between Members, nor is Airbnb a real estate broker or
insurer.”218 These terms also stipulate that Airbnb does not act as an
agent in any capacity for any Member.219 However, this is except for
when it comes to payment services as in that case, “ . . . Airbnb
Payments acts as the Providing Member’s payment collection agent for
the limited purpose of accepting payments from [the user] on behalf of
the Providing Member.”220 In fact, “Airbnb Payments will deduct any
Host Fees from the Listing Fee before remitting the payout to the Host,”
meaning that Airbnb will hold funds on behalf of/for the host.221 When
the host “accept[s] or [has] pre-approved a booking request by a Guest,
[she is] entering into a legally binding agreement with the Guest.”222
Yet, “[i]n certain circumstances, Airbnb may cancel a pending or
confirmed booking on behalf of a Host or Guest and initiate
corresponding refunds and payouts.”223 Thus, Airbnb can directly
influence the formation and operation of the contract between the host
and the guest. Further, similar to Uber, some of the terms of the contract
between the host and the guest are imposed by the terms of Airbnb. For
example, according to Airbnb’s terms, a confirmed booking of
accommodation is a limited license granted to the guest by the host to
enter, occupy and use the accommodation, during which time the host
retains the right to re-enter the accommodation “in accordance with
[the guest’s] agreement with the host.”224 Similar to Amazon
Services.” Members using Host Services offered on the platform are referred to as “Guests.”
Host Services can include the offering of vacation or other properties for use
(“Accommodations”), single or multi-day activities in different categories (“Experiences”),
access to events and locations (“Events”), and a variety of other travel and non-travel related
services. Id. “Members” are registered users and include the consumers and suppliers.
218. Id. Section 1.2.
219. Id.
220. See
Airbnb
Payments
Terms,
of
Service
(§
9.3),
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.co.uk/terms/payments_terms
[https://perma.cc/T92S-S7WL].
Also,
according to these Payments Terms, Airbnb is a “payment collection agent solely for the limited
purpose of accepting funds from Members purchasing” services on the platform. Id. Section 9.1.
The same Payments Terms also include a liability disclaimer and indemnification clause in
favour of Airbnb. Id. §§ 18, 19.
221. Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 217, § 6.3.
222. Id. § 7.1.7.
223. Id. § 9.5.
224. Id. § 8.2.1.

264

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:2

Marketplace, Airbnb’s terms stipulate that the relationship between a
host (or co-host) and Airbnb is “limited to being an independent, thirdparty contractor, and not an employee, agent, joint venturer or partner
of Airbnb for any reason.”225 Further, the host or co-host acts
exclusively on his own behalf and for his own benefit.226
In contrast, according to Booking.com’s terms, the platform “acts
as an intermediary (agent) between guests wanting to make an online
hotel reservation and [the hotel partner] offering rooms.”227
Furthermore, “the agreement and transaction is made directly between
[the hotel partner] and the guest. . . . Booking.com is not a contracting
party in the transaction between [the hotel partner’s] property and the
guest.”228 The payment is made by the guest directly to the hotel and
Booking.com does not sell the accommodation.229 Notably, “[w]hen a
guest makes a booking, their reservation is confirmed immediately. So
it [is] not possible to reject a reservation.”230 Thus, the contract is
concluded through the agency of Booking.com with no further
“negotiation” or other contractual dealings taking place between the
actual contracting parties (i.e. the guest and the hotel) and Booking.com
imposes the clause into the parties’ contract concerning the
impossibility to reject a reservation.
To summarize, all of the platforms stipulate in their standard
terms and conditions that the relevant transaction, which is facilitated
by the platform, takes place between the supplier and the third party
(i.e. that the contract is concluded between the supplier and the third
party) where the platform is not a party to the contract. Except for
Amazon, eBay and Airbnb, the platforms describe themselves as agents
in their standard contracts. Some of the platforms’ contracts also reveal
225. Id. § 1.4. A “co-host” is a Member whom a host authorizes to administer the host’s
listings and make bookings, etc. on the host’s behalf. Id. § 7.4.1. This authorization by the host
has to be “enabled” by Airbnb. See id.
226. “[A]nd, not on behalf, or for the benefit, of Airbnb.” Airbnb Terms of Service, supra
note 217, § 1.4.
227. How Does Booking.com Work for Property Owners?, BOOKING.COM
https://partnerhelp.booking.com/hc/en-gb/articles/213302145-How-does-Booking-com-work[https://perma.cc/4B3R-3LCU] (last visited Aug. 6, 2018).
228. Id.
229. How
our
online
booking
service
works,
BOOKING.COM,
https://www.booking.com/content/how_we_work.en-gb.html [https://perma.cc/6PH5-5GNZ]
(last visited Aug. 6, 2018).
230. Can
I
Cancel
a
Reservation?,
BOOKING.COM,
https://partnerhelp.booking.com/hc/en-gb/articles/213302445 [https://perma.cc/5BA6-WLDT]
(last visited May 10, 2019).
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that the contract between the supplier and the third party is concluded
at the time of the third party’s interaction with the platform with no
further contractual steps taken by either party to the contract at a later
stage (e.g. Booking.com; eBay; Uber). All of the platform contracts
insert terms and conditions into the contract concluded between
suppliers and customers. Nearly all of the platforms (i.e. Amazon;
Uber; Apple App Store; Airbnb; eBay) hold funds on behalf of/for their
suppliers for various reasons (e.g. because they receive payment from
the third party before passing on the funds (minus their commission,
etc.) to the supplier, etc.).
B. Price-Setting and Remuneration
Price-setting powers of the intermediary and how the intermediary
is remunerated are some of the significant factors in establishing the
legal nature of the operations of any intermediary. Amongst the
platforms studied here, Uber is unique when it comes to price-setting
power as it is the only platform studied, which has relatively direct
influence on the price paid by the customer for the subject matter of the
contract between the supplier and the customer.231 This is because at
the end of a trip, Uber’s servers calculate a fare for a given ride, taking
account of time spent and distance covered.232 The figure provided by
Uber is a “recommended fare” and the driver can agree a lesser (but not
greater) sum with the passenger.233 In terms of remuneration, Uber does
not charge a fee to passengers, but deducts a “service fee” from the fare
paid by the passenger before passing the remainder to the driver.234 If
a lower fare than suggested by Uber is agreed, Uber is entitled to the
service fee (i.e. commission) on the basis of the recommended amount.
Passenger pays Uber, who makes weekly payments to drivers.235
231. As will be discussed below, the reason for Uber’s having such influence can be
related to the particular regulatory context in which it operates and may not be detrimental to a
finding of agency. See infra note 331 and accompanying text.
232. Uber (ET), supra note 23, ¶ 18. In surge areas, a multiplier is applied to fares resulting
in a charge above the standard level.
233. Id. ¶ 19.
234. Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 197. According to the facts established
in the employment law litigation against Uber in the UK, the service fee ranges between 20% to
25% of the fare; Uber (ET), supra note 23, ¶ 21. The rates that apply for the “transportation
services provided by the Transportation Provider can be found on the Website and through the
Uber App”; Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 197.
235. Uber (ET), supra note 23, ¶¶ 20-21.
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In relation to price-setting, Airbnb provides a “pricing tool that
can recommend competitive rates,” but the rate charged is up to the
landlord.236 Airbnb charges the guests before arrival and the landlord is
paid automatically after check in with Airbnb deducting a “service
fee.”237 Similarly, Booking.com operates on a commission basis and
the hotel partner has to pay Booking.com a set percentage on each
reservation made through the site.238 The rates are determined by the
hotel partner.239 Booking.com’s “Preferred Partner Programme” allows
certain hotels (“which stand out”) to be ranked higher in the results than
others all else being equal. These hotels pay a higher commission rate
for this ranking. Notably, the commission percentage is also a factor
taken into account by the standard algorithm that ranks the
properties.240 In contrast, Airbnb’s ranking algorithm does not appear
236. See Overview, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.co.uk/host/homes?from_nav=1
[https://perma.cc/9HWM-LBVX] (last visited Aug. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Airbnb Overview].
237. Id.
238. How
Much
Commission
Do
I
Pay?,
BOOKING.COM,
https://partnerhelp.booking.com/hc/en-gb/articles/212708929-How-much-commission-do-ipay [https://perma.cc/4MKM-6G79] (last visited Aug. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Booking.com
Commission]. Commission is normally paid on confirmed bookings after the guest has checked
out and paid, but is due on non-refundable bookings irrespective of whether the guest stayed at
the hotel or not. Id.
239. For rates being set by the hotel, see supra note 221. For the price-matching-guarantee,
see Trip Terms and Conditions, BOOKING.COM, https://www.booking.com/content/terms.engb.html?label=gen173nr1FCAEoggI46AdIM1gEaFCIAQGYAQm4ARfIAQzYAQHoAQH4AQuIAgGoAgM;sid=94a
e90ce16060ed32b20c5dd267e4d9a [https://perma.cc/MNY7-BRFP] (last visited Mar. 19,
2019). Interestingly, Booking.com offers a price-matching-guarantee to guests. Where such a
guarantee is activated, the ultimate price paid by the guest will have been indirectly determined
by Booking.com rather than the hotel partner. This author has argued elsewhere that the various
investigations and decisions concerning Booking.com by competition authorities in Europe were
misguided in their lack of attention to this price-matching-guarantee by limiting their
investigations to the most-favored-customer clauses of Booking.com. See Akman, supra note 7,
at 786-87. Interestingly, Booking.com also appears to provide a “rate intelligence tool,” which
allows property owners to check rates at competitors; Rate Intelligence, BOOKING.COM,
https://partnerhelp.booking.com/hc/en-gb/community/posts/360020765514-Rate-Intelligence
[https://perma.cc/C6JT-B4DC] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
240. The hotels are listed on Booking.com in default order called “our top picks” which is
“created by a complex ever changing and evolving automatic system. This algorithm considers
a multitude of criteria including the popularity of a provider among their customers, the prices,
the customer service record, certain booking data, the commission percentage and the on-time
payment of commission.” How our online booking system works, BOOKING.COM,
https://www.booking.com/content/how_we_work.html [https://perma.cc/3RAQ-76QZ] (last
visited Nov. 30, 2019). The user can change the ranking list on the basis of their own preference
in relation to location, review score, etc.
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to take into account the commission percentage, at least not
explicitly.241
In return for the services of Amazon Marketplace, Amazon
charges suppliers a “referral fee” (a percentage of the sales proceeds),
a non-refundable subscription fee (monthly or per transaction) and
where applicable, a “variable closing fee.”242 eBay charges sellers a fee
per transaction (usually a percentage of the selling price), an additional
subscription fee for business sellers, and, it retains the right to charge a
fee even where the item does not sell “for the introduction to a buyer
for that item on the eBay site.”243 It is particularly clear from this latter
term that eBay is charging for services that it provides to buyers and
sellers, which consist in the introduction of contract parties to one
another, rather than making a profit through resale, in remarkably
similar fashion to a traditional estate agent business.
Finally, for Apple App Store, many of the apps sold in the App
Store are developed by third-party developers, and Apple earns a
241. What factors determine how my listing appears in search results?, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.co.uk/help/article/39/what-factors-determine-how-my-listing-appears-insearch-results?q=algorithm [https://perma.cc/6996-LTKZ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
242. Amazon Payments – Selling on Amazon User Agreement, supra note 207, § 4. The
closing fee only applies to media items such as books, DVDs, etc. and is £0.50 per item at the
time
of
writing.
See
UK
Amazon
site,
AMAZON,
https://sellercentral.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/external/help.html?itemID=H78LW99F4XF3Z38&l
anguage=en_GB&ref=efph_H78LW99F4XF3Z38_cont_200336920 [https://perma.cc/8VE45FLM ] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). The referral fee ranges between 7% and 45% depending on
the item (and depending on the particular Amazon site); id. The range provided is for the UK.
For sellers using the “Fulfilment by Amazon” service where Amazon stores and ships the seller’s
products to customers, there is a different compensation scheme. The sellers pay a “fulfilment
fee” (a flat rate per unit fee based on product attributes) and a “storage fee” (per cubic foot per
month). There is no subscription fee for this service. See Pay only for the services you use,
AMAZON,
https://services.amazon.co.uk/services/fulfilment-by-amazon/pricing.html
[https://perma.cc/BJK2-NJJH] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). For Fulfilment by Amazon orders,
Amazon sets the shipping fee to customers. Amazon Services Europe Business Solutions
Agreement, supra note 205, F.10.2.
243. eBay User Agreement, supra note 208. At the time of writing, eBay’s fee structure
(for private sellers) works in the following way: no listing fees for the first 25 items (and a set
fee per item to list thereafter); 10% of the final price (including shipping costs) when the item
sells up to a set cap (£250 in the UK) per item; What Fees You’ll Pay, EBAY,
https://sellercentre.ebay.co.uk/private/what-fees-youll-pay
[https://perma.cc/TL7S-PRMQ]
(last visited Aug. 3, 2018). For sellers making a lot of sales, eBay offers the option to set up an
“eBay Shop” for a flat fee per month which allows the sellers to list up to 100 free listings a
month. Id. eBay also has different fee structures for business (professional) sellers which include
a subscription fee in addition to a final value fee calculated as a percentage of the selling price
ranging between 6% to 11% at the time of writing (excluding motors sales). Id.
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commission on each app purchased.244 The price charged for the app is
determined by the developer.245 There are also annual fees that the
developers have to pay to join Apple’s developer program.246
In sum, except for Uber, none of the platforms have any (direct)
influence over price-setting in relation to the products/services of the
suppliers, which are offered on the platform. In terms of remuneration,
all of the platforms are remunerated by a fee that reflects a percentage
of the value of the transaction intermediated by the platform.
Occasionally, there are also fees to join the platform. Notably, the main
remuneration is through a fee that reflects a commission for the
intermediation services provided by the platform rather than the
platform’s making profit through the sale/provision of the contract
goods/services to third parties.
C. Ownership, Investments, Liability and Risks Undertaken on the
Relevant (Product/Services) Market
Only two of the platforms explicitly state in their standard
contracts that they do not have ownership of the subject matter of the
transactions over their platform. eBay’s terms and conditions stipulate
that eBay does not have possession of things listed or sold through its
website.247 Similarly, Airbnb’s terms also note that “Airbnb does not
own, create, sell, resell, provide, control, manage, offer, deliver, or
supply any Listings or Host Services, nor is Airbnb an organizer or
retailer of travel packages.”248 However, it is worth noting that there is
nothing in the business models or terms and conditions of the other
platforms, which would suggest that they (could) have ownership of
the subject matter of the contracts concluded on their platforms. In fact,
in the case of Uber and Booking.com, the subject matter is a service
(rides or room-booking). In the case of Booking.com, an explicit clause
244. When a customer purchases a third-party app, arguably, the payment is submitted to
the App Store, and 30% of that amount goes to Apple, with 70% going to the developer. See the
alleged facts in Pepper, supra note 31, at 2-3. Technically, the apps made available through the
App Store are licensed, not sold, to the user. Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra
note 214.
245. Apple also imposes a condition that the app is priced in dollar increments of .99 cents;
Pepper, supra note 31, at 6 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).
246. iPhone Developer Program License Agreement, supra note 213. See also Pepper,
supra note 31, at 6 (confirming that there is an annual fee of $99 for membership).
247. eBay User Agreement, supra note 208.
248. Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 217.
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stipulates that “Booking.com does not (re)sell, rent out, offer any
(travel) product or service.”249 Regarding Amazon Marketplace, where
Amazon itself is not the supplier, it has no ownership of the products
in question and an express term stipulates that it is the third-party seller
(i.e. supplier) who sells the product.250 In case of Apple App Store, it
appears that for apps of developers, it is the third-party developer who
licenses the app to the user (through the agency of Apple).251
In terms of investments or potential risks undertaken on the
relevant market in relation to products/services provided to third
parties, in the case of Booking.com, Amazon Marketplace, eBay and
Apple App Store, it is not possible to detect relevant clauses in standard
contracts (or elsewhere) regarding any investments or risks undertaken
on the relevant market.
In the context of Uber, regarding investments on the relevant
market, it is the drivers who supply the vehicle and the drivers are
responsible for all costs related to owning and running the vehicle.252
Thus, Uber does not appear to make investments or take risks in
relation to the transport activity. Uber does vet the drivers in checking
that they have the necessary documents, that their car meets the
requirements set by Uber, etc. before they can offer their services on
the platform, and Uber offers advice to drivers who do not have the
compulsory private car hire license on how to get one.253 Given that all
of these relate to Uber’s efforts in facilitating more drivers to join the
platform, these can be deemed to be investments in Uber’s platform
business (i.e. the agency services market) rather than the relevant
market concerning the services provided to customers. However, as of
June 2018, Uber also appears to provide automatic insurance coverage
for drivers satisfying certain eligibility criteria for the costs of on-trip
as well as off-trip events, which can be seen as takings risks on the
relevant market.254 Having said that, given that the insurance provided
249. Trip Terms and Conditions, supra note 239, ¶ 1.
250. Amazon Services Europe Business Solutions Agreement, supra note 205.
251. Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 214. Users also have to
agree that “Apple is a third-party beneficiary” of the license agreement applicable to each Third
Party App and may enforce such an agreement. Id.
252. Uber (ET), supra note 23, ¶¶ 44-45.
253. The Basics: How to Drive with Uber in the UK, UBER, https://www.uber.com/enGB/drive/requirements/ [https://perma.cc/35YB-CU54] (last visited May 15, 2019).
254. Partner Protection Insurance, UBER, https://www.uber.com/en-GB/drive/insurance/
[https://perma.cc/YGF3-HLSP] (last visited May 15, 2019).
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covers off-trip events as well, one could also consider this insurance to
be an investment in Uber’s platform business in order to attract more
drivers to the platform. Airbnb also provides insurance for every
property against accidental damage, as well as liability insurance to
protect hosts against claims, which can be more easily considered as an
investment in the relevant product/service market as the insurance is
directly related to the services provided to third parties by the hosts.255
Although this could also be seen as an investment in the Airbnb
platform, it is to a lesser degree than the case with Uber as the insurance
coverage is limited to the contingencies of the contract between the host
and the third party. Nevertheless, both provisions of insurance can be
part of the platform’s strategy to combat the risk of “disintermediation”
and keep users on the platform, as discussed in more detail below.256
In terms of promotional activities in relation to the contract
goods/services, Booking.com promotes the properties listed on
Booking.com on search engines as well as through affiliate partners,
and offers assistance to hotels and their guests.257 Such assistance could
be seen as investment in the relevant market, but could equally be
deemed an investment in Booking.com’s own platform business.
Similarly, Amazon Marketplace terms and conditions stipulate that
Amazon will promote third-party products as determined by Amazon
including via advertising.258 Airbnb has similar terms on advertising
the listed properties (and the platform).259
All of the standard contracts contain clauses of liability waivers
and indemnity. For example, Uber disclaims all liability for the
reliability, timeliness, quality, suitability or availability of the services
or third-party providers (i.e. drivers).260 Similarly, Amazon’s standard
terms include an indemnification clause by which Amazon excludes
any liability for any claim, loss, damage, settlement, cost, expense, etc.
in relation to products of sellers on the Marketplace.261 The terms also
limit liability of Amazon (and sellers) to damages resulting from willful

255. See Airbnb Overview, supra note 236.
256. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
257. Booking.com Commission, supra note 238. Booking.com provides verified guests
reviews on the platform, as well as customer service in over forty languages.
258. Amazon Services Europe Business Solutions Agreement, supra note 205, § 1.2.
259. Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 217, § 1.5.
260. Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 197, pt. 2 § 5.
261. Amazon Services Europe Business Solutions Agreement, supra note 205, § 6.
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conduct and gross negligence.262 Similarly, the terms stipulate that the
supplier is responsible for any non-performance, non-delivery,
incorrect delivery, theft or other mistake or act in connection with the
fulfilment and delivery of the products.263
In the same vein, eBay’s agreement stipulates that while eBay
may provide pricing, postage, listing and other guidance in [their]
Services, such guidance is solely informational and [users] may
decide to follow it or not. eBay does not review users’ listings or
content. . . . eBay has no control over and does not guarantee the
existence, quality, safety or legality of items advertised; the truth
or accuracy of users’ content, listings or feedback; the ability of
sellers to sell items; the ability of buyers to pay for items; or that a
buyer or seller will actually complete a transaction or return an
item.264

Similar to eBay’s terms, Airbnb’s terms also indicate that Airbnb does
not control or guarantee “(i) the existence, quality, safety, suitability,
or legality of any Listings or Host Services, (ii) the truth or accuracy of
any Listing descriptions, Ratings, Reviews, or other Member
Content . . . , or (iii) the performance or conduct of any Member or third
party.”265 Booking.com has similar liability exclusion terms.266
According to Airbnb’s “Terms of Service,” hosts alone are responsible
for “identifying, understanding, and complying with all laws, rules and
regulations that apply to their Listings and Host Services.”267
262. Id. § 7.2b. Prior to changes to Amazon’s business terms following a Bundeskartellamt
investigation (supra note 21), the terms had released Amazon from any claim, demand, damages,
etc. in relation to any such disputes between market participants because Amazon was stipulated
not to be involved in transactions between customers and sellers.
263. Amazon Services Europe Business Solutions Agreement, supra note 205, § 3.1. Prior
to changes to Amazon’s business terms following a Bundeskartellamt investigation (supra note
21), Amazon also required parity between the supplier’s different sales channels and
Marketplace in relation to quality of products and level of customer service. Amazon used to
require price parity across sales channels, too, but it abandoned this practice in the United States
in Mar. 2019, and earlier in the EU as a result of an investigation by the Bundeskartellamt. See
Ahiza Garcia, Amazon will no longer dictate how sellers price their products, CNN (Mar. 12,
2019),
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/11/tech/amazon-price-stipulations/index.html
[https://perma.cc/GE93-QA26]; Amazon abandons price parity clauses for good,
BUNDESKARTELLAMT
(Nov.
26,
2013),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2013/26_11_2
013_Amazon-Verfahrenseinstellung.html [https://perma.cc/7DQ3-8E2P].
264. eBay User Agreement, supra note 208.
265. Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 217.
266. Trip Terms and Conditions, supra note 239.
267. Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 217.
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Finally, according to Apple’s terms, “the App Provider of any
Third Party App is solely responsible for its content, warranties, and
claims that [the user] may have related to the Third Party App.”268
Apple sets content usage rules for consumers, and “may monitor
[users’] use of the Services and Content to ensure that [they] are
following these Usage Rules.”269 Both user and developer terms and
conditions include liability waiver terms in favor of Apple.270
There are two further sets of terms found in the standard contracts
of platforms, which are possibly unusual for traditional agency
agreements. The first type of terms involves a prohibition/restriction of
contact imposed by the platform (i.e. putative agent) between supplier
(i.e. putative principal) and customer (i.e. third party) outside of the
platform. All bar one of the platforms studied impose restrictions of
contact between the contracting parties. For example, with Uber,
drivers can neither obtain passengers’ contact details nor provide their
own to the passengers.271 Similarly, Amazon Marketplace sellers are
prohibited from circumventing the Amazon sales process or diverting
customers to another website or sales process.272 Sellers are also
prohibited from sending unsolicited emails to customers (other than
those necessary for order fulfilment and related customer service), and
marketing emails; they must contact buyers only through the
messaging tool provided by Amazon.273 Similar to Uber and Amazon,
eBay has a policy of preventing buyers and sellers from using eBay to
contact each other to make offers to buy or sell outside of eBay.274
Similar to Amazon, eBay prohibits the use of the contact information
of other users for any purpose other than in relation to a specific eBay
268. Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 214.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. This was one of the facts relied on by the Employment Tribunal in rejecting the
finding that the drivers are the principal and Uber is the agent. Uber (ET), supra note 23, ¶ 92.
272. See
Prohibited
seller
activities
and
actions,
AMAZON,
https://sellercentral.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/external/G200386250?language=en_GB
[https://perma.cc/HYS8-NCSA] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). Previously, Amazon Services Europe
Business Solutions Agreement, supra note 205, § 15, obliged sellers not to contact Amazon users
directly about an order that they have placed with the aim of influencing them to make an
alternative purchase or indirectly target them by communications of any kind.
273. Id.
274. Offers to buy or sell outside eBay, EBAY, https://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/policies/rfespam-non-ebay-sale.html [https://perma.cc/9EJ5-PK7P] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). As
mentioned above, sellers are liable for fees arising out of all sales made using some or all eBay
services, even if sales terms are finalized or payment is made outside of eBay. Id.
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transaction.275 Airbnb also has rules against members contracting with
each other outside of Airbnb to circumvent their agreement with
Airbnb.276 Booking.com has similar restrictions in relation to allowing
property/hotel owners and guests to contact each other, through the
provision of anonymous alias email addresses, etc. although some
contact outside the platform remains possible.277 Such a clause is not
found in Apple’s terms and conditions since the issue of contact is not
relevant to Apple App Store: the apps on App Store can only be used
on iPhones and only those apps on App Store can be used on iPhones,
so contact between a developer and user outside of the App Store is a
non-issue for Apple unlike for all the other platforms.
The second set of peculiar terms found in platform contracts relate
to mechanisms put in place by platforms to exclude suppliers (i.e.
putative principal) (and occasionally customers) from the platform if
they do not comply with certain terms and conditions as well as in case
of “poor performance.” For example, concluding a sale outside of eBay
after using eBay to make initial contact can lead to the seller’s and/or
buyer’s exclusion from using the site.278 In the same vein, it is possible
for riders as well as drivers to lose access to the Uber App as a result
of poor ratings.279 Similar to Uber’s business model, Amazon also
regularly reviews “the performance of all sellers and notify them when
275. eBay User Agreement, supra note 208. For further details of eBay’s seller
performance
policy,
see
Seller
performance
policy,
EBAY,
https://www.ebay.com/help/policies/selling-policies/seller-performance-policy?id=4347
[https://perma.cc/YKB6-RTDM] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
276. Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 217. Airbnb allows contact between them to ask
questions about a booking, etc. Id.
277. Booking.com reveals guests’ contact details to property owners after a booking is
made, so technically property owners may be able to contact guests outside the platform (e.g. by
phone). What information about reservations can I see in the extranet?, BOOKING.COM,
https://partnerhelp.booking.com/hc/en-gb/articles/360001423048-What-information-aboutreservations-can-I-see-in-the-extranet [https://perma.cc/Z659-A3CD] (last visited Feb. 15,
2019). However, the email addresses provided are not the actual, private addresses, and
Booking.com has access to all communication sent via Booking.com; Does Booking.com have
access to the messages I send to guests, BOOKING.COM, https://partnerhelp.booking.com/hc/engb/articles/115003976749-Does-Booking-com-have-access-to-the-messages-I-send-to-guests(last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
278. Offers to buy or sell outside eBay, supra note 274.
279. Uber “Community Guidelines” is available as only applicable to US riders and
drivers. Uber Community Guidelines, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/communityguidelines/us-en/ [https://perma.cc/XR28-NJZM] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). The fact that Uber
subjects drivers to a rating system was held to be a “powerful point” indicating that drivers work
for Uber as “workers” in Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶ 96.
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they are off-target.”280 Amazon “occasionally” suspends or blocks
sellers with “very poor performance” with immediate effect and
otherwise gives sellers 60 days for measurable improvement in
performance.281
Airbnb also retains the right to suspend or terminate accounts (of
guests and hosts) based on performance (e.g. cancelled bookings,
etc.).282 Booking.com has similar rules in relation to hotels where, for
example, legitimate and serious complaints from guests can lead to
termination of the contract by the platform.283 Similarly, Apple reserves
the right to terminate or suspend the developer as a registered Apple
Developer at any time in Apple’s sole discretion, in the same way that
the developer may terminate his participation as a registered Apple
Developer at any time, for any reason.284 Unlike the other platforms’
terms and conditions, Apple’s terms do not explicitly relate this to
“poor performance.”
In sum, none of the platforms studied have ownership of what is
being sold/provided to third parties through the facilitation of the
platform. Some of the platforms take on some limited risks and
undertake some limited investments in relation to the relevant market.
All bar one of the platforms restrict direct contact between suppliers
and customers (i.e. contracting parties). All of the platforms have
measures in place for excluding users from their platform. Finally, all
of the platforms have clauses that exclude their liability for various
contractual failures and malfunctions in relation to the
products/services provided by the suppliers to third parties. Diagram 1
below summarizes the pertinent aspects of the platform standard
contracts to illustrate the factors that are relevant to the legal
characterization of the platform business model.

280. See
Seller
Performance
Measurement,
AMAZON
https://sellercentral.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/external/200370550?language=en_GB&ref=efph_2
00370550_cont_521 [https://perma.cc/Z89H-UY7L] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). Performance is
measured on the basis of the “Order Defect Rate” which relates to the percentage of orders on
which the seller received negative feedback, etc.
281. Id.
282. Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 217, Section 15.5. Similar to eBay’s terms and
conditions, Airbnb’s also include terms on excluding liability and indemnification. Id. Sections
17-18.
283. General Delivery Terms, BOOKING.COM, https://partner.booking.com/engb/help/working-booking/what-are-bookingcom’s-hospitality-standards
[https://perma.cc/3PJC-NXHD] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
284. Apple Developer Agreement, supra note 213, ¶ 10.
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Diagram 1 – Platform standard terms and conditions
V. APPLICATION OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES AND SINGLE
ECONOMIC ENTITY DOCTRINE TO PLATFORMS
This Section brings together the relevant factors indicating agency
from the different areas of law discussed in Sections II and III, and
applies these to the platform standard contracts as exposed in Section
IV to establish whether platforms are agents of their suppliers on the
basis of these factors and their standard contracts. It should be noted at
the outset that this exercise is one of balancing in trying to establish
whether the factors which point towards the existence of agency
outweigh any factors that may suggest otherwise. This is because in
commercial relations, where an authority looks beyond the contract
between parties in determining what the “real” economic and
commercial context is, it is inevitable that such determination will be
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the outcome of a balancing act. As noted above,285 the areas of law
studied do look beyond the contract to establish the real economic and
commercial context, and the balancing act becomes necessary in such
assessments. This Section applies the findings on agency from all of
the areas of law studied, rather than just competition law, in its striving
for consistency, and legal and business certainty, which can be
established to a greater degree if the legal characterization of platforms
were uniform under different areas of the law. Given that the concepts
of agency found in these different areas of law broadly reflect the same
principles, it is, indeed, also to be expected that these different areas of
law adopt the same legal characterization of the same business
arrangement in establishing whether it is one of agency. The holistic
treatment of principles of agency from different areas of law is also
justified by the fact that, as noted above,286 these other areas of law
have dealt with many more questions concerning the commercial
delegation model of agency and its fundamental, operational principles
than competition law, and thus provide important general guidance for
the competition law assessment of such arrangements where
competition law lacks such established general principles. When it
comes to platforms in particular, competition law has not yet
established general principles in any aspect of the legal question of
agency.
Reviewing the findings from Sections II and III in relation to
factors demonstrating the existence or absence of agency leads to the
identification of the following factors as being significant. Concerning
common law and commercial agents, these relate to: contractual
stipulations as to the existence of agency; how the intermediary is
remunerated (i.e. being remunerated for services as opposed to by
profit); commercial interest alignment (resulting from the fiduciary
relationship with the principal); scope of authority in changing the
principal’s legal position; warranting to use reasonable endeavors (as
opposed to warranting success), and, ownership of contract goods.
Intermediaries which introduce contracting parties to one another even
if they do not conclude contracts on behalf of either party can also be
agents (e.g. estate agents). Notably, factors which do not prevent a
finding of agency include those such as: the principal’s lack of control
over the agent; the agent’s ability to influence and even set the final
price paid by the third party; the undisclosed nature of the principal;
285. See supra notes 78 and 152 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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the agent’s acting for competing principals (where the nature of the
business so requires); the agent’s occasional bearing of costs of refunds
for defective goods and some commercial risk arising out of the
contracts between the principal and third parties. In competition law,
the contract is also the starting point for the assessment with the main
criterion revolving around the agent’s undertaking of commercial or
financial risks on the relevant market (i.e. those risks which relate to
the performance of the contract with third parties). These risks can
result from investments in relation to the contract goods/services or
from other activities required by the principal on the relevant market.
Negligible risks undertaken by the intermediary do not prevent it from
being an agent. Some promotional measures aimed at the public on the
relevant market do not prevent a finding of agency, either. Similarly,
risks undertaken on the agency market as opposed to the market for the
products/services provided to third parties (i.e. relevant market) are not
relevant risks in this assessment. Ownership of the goods and the
contract’s being concluded between the third party and the putative
principal are also relevant factors in competition law, similar to the
other areas of law studied. Price-setting power is relevant in
competition law in the context of risk-taking as it suggests the ability
to determine commercial strategy and influence competition on the
market, which would normally imply the absence of agency.287 This is
a factor regarding which competition law differs from the other areas
of law studied in the emphasis it places on it in relation to the existence
or absence of agency.
After applying all of the findings from Sections II and III to the
terms and conditions set out in Section IV, one can conclude that
platforms studied in this article appear to be, on balance, independent
contractors (as opposed to employees) who are agents of their
suppliers.288 Further, given that platforms facilitate particular
transactions on behalf of their suppliers on the relevant market, and it
is only in this context that they act for and/or on behalf of the suppliers,
they appear to be “special agents” under the traditional distinction

287. This is reflected in the treatment of agency in the Verticals Guidelines, supra note
35, ¶ 18 as noted in accompanying text to supra note 162.
288. This author has argued that this is the case for platforms such as Apple iBooks and
Booking.com in the context of an assessment of most-favored-customer clauses; see Akman,
supra note 7, at 812.
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recognized in English law between special and general agents.289 The
rest of this Section explains the reasons for which platforms are agents
under the existing case law and rules found in the different areas of law
studied.
As an initial remark, it is worth reiterating the relevance of
internal and external aspects of agency, as discussed above.290 Notably,
the EU Verticals Guidelines as well as the EU Directive on Commercial
Agents (and the UK Commercial Agent Regulations) define agents as
persons vested with the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts
on behalf of another, so concluding contracts to change the principal’s
legal position does not appear essential for qualification as agency.291
The power to negotiate contracts suffices for it. In fact, in the context
of the single economic entity doctrine, given that the inquiry relates to
establishing whether the two entities in question are part of a single
undertaking, even relations which demonstrate only the internal
aspects of agency may qualify the relevant intermediaries as agents. In
any case, applying the common law rules, it appears that platforms
demonstrate not only the internal, but also external aspects of agency.
This is because all of the platforms studied at least hold money for their
principals and/or receive and communicate information on their
principals’ behalf and/or ultimately conclude the contract on the
principal’s behalf through the interaction of the customer with the
platform with no further dealings between customer and the supplier.
The platforms also have a degree of control in the operation of some
aspects of the contract between the suppliers and customers through
insertion of clauses in these contracts which they facilitate,
demonstrating the ability to change the principal’s legal position
without any further negotiation between the actual contracting parties
(i.e. the principal and the third party). Thus, both internal and external
aspects of agency are present in the case of platforms.

289. According to Bowstead and Reynolds, the distinction between special and general
agents may no longer be of much utility in English law despite being a well-established one;
BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 1-045. Because the doctrine of apparent authority in
England is explained without reference to this distinction these days instead by invoking
estoppel, etc.. Id. ¶ 1-045.
290. See accompanying text to supra note 39.
291. See Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶ 12. See also Directive, supra note 66, arts.
1, 2(1). This is also the case for RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 1.01, which only refers to
acting “on the principal’s behalf” in defining agency.
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In terms of contractual stipulations as to the nature of the
agreement being that of agency, as exposed in Section IV, whilst Uber,
Booking.com and Apple App Store self-proclaim to be agents, the
opposite is true for Amazon, eBay, and Airbnb. Interestingly, there is
nothing obvious or inherent in the business models of these six
platforms that would justify this difference in the legal characterization
of their business models. In fact, what they all do in facilitating
transactions between contracting parties is remarkably similar in nature
despite their activities being focused in different business sectors. As
also noted above, 292 no area of law studied is bound by the wording of
the contract in terms of the legal characterization, and the assessment
is conducted on the basis of the “real” commercial context. Having said
that, where there is no reason to disregard the contractual wording, in
commercial disputes, the contractual wording will be held to be valid
in its characterization of the relevant business relation.293 Thus, in such
cases where the platforms’ contracts stipulate the existence (or
absence) of agency, to rebut that clause, one will need to provide
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the “real” economic and
commercial context proves a different business arrangement. For all
the platforms studied in this Article, including those that self-proclaim
not to be agents, the nature of their commercial activities points to the
existence of an agency arrangement rather than any other arrangement,
as demonstrated by the overall content of their standard contracts
studied in Section IV. The rest of this Section elaborates further on the
reasons for this finding.
None of the platforms studied have ownership of the
products/services for which they facilitate transactions. In fact, all of
the platforms’ terms and conditions exclude liability in relation to the
performance of the contract between the supplier and the customer.
These are factors that qualify them as agents in all the areas of law
studied. Normally, these platforms neither make market-specific
292. See supra notes 78 and 152 and accompanying text.
293. See MIG, supra note 74, discussed in accompanying text to supra note 78. In the
ongoing employment litigation against Uber in the UK, the courts appear to be suggesting that
some of Uber’s contracts may be “sham” contractual arrangements; see e.g., Uber (CA), supra
note 23, ¶ 105. But see Uber (CA) (Underhill LJ, dissenting), supra note 23, ¶ 146 (finding that
“the relationship argued for by Uber is neither unrealistic nor artificial.”). The current Article
proceeds on the assumption that the standard contracts studied here are not “sham” contracts,
not least because such a factual assessment needs to be conducted on a case-by-case basis with
relevant factual evidence, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
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investments nor invest in sales promotion for particular
products/services of their suppliers.294 Crucially, platforms do not
assume any significant financial or commercial risks related to the sales
or performance of the contract with third parties (i.e. on the relevant
market).295 There appear to be some limited exceptions to this in cases
of, for example, provision of insurance or advertising. Yet, these appear
to be, overall, negligible, and certainly within the scope of the case law
294. Cf. Gurin & Peeperkorn, supra note 11, ¶ 9.58, who argue that “investments to create,
maintain, and update [a platform’s] specialized website to be active on a particular market” are
“market-specific investments” that entail “risks” of the type which cannot be borne by the
“principal” (i.e. supplier) and thus, lead to the conclusion that platforms are not agents. This
author would respectfully disagree with the characterization of such investments as relevant
risks in the assessment of agency under the single economic entity doctrine since those
investments (and the ensuing risks) relate to investments in the “agency market” and not in the
“relevant market” (i.e. the relevant market for the particular products/services provided to third
parties). Such market-investments by a platform are not made in relation to a given
product/service of a given supplier, but are made in relation to the platform’s own business,
which by being an online business requires the creation and maintenance of a website. This is
implicitly acknowledged by Gurin & Peeperkorn, supra note 11, ¶ 9.58, when they remark that
“[i]t is, in particular, difficult to imagine how these market-specific investment costs and risks
can be transferred to the supplier if other suppliers’ products are also sold on the same
distributor’s website.” Although the authors make this point to support the argument that
because of this impossibility of transfer of these risks to the supplier, the platforms are not
agents, the same point demonstrates why the market-specific investments referred to by the
authors are not the relevant type of investments/risks. Had they been of the relevant type of risks
(i.e. those risks that arise out of the contract with the third parties), then it would have been
possible for such risks to be borne either by the supplier or by the principal. The fact that the
investments/risks identified by Gurin & Peeperkorn can only be borne by the platform is proof
that those investments/risks relate to the “agency market” and not to the “relevant market,” and
thus, are not relevant risks in the assessment of agency under the single economic entity doctrine.
295. Cf. HRS, supra note 11, ¶ 148 where the Bundeskartellamt found that HRS was “not
a dependent agent since HRS bears its own financial and economic risk” on the basis of factors
such as the HRS investment in advertising the HRS “brand,” the establishment of a contractual
network with a large number of hotels and cooperation partners (e.g. major travel companies),
as well as the establishment and ongoing technical refinement and development of the content
of the HRS website, and cooperation with major Internet providers, such as Amadeus, Google,
Facebook, etc. With all respect to the Bundeskartellamt, all of these relate to investments and
risks related to the market for the agency business, and not the relevant market on which
products/services are provided to third parties, which is the relevant market for the assessment
of risks. The Swiss Competition Comm’n has followed a similar approach in COMCO Online
Booking, supra note 6, ¶ 99 when it held that the online travel agents such as Booking.com are
not agents for competition law purposes because of “the fact that operating an online-booking
platform requires high market-specific investments, for example investments concerning
marketing for the platform as well as for the respective distribution infrastructure (homepage,
reservation systems, IT-infrastructure etc.).” With all respect to COMCO, this finding also
confuses the two markets and focuses on the wrong market in relation to the assessment of risks
(i.e. the agency market). For the distinction between the two markets, see AG Opinion, supra
note 136 and accompanying text.
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on agency in common law and commercial law. Further, some of these
investments (e.g. advertising) and risks can be deemed to relate to the
platform market (i.e. the agency market) as opposed to the relevant
market, which would imply that they are not relevant to the assessment
of agency. The main, and perhaps the only, non-negligible risk that any
of the platforms studied takes is the risk of not earning a commission
where the contract between a supplier and a third party is not concluded
on the platform. This, however, is a risk that relates to the activity of
providing agency services in general and is not material to the
assessment of agency.296
All of the platforms’ standard contracts stipulate that the contract
is formed between the supplier and the customer, which is another
factor indicating agency under all areas of law studied. Indeed, it
appears that irrespective of the time of contract formation, namely,
whether the platform in question concludes the contract for the
supplier, or, whether the supplier and the customer conclude the
contract between themselves (after being “introduced” by the
platform), the platform can be an agent. This is important because in
the online services offered by platforms, it is not always clear at which
point the contract is concluded between the supplier and the customer,
which can blur the precise role played by the intermediary facilitating
the transaction. There is normally not a separate dealing between the
supplier and the customer other than the interaction that takes place
between the customer and the platform. However, for contract law
purposes, the time of contract formation may or may not be when the
customer engages with the platform, depending on the platform and the
activity in question.297 For example, the time of contract formation may
be when the supplier accepts the order placed by the customer on a
platform where products are sold. In contrast, the time of formation for
booking accommodation may be when the platform accepts the guest’s
request to book a room with immediate confirmation. These different
scenarios can have different consequences in relation to whether the
contract has been concluded by the agent for the principal or not. The
important point for the purposes of this Article is that intermediaries
who do not technically conclude the contract for the principal may also
be agents in common law (e.g. estate agents). This is because it is
sufficient for the intermediary to negotiate the contract to qualify as an
296. See accompanying text to supra note 158; Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶ 15.
297. For a contract law assessment of the agreement between a rider and a driver using
Uber’s platform, see, e.g., Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶¶ 76-82.
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agent. Thus, the contractual inquiry is not strictly necessary for or
relevant to establishing the legal position of platforms as agents. As
already mentioned, this is also the approach of the EU Verticals
Guidelines and the EU Directive on Commercial Agents (and the UK
Commercial Agents Regulations), which all acknowledge that agents
may simply negotiate contracts rather than having to conclude
contracts.298 In fact, in the context of platforms, the nature of the
business model and of e-commerce might suggest that even
“negotiating” contracts in the traditional sense is not necessary for the
intermediary to qualify as an agent. This was the outcome upheld by
the Court of Appeal in Insurancewide.com concerning a tax law
dispute, where the court held that an insurance comparison website was
an intermediary that qualified as an (insurance) agent despite the fact
that the website had nothing to do with the negotiation of the terms of
the insurance contract or its preparation or the collection of premiums
or the handling of claims.299 This is because the comparison site in
question was providing services characteristic of an insurance broker
or agent, which were vital to the process of introducing those seeking
insurance with insurers.300 Given that the platforms studied here not
only introduce the contracting parties, but also impose terms into the
contract between the supplier and the customers, they arguably do more
than what was accepted to be sufficient “negotiating” in
Insurancewide.com, and argumentum a fortiori satisfy the requirement
of negotiating contracts as agents.
Another relevant point for platforms derived from agency law is
that the fact that on some platforms the supplier (i.e. principal) is not
disclosed to the consumer does not render the platform a non-agent.
Thus, for example, the fact that a passenger may not know with whom
she is entering the contract of transport when using Uber which
facilitates a match with a driver, does not prevent Uber from being an

298. See supra note 291. See also Peugeot 2, supra note 163, ¶ 48 in the same vein.
299. The Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs v. Insurancewide.com Services
Ltd., Trader Media Group Ltd. [2010] EWCA (Civ) 422, ¶ 87. The case concerned VAT and the
application of a VAT exemption to insurance intermediaries.
300. Id. It was also immaterial that Insurancewide.com’s terms and conditions included a
denial that it was an insurance broker or intermediary. Id. ¶ 88. See also Fryer, supra note 72,
on the interpretation of “negotiate” in this context.

2019]

ONLINE PLATFORMS

283

agent of that “undisclosed principal.”301 It is also notable that in agency
law, limited control of the principal over the intermediary does not
prevent agency. This is also relevant to platforms since in relation to
most platforms studied in this article, the supplier does not necessarily
have much control over the actions of the platform in its facilitation of
transactions with users, which is usually a more powerful commercial
entity than the supplier itself (e.g. Amazon Marketplace versus a
retailer; Uber versus a single driver). Yet, an agent-principal
relationship need not assume that power lies with the principal.302 For
example, in Secret Hotels2, the UK Supreme Court held that Secret
Hotels2, a platform which marketed holiday accommodation consisting
of thousands of hotels, villas, etc. through a website—similar to
Booking.com and Airbnb in business activity—was an agent of the
hoteliers which had their hotels listed on the website.303 According to
“terms of use” on the website, the customer (travel agents and holidaymakers) had to pay the whole of the sum which she had agreed with
Secret Hotels2 (at the time “Med”) to pay for the holiday before the
holiday-maker arrived at the hotel.304 Med, however, only paid the
hotel a lower sum when the holiday ended.305
The case concerned the VAT liability of Med which in turn hinged
upon whether it was Med who supplied the room to the customer in
return for the whole of the sum (in which case Med would have
essentially booked the room for the lesser sum) or whether it was
through Med’s agency that the hotelier supplied a hotel room to a
customer for the larger sum (in which case Med would have been
entitled to the difference between the two sums as a commission from
the hotelier acting as his agent).306 Essentially, the question was
whether Med was the principal or the agent when making the supplies
of hotel accommodation. Thus, the legal issue was remarkably similar
to that of, for example, whether it is Uber that provides the transport
301. In situations where the customer believe that she is dealing only with the agent and
the terms and conditions have the agent’s name on them rather than that of the supplier, the agent
becomes an undisclosed agent; SINGLETON, supra note 70 at 3, 48.
302. Uber (EAT), supra note 23, ¶ 111. See also The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s
Revenue & Customs v. Secret Hotels2 Ltd. [2014] UKSC 16. Cf. Gurin & Peeperkorn, supra
note 11, ¶ 9.58.
303. Secret Hotels2, supra note 302, ¶¶ 45-50.
304. Id. ¶ 4.
305. Id.
306. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.
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service to riders or whether it is the drivers who provide the services to
riders through Uber’s agency. The Supreme Court found that the hotel
room was provided by the hotelier to the customer through the agency
of Med.307 This was despite the fact that Med was, as a result of its
superior bargaining power, able to impose terms on the hoteliers such
as that relating to the hotelier having to compensate Med for its losses
(including loss of commission) if the hotelier could not provide the
accommodation it had agreed to provide to a customer. Further, the
agreement was very one-sided in that it contained no express
obligations on Med other than basic obligations (such as dealing
accurately with the requests for bookings and relating all monies
received from customers to hoteliers) whilst containing many
obligations imposed on the hotelier.308 In fact, even Med’s ability to fix
its own commission did not mean that the relationship was one other
than that of agency.309 The UK Supreme Court also emphasized the fact
that it was the hotelier, not Med, who owns the accommodation and it
is the customer, not Med, to whom it is ultimately supplied.310 The
similarity of the facts in these cases and the business model of
platforms studied in this Article is striking, which suggests that in the
United Kingdom, the business models of these platforms would be
considered as that of agency if this Supreme Court precedent were
applied by analogy.311
Indeed, the facts noted by the PC in Hong Kong Golf Club which
relate to the control that the agent had over the principal, as well as the
collection of fees from customers before making payments to the
caddies,312 are also highly similar to the facts of how the platform
business model works, and would suggest that the platforms studied
here are also agents, even if they may “recruit” the suppliers (e.g.
drivers) and have the power to discipline them (e.g. by excluding them
from the platform), etc. Interestingly, the factors noted in Hong Kong
Golf Club are comparable to the facts which the CoJ used to justify its
finding in Uber Spain that Uber was a transport service and not an
intermediation service (e.g. that Uber exercises “decisive influence”
307. Id. ¶ 36.
308. Id. ¶¶ 41, 39.
309. Id. ¶ 41.
310. Id. ¶ 57.
311. This appears to be also how Underhill LJ interprets Secret Hotels2 in his dissenting
opinion in Uber (CA). Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶ 153. See infra note 314 for further discussion.
312. See generally Hong Kong Golf Club, supra note 108.
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over the conditions under which the drivers provide the service).313
This suggests that a UK court may reach the opposite outcome to that
reached by the CoJ in Uber Spain in a similar dispute concerning a
platform if it applies Hong Kong Golf Club and Secret Hotels2 to a case
concerning such a platform. In fact, the similarity between cases such
as Hong Kong Golf Club and Mingeley concerning taxi companies and
Insurancewide.com and Secret Hotels2 concerning online
intermediaries and the business model of the platforms studied in this
article is clear: there appears to be no apparent reason which would
justify a different legal characterization of platforms than that of
agency given this case law, at least in English law.314 This outcome is
313. See Case C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:98 (2017) ¶¶ 10, 12. See Advocate General Szpunar Opinion in Case C390/18, YA, AIRBNB Ireland UC, Hotelière Turenne SAS, Pour un hébergement et tourisme
professionnel (AHTOP), Valhotel, ECLI:EU:C:2019:33 (2019) ¶¶ 69-71, where AG Szpunar
differentiates the service provided by Airbnb from that provided by Uber in emphasizing, inter
alia, that Airbnb does not exercise decisive influence over the conditions under which the
relevant services are provided.
314. In Uber (CA), the CA refused to apply Secret Hotels2 in the ongoing employment
litigation between Uber and drivers, and instead held that Autoclenz—which was not cited to the
UK Supreme Court in SecretHotels2—is the relevant precedent. Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶ 54.
The CA appears to distinguish SecretHotels2 on the basis that the case did not concern
employment and there was no suggestion in the case that the written terms represented what was
occurring on the ground, and that there was undoubtedly a contract between each hotel and Med
unlike Uber’s argument in the ongoing litigation that there was no contract between Uber
London Limited and drivers. Id. ¶ 53. The CA also distinguished Mingeley, supra note 112, on
the facts in Uber in finding that the “critical finding in Mingeley was the absence of any
requirement for the driver to accept a fare offered to him by the system.” Id. ¶ 57. The Court
held that this was in contrast to the situation with Uber. Id. ¶ 56. However, Uber drivers can also
request different fares than that recommended by Uber’s algorithm in that they can accept a
lower sum from the rider. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. If it is unusual on the facts
for an Uber driver to do so, it is presumably just as unusual for a minicab driver as the one in
Mingeley to accept a different fare than that provided by the taxi company’s system in practice.
In fact, see the dissenting opinion of Underhill LJ in Uber (CA) noting that “it is very common
for minicab operators to prescribe set fares, but the drivers may nonetheless contract as
principals.” Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶ 138. There is one notable difference in the facts of two
cases, namely that drivers in Mingeley paid a weekly sum to the taxi company rather than
commission per ride as is the case with Uber drivers. As also noted by the CA, in Mingeley the
driver kept all the fare money. Id. ¶ 56. However, in another case with very similar facts to
Mingeley, it was held that such payment was essentially “commission” by a tax tribunal, and the
CA in Uber does not elaborate on why the same would not be the case for the weekly sum paid
by the driver in Mingeley. See Khalid Mahmood v. the Commissioners for HM Revenue and
Customs [2016] UKFTT 0622 (TC) ¶¶ 43-45. The CA also distinguished Khan on the grounds
that the question in that case was whether there was a contract of employment and not whether
the driver was providing services as the same type of “worker” as relevant in Uber. Uber (CA),
supra note 23, ¶ 58. With all respect to the CA, given how much emphasis it put on the relevant
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diametrically opposed to, for example, the findings of the
Bundeskartellamt which used, inter alia, the fact that the restraint in
question was imposed by the platform over the supplier as a result of
the superior bargaining power that the platform had over the supplier
to justify its finding that the platform (i.e. online travel agent) was not
an agent of the supplier (i.e. hotels) in the provision of hotel rooms to
guests in HRS.315 Thus, the potential for adopting different legal
characterizations of identical business models—and possibly identical
businesses—with the consequence of diminishing business and legal
certainty for platforms operating globally on standard contracts is
clear.316
The issue of the interests of the principal and the agent being
commercially aligned rather than commercially adverse—a reflection
of the fiduciary relationship between the principal and the agent—is
also relevant to the characterization of platforms and needs to be further
elaborated on. In relation to a platform’s facilitating a transaction
between a customer and a supplier on the platform, the commercial
interests of the platform and the supplier are normally aligned and not
adverse. This is because when a transaction is facilitated on the
platform in relation to the sale/provision of a product/service on the
relevant market to the third party (i.e. customer), both the supplier and
commission and fares in explaining why Mingeley is not applicable to the facts in Uber, given
the similarity of facts in Khan and Uber including how commission is paid, it would have been
helpful for the Court to elaborate further on this. Having said that, unlike Mingeley which is a
judgment of the CA itself, Khan is an unreported EAT decision, which would not have been
binding on the Court, anyway. In Uber, the CA also distinguished Hong Kong Golf Club, supra
note 108, on the facts and held that it was of no assistance in the case at hand because it
concerned the question whether the golf caddie was an independent contractor or an employee
rather than whether he was a “worker” as is the case in Uber. Id. ¶ 68. Again, with all respect,
the CA appears to have dismissed the relevance of the case perhaps too easily—not least because
Uber’s argument is that it is an agent of the drivers as was the finding in relation to the golf club
in Hong Kong Golf Club. The dissenting opinion of Underhill LJ in Uber (CA) also supports the
point that Mingeley, Khan and Hong Kong Golf Club are of assistance in the case. Id. ¶ 144. In
fact, the Dissenting Opinion also accepts that SecretHotels2 confirms that “the operator of an
internet platform which puts together suppliers of services and customers of those services can
effectively stipulate that it is acting only as an agent even if it has its own strong customer-facing
brand and exercises a high degree of control over aspects of the transaction between supplier
and customer.” Id. ¶ 153.
315. See HRS, supra note 11, ¶ 147.
316. As noted by the current author elsewhere, this has already happened in the case of
online travel agents such as Booking.com which have been subject to significantly different legal
treatments of their business model in relation to most-favored-customer clauses around Europe,
See Akman, supra note 7, at 832-33.
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the platform generate revenue as a result of that same transaction. Thus,
the platforms studied demonstrate this characteristic feature of an
agency arrangement in relation to commercial interest alignment on the
relevant market concerning the products/services provided to third
parties. This also reflects the fact that, for competition law purposes,
platforms and suppliers are in a vertical relationship to one another in
the production chain, and the platform is a channel for reaching
customers for the supplier.317 There are, however, important nuances to
this, such as the relation between Amazon and third-party sellers on
Amazon Marketplace or app developers and Apple on App Store,
which may also offer products/apps in competition with one another.318
Such a conflict of commercial interests, indeed, clashes with the
fundamental operation of an agency relationship, and will be returned
to in Section VI in the (re)interpretation of the single economic entity
doctrine and the agency rule in the context of platforms on the basis of
the concept of “competitive neutrality.”
It may be argued that the fact that some platforms’ (e.g.
Booking.com) algorithms take into account the commission rate in
ranking results also creates a degree of commercial adversity, as
discussed above in the context of agency in common law.319 Thus, for
example, Booking.com can increase its revenue by preferring the
higher-commission-paying principals over principals that pay a lower
commission, which may be deemed to potentially infringe an agent’s
fiduciary duty towards her principal. However, unlike in Amazon’s
case, this is not about commercial interest alignment between
Booking.com and the particular hotel on the “relevant market”
concerning the particular room-booking activity where either
Booking.com or that hotel generates revenue. In other words, the
conflict does not concern the agent’s putting herself in a position where
her duties as agent conflict with her own interests, but one where her
duties as agent conflict with the interests of another principal. Thus, it
317. See, e.g., the US Supreme Court characterization of the relationship between Apple
App Store, app developers and iPhone owners as parties on a vertical chain of distribution in
Pepper, supra note 31. Cf. Nowag who argues that the link between a platform and a supplier is
difficult to classify as a vertical relationship. Nowag, supra note 11, at 395.
318. A leading Australian case found that although there was no implied term that a
distributor would not do anything inimical to the market for the manufacturer’s products, it was
a breach of contract to defer fulfilling orders for the manufacturer’s products in anticipation of
fulling them themselves; BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 6-015 with reference to
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41 (Austl.).
319. See accompanying text to supra notes 53 and 55.
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is about a commercial conflict arising out of the fact that Booking.com
non-exclusively acts for principals (i.e. hotels) who are potentially in
competition with another. Hence, this conflict arises out of the fact that
the agent (i.e. platform) in question works for multiple principals (i.e.
suppliers). It is the multiplicity of principals that creates the possibility
that the agent (i.e. platform) may prefer some principals over others
because they are more profitable for her agency business (and not for
her separate business on the relevant market) due to higher
commission. This is not dissimilar to the position of an estate agent—
which is legally an agent—in being able to achieve different levels of
commission in promoting and enabling the sale of potentially
competing properties for different principals where one would generate
higher revenue due to, for example, higher sales price or higher
commission rate. As discussed above in the context of Kelly and
RML,320 acting for competing principals is not inimical to a finding of
agency in commercial law where the nature of the agent’s business
requires this. Therefore, this should not be seen as a commercial
conflict that would prevent a finding of agency in the context of
platforms, either.
Indeed, all of the platforms discussed in this Article facilitate
transactions between customers and numerous suppliers, many of
which may also be each other’s potential competitors. The commercial
law position contrasts to that of the CoJ in Suiker Unie, where the Court
noted that, in general, the fact that a supplier prohibits its agents who
sell in its name and for its account from acting simultaneously for
competing suppliers without its consent “corresponds to the nature and
spirit of a legal and economic relationship of the kind in question.”321
This suggests that for the CoJ, exclusivity of the agent is a normal
feature of agency.322 Yet, the CoJ also accepts that such exclusivity can
be validly contracted against by consent. Further, requiring exclusivity
for there to be an arrangement of agency reflects an outdated view of
commerce and commercial agency, which is no longer fit for the
realities of commerce where agents are no longer individuals walking
from door to door with a bag of samples, but companies acting on
behalf of other companies, etc. Thus, the competition law position
should be updated to align with the position in commercial law to bring
320. See accompanying text to supra note 85.
321. Suiker Unie, supra note 32, ¶ 479.
322. See Reisbureaus, supra note 181, ¶ 20.
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it in line with the realities of 21st century commerce and e-commerce,
in particular.323 As discussed above in relation to the position in
commercial law, the online platforms analyzed in this work clearly fall
under the second type of agency as per Kelly and RML, where the
nature of the business requires the agent to act for competing principals
as this is their business function.324 This is, indeed, also the position
found in some of the judgments of the GC, as noted above.325 Similarly,
according to the EU Verticals Guidelines, it is immaterial for the
assessment whether the agent acts for one or several principals.326 Both
the commercial law position and the position of the GC and the
Guidelines are preferable to that of the CoJ in their accommodation of
the requirements of modern day agency business model.
Applying the remainder of principles set out in the EU Verticals
Guidelines other than that concerning exclusivity, online platforms
studied here satisfy those criteria for agency, too. This is because, as
exposed by their relevant standard contracts, the platforms do not buy
any products from the suppliers to resell them to customers.327
Similarly, they do not bear any of the risks related to not
selling/providing the products/services other than the risk of not
generating any commission income. They also do not bear any of the
risks related to the sale/provision of the products/services to the
323. The CoJ position requiring exclusivity appears to be in line, however, with the
German position that a commercial agent is obliged not to work for competing principals;
German Commercial Code section 86 cited in Randolph & Davey, supra note 72, at 135. In the
United States, it has been accepted that it is a common form of organization for travel agents to
work with many airlines, hotel chains, etc., similar to estate agents, without this preventing them
from being “genuine agents” for antitrust purposes. See Ill. Corp. Travel v. Am. Airlines, 889
F.2d 751, 752-53 (7th Cir. 1989).
324. In Suiker Unie, although the CoJ remarked that, for the purposes of applying EU
competition rules, the relationship between an economic operator and his intermediaries must
only be determined in the light of EU law and compliance with national law governing the
particular type of contract is not determinative when assessing whether the contract is caught by
EU competition rules, it still made reference to the “nature and spirit” of the relevant legal and
economic relationship, which can only be informed by concepts of national law (e.g. common
law) where there is no particular body of EU law which can establish these factors as in agency.
See Suiker Unie, supra note 32, ¶ 478.
325. See accompanying text to supra notes 179 and 186.
326. Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶ 13. This clearly contrasts with the CoJ ruling
in Reisbureaus, supra note 181, ¶ 20.
327. Cf. Pepper, supra note 31, where the US Supreme Court found that Apple is a retailer
of iPhone applications. This is difficult to understand given the context: the apps in question are
software and the supply activity in question is licensing of software. To compare Apple App
Store to a retailer is, therefore, not entirely illuminating.
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customers due to numerous liability exclusion clauses (with limited
exceptions concerning refunds, etc.). They get remunerated by the
suppliers when a contract is concluded with the customer, in proportion
to the value of the contract goods/services (i.e. by commission). The
commission paid to platforms by suppliers represents a fee for the
services of intermediation rather than profit received as an independent
intermediary, which again suggests a relation of agency in all of the
areas of law studied. Indeed, these factors also reflect the fact that
platforms only warrant to use reasonable efforts in facilitating
transactions for the parties involved rather than warrant a particular
outcome for their principals (i.e. suppliers), which is again, in line with
agency principles. Importantly, the platforms do not set the price of the
products/services in question, unlike, e.g., a retailer, with the exception
of influence on price in the case of Uber. Interestingly, as seen above,328
in commercial law the way in which the price paid by the customer is
arrived at is not determinative for a finding of agency.329 Thus, pricesetting power appears more important in competition law than in the
commercial law characterization of an arrangement as agency, which
suggests that in the case of a business model such as that of Uber’s,
common law may find agency where competition law does not.330
However, it is important to note that in the case of Uber, specific
regulations apply requiring an element of price-setting.331 Further,
328. See accompanying text to supra note 74.
329. Cf. the European Comm’n position that where the sharing economy platform sets the
final price to be paid by the user, this indicates that platform may not only be providing
information society services, but also the underlying service (e.g. transport); Communication
from the Comm’n to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2016) 356 final (June 2, 2016), § 2.1,
available
at
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2016%3A356%3AFIN [https://perma.cc/A6BP-WPVK] (last
visited Mar. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Communication from the Comm’n].
330. Interestingly, it appears less important in US competition law than in EU competition
law, too; see e.g., Williams, where the US District Court found that the relationship between
fast-food franchises and the common franchisor was one of a single economic entity, despite the
fact that the franchisees had the ability to vary their prices (i.e. had some pricing control).
Williams v. IB Fischer Nevada, 794 F. Supp, 1026, 1031 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d 999 F.2d 445,
447 (9th Cir. 1993). Consequently, the no-switching agreement whereby the franchisees agreed
not to offer employment to the manager of another franchise within six months of that manager’s
termination of employment, unless the manager obtains a release from their former employer,
was found not to fall within the scope of Sherman Act, Section 1.
331. It is a standard regulatory requirement, across the private-hire industry, for fares to
be agreed between the operator (e.g. Uber or a traditional minicab firm) and the passenger;
Appellant’s Skeleton Argument in Uber (EAT), supra note 23, ¶ 16. Importantly, the Private
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Uber exercises limited influence on the final price because Uber uses
an algorithm that recommends a maximum fare to the driver in question
who can accept a lower price from the customer.332 It is also notable
that in the context of platforms, it is the suppliers (e.g. drivers) who pay
the platform (e.g. Uber) for the platform’s services (which e.g. Uber
deducts from the payment by the customer, i.e. rider) rather than the
platform paying the suppliers (e.g. Uber paying the drivers). This not
only supports the assessment of the relationship as that of agency
through its exclusion of alternatives such as a retail arrangement, but
the direction of payment also casts doubts on alternative
characterizations, such as that of employment, which would require the
platform (e.g. Uber) to pay the suppliers (e.g. drivers).333
The application of the CoJ’s holdings in CEPSA to platforms is
also of notable value in relation to remuneration and risks.334 First, the
online platforms are in a very similar situation to the petrol-station
operator in that they only receive remuneration as a result of enabling
Hire Vehicles (London) (Operators’ Licences) Regulations 2000 originally stipulated that the
private hire operator has to “agree the fare for the journey booked, or provide an estimate of that
fare” if required by the person making the booking. Private Hire Vehicles (London) (Operators’
Licences) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/3146, art. 9(3) (Eng.). By an amendment in 2016, this was
changed to require the operator to “[a]gree the fare with the person making the booking or; . . .
[p]rovide an accurate estimate of the fare to the person making the private hire booking.” See
Private Hire Vehicles (London) (Operators’ Licences) (Amendment) Regulations 2016, art. 4.
332. See Nowag, supra note 11, at 399 (arguing that Uber does not directly “fix” the prices
or a price range for drivers). See also accompanying text to supra note 235, however, in relation
to Uber’s contracts which stipulate that the commission paid to Uber will be based on the fare
recommended by Uber even if the driver agrees to a lesser sum.
333. This point was also made by the Employment Tribunal in Stringfellow which relied
on the direction of payment as a factor in finding that the claimant (a lap dancer) was not an
employee of the club. This finding was overturned by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, but
reinstated by the Court of Appeal which agreed that the claimant was not an employee;
Stringfellow, supra note 107. In fact, the CA held this (i.e. the putative employer being under no
obligation to pay the putative employee anything) to be the most important finding in relation to
the conclusion that the relevant contract was not one of employment. Id. ¶ 45. It should be noted,
however, that in this case, the putative employee was negotiating her own fees with the clients
at the club, in contrast to the case in e.g. Uber, where Uber sets the maximum fare. Having said
that, there is, indeed, a line of tax cases in which private hire operators have been found to be
agents for individual drivers. See, e.g., Lafferty v. The Commissioners for HMRC [2014]
UKFTT 358 (TC); Khalid Mahmood v. The Commissioners for HMRC [2016] UKFTT 622
(TC). See also HMRC Guidance (VAT Notice 700/25: taxis and private hire cars), How VAT
applies to taxis and private cars (VAT Notice 700/25) ¶ 3, GOV.UK (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how-vat-applies-to-taxis-and-private-hire-cars-notice70025#para32 [https://perma.cc/A44Y-ADNW].
334. CEPSA, supra note 32, discussed in the accompanying text to supra note 129.
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the conclusion of the contract between the third party and supplier (i.e.
commission is paid after the transaction is facilitated and in proportion
to the number and value of transactions so facilitated, etc.). This
suggests the existence of agency not just in competition law, but in all
areas of law studied. Second, the CoJ’s reference to investments in
advertising suggesting a transfer of risk to the intermediary, if taken at
face value, may suggest that platforms studied here are not agents
because they invest in online advertising, etc. However, one has to
distinguish between the advertising of the platform business itself and
the advertising or other investment “specifically linked to the sale of
the goods” which in case of, for example, Booking.com or Amazon
Marketplace would be investing in advertising for the sale of a given
room at a given hotel or a particular product of a third-party seller. If
an investment in the agency business as such (including investment in
advertising the business) renders an agent a separate undertaking, then
no agreement between any agent and principal is likely to fall outside
of Article 101 because any agency business will require some
investment in the business, and advertising online is a core part of
online business models. Thus, it must be that the CoJ here refers to risks
other than those resulting from investing in the agency business as a
separate business in itself. The relevant investments must be those
made in the “relevant market,” not in the “agency market.”335 Similarly,
even in the case of advertising for the sale of a given hotel room or a
given product, the financial risk of the room going vacant or the product
not selling still lies with the hotel or the third-party seller. The only risk
involved for the platform remains the risk of not generating
commission income. Thus, even in such a case where the platform
invests in advertising, the supplier continues to bear the main financial
and commercial risk, a fact which would suggest the existence of
agency on the part of the platform.
As noted above, there are some terms in the platforms’ standard
contracts, which are unusual for traditional agency contracts: terms that
prevent the suppliers (i.e. principals) from contacting their contracting
parties outside the platform (i.e. agent), and, terms that allow the
platform (i.e. agent) to exclude suppliers (i.e. principals) from
concluding future contracts on the platform.336 It could be legitimately
questioned whether these terms prevent platforms from being agents of
335. For the distinction between these two markets, see accompanying text supra note
136.
336. See accompanying text supra note 271.
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their suppliers. With the first type of term, the agent restricts/prohibits
contact between the actual contracting parties. This can be deemed
unusual in a traditional agency relationship where the principal would
be expected to be able to contact its contracting party.337 Further, such
clauses also essentially involve the agent’s imposing terms and
conditions into the contract between the third party and its principal,
which may raise questions concerning the provider of the underlying
products/services in the contract with the third party.338 With the
second type of clause, the agent has the means to prevent its principal
from entering into a transaction with third parties through the
intermediation of the agent in future where the supplier and/or third
party fail to meet certain performance criteria. This can also be seen as
a clause foreign to traditional agency relations as it involves the agent’s
imposing rules of conduct on the principal, which could be deemed to
clash with the agent’s duty to account to the principal.339
Both types of terms are, however, to be expected in the platform
business model studied here because they seek either to prevent freeriding by suppliers and users, or, to preserve the quality of the platform.
Both sets of these terms and conditions reflect the two-sided nature of
the platform business model.340 The first type of terms aims to prevent
337. See e.g., Uber (EAT), supra note 23, ¶ 110 (where the EAT noted that it is
questionable that agency is the right characterization of the business when the “principal” is
prevented from building up a business relationship with the end user of the service).
338. This is one of the factors which the European Comm’n states to suggest that in the
context of a sharing economy platform, the platform not only offers an information society
service, but also provides the underlying service (e.g. transport, short-term accommodation,
etc.). See Communication from the Commission, supra note 329, § 2.1. In contrast, in the context
of agency, the fact that the agent can make contractual decisions on behalf of and for the
principal demonstrates that the agent is capable of changing the principal’s legal relations with
third parties, demonstrating the existence of the external aspects of agency, confirming the
presence of agency.
339. See accompanying text to supra note 60.
340. Two-sided (or multisided) markets refer to those markets where a business (e.g. a
“platform”) facilitates direct interactions between different types of customers; see EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 15. Interestingly, the CA found that Uber’s rating system for
drivers amounts to a performance management/disciplinary procedure which is a “powerful
point supporting the case that the drivers work for Uber”; Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶ 96. Yet,
given that such review procedures are in place in contracts of all of the platforms studied here,
the CA may have failed to appreciate the reasoning and function of such procedures, which
result from the two-sided nature of the business model and relevant network effects. It is difficult
to agree that such procedures signify an employment arrangement due to the performance
management quality that they demonstrate when all of the platforms studied here contain such
clauses and employment is clearly not the correct characterization of the relationship between
third-party sellers and Amazon Marketplace, etc. That such terms are simply measures to ensure
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free-riding and counter the risk of “disintermediation” that would result
from parties’ contracting outside of the platform once they “find” each
other on the platform.341 Such contracting would eliminate the
possibility of remuneration for the platform due to the loss of
commission, as these platforms only generate revenue when the
transaction between the parties who have found each other on the
platform is actually concluded on the platform. In the long run, such
free-riding can also diminish the incentives to invest in the platform
business model, and could be welfare-decreasing.342 It is, indeed,
telling that Apple App Store terms do not contain a term restricting
contact between the third-party app developer and customers: it
appears that where there is no possibility of free-riding as in the case
of Apple (resulting from the fact that only apps in the App Store can be
used on iPhones), the platform has not adopted restriction of contact
rules, which suggests that the rationale behind the rules may, indeed,
be that of preventing free-riding. The second type of these terms can be
justified by the platforms’ aiming to preserve the quality of the
interactions on the platform in order to sustain the network effects
enjoyed by the platform.343 These terms may arguably be necessary to
preserve the investments made in the platform by ensuring a certain
quality of the product/service provided by the intermediary from which it makes profit is
acknowledged in the dissenting opinion of Underhill LJ in Uber (CA), supra note 23, ¶ 138.
341. “Disintermediation” refers to network members bypassing a hub to connect directly.
For the definition and a discussion of the risk of intermediation for platforms and how platforms
try to avoid this risk, see Feng Zhu & Marco Iansiti, Why Some Platforms Thrive and Others
Don’t, 2019 HARVARD BUS. REV. 118 (2019). Mechanisms used by platforms to deter
disintermediation include prohibiting users from concluding transactions off the platform and
blocking users from exchanging contact information as well as attempts at increasing the value
of conducting business on the platform by, for example, providing insurance, dispute resolution,
communication tools, etc. See id.
342. This was, indeed, the reason for the distinction made between “narrow” and “wide”
platform most-favored-customer clauses by some authorities in Europe, which found that narrow
most-favored-customer clauses may be necessary for the business model to be sustainable; see
Akman, supra note 7, 792, 799.
343. Network effects relate to the fact that on two-sided markets, demands on the two sides
of the market are interlinked. See Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market Definition in Two-Sided
Markets: Theory and Practice, 10(2) J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 293, 296 (2014). There are
two types of network effects: direct and indirect. A “direct network effect” exists where
consumers’ willingness to pay for a product depends on the number of other consumers (or the
quantity bought) of the same product; id. n. 8. An “indirect network effect” exists where
consumers’ willingness to pay for a product depends on the number of consumers (or the
quantity bought) of another product. Id. In the context of two-sided markets, the indirect network
effect relates to demand on one side of the market depending on demand on the other side of the
market.
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quality level in the dealings facilitated between suppliers and
customers. This is because erosion of such quality on one or both sides
of the platform can lead to a loss of network effects and of the necessary
scale of operations for the platform, which can ultimately lead to the
collapse of the business model.344 Thus, although both of these types of
terms may be unusual for traditional agency relations, they do not
appear to be unusual for the standard contracts of platforms given how
the platform business model functions. Consequently, they should not
be deemed to be factors preventing the existence of agency where, as
demonstrated throughout this Section, the balance of the relevant
factors points in the direction of a relationship of agency.
All in all, as the law currently stands, the relationship between a
platform and a supplier in the context of the relevant products/services
market where the platform facilitates a transaction between the supplier
and the third party (i.e. customer) cannot be legally explained in any
other way than that the platform acts as the agent of the principal (i.e.
supplier) in that transaction facilitated between the supplier and the
third party. The implication for competition law purposes, as noted
above, is that the application of the single economic entity doctrine and
the agency rule thereunder exclude the restrictions of competition on
the relevant market found in the agreements between platforms and
suppliers from the scope of the prohibition in Article 101. The next
Section explores whether, and if so, how, the single economic entity
doctrine should be (re)interpreted in this context to render the
competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements applicable
to contracts of platforms with their suppliers.
VI. (RE)INTERPRETING THE SINGLE ECONOMIC ENTITY
DOCTRINE AND THE AGENCY RULE: COMPETITIVE
NEUTRALITY
Section V demonstrated, based on the principles of agency from
different areas of law and the single economic entity doctrine, that the
344. For example, if riders stop using Uber after dissatisfaction with the quality of the ride
that they booked on the platform, this not only reduces the number of riders on one side of the
market, but can also lead to a reduction in the number of drivers who offer their services on the
platform because there will be fewer riders to offer their transport services to on the platform.
Further, given that commission is only generated as a result of successful transactions, the
lowering of the quality of the interactions on the platform can lead to a loss of the necessary
scale of operations to generate any revenue. In the long run, the loss of the network effects and
the necessary scale can lead to the collapse of the two-sided business model which operates on
the basis of commission.
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platforms studied in this Article are legally agents of their suppliers in
relation to the transactions that they facilitate on the relevant market
between their suppliers and third parties. As noted above, the agency
rule under the single economic entity doctrine means that once it is
accepted that platforms are agents of their suppliers, the agreements
between platforms and suppliers fall outside the scope of competition
law in relation to restrictions of competition on the relevant market
where the platform is acting as the agent of the supplier. Given the
ubiquity of the platform model and the growing share of e-commerce
in the digital economy, this finding implies that there is a significant
“platform gap” in competition law as currently conceived, which
immunizes potentially substantial restrictions of competition from
scrutiny. The next legal question, therefore, becomes whether this
application of the single economic entity doctrine should be modified,
and if so, on what basis such (re)interpretation should take place, so
that such agreements which contain restrictions of competition come
under the scope of application of Article 101.
This Article would argue that the agency rule and its operation
under the single economic entity doctrine should be modified and/or
(re)interpreted to the extent that there is a commercial conflict of
interest between the platform (i.e. putative agent) and a given supplier
(i.e. putative principal) in relation to the transaction to be facilitated
with the customer on the relevant market. Namely, where there is a
commercial conflict of interest between the platform and the supplier
in relation to the transaction to be facilitated on the relevant market, the
platform should not be deemed to be an agent of the supplier in that
context. This is because, as agency law demonstrates, the concept of
agency is fundamentally built upon an alignment of commercial
interests between the agent and the principal, rather than upon
commercial adversity.345 This results from the fact that agency is a
mode of delegation where the principal appoints the agent to act in the
principal’s commercial interest to conclude transactions, which
ultimately benefit both the principal and the agent, when successful.
This reflects the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the agent
and the principal, which requires the agent’s “loyalty” to her principal:
the agent’s “duty and interest” need to be aligned and not in conflict.346
345. See accompanying text to supra note 53.
346. See RML, supra note 86, ¶ 20 discussed in the accompanying text to supra note 86.
The proposal in this Section is also partly in line with Restatement, supra note 42, § 8.04, which
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This fundamental feature of agency, namely that of commercial interest
alignment resulting from the fiduciary nature of the relationship, can
be transposed into competition law as a guiding principle to establish
which commercial arrangements represent that of agency and,
subsequently, justify the agency rule under the single economic entity
doctrine and which do not. This is because despite this not being
acknowledged in competition law jurisprudence, soft law or
commentary, in such cases where their commercial interests are
aligned, for competition purposes, the agent and the principal are also
in a state of competitive neutrality: they do not compete with one
another and their business operations are complementary in nature
rather than rivalrous. Under such circumstances, there is no reason not
to treat the platforms as part of the same undertaking with the suppliers
under the single economic entity doctrine, as the doctrine currently
provides, as discussed in Section V. In fact, the principles and operation
of agency in all areas of law studied point towards this outcome. Where
the platform and supplier are in a competitively neutral position, the
platform simply constitutes a means for the principal to conclude
transactions with customers, and in this activity, they act as a single
economic entity. It also makes commercial sense to treat them as one
under such circumstances because the two entities would be acting as
one on the relevant market in relation to the transactions concluded
with third parties. This normally holds for the platform business model
in that it is in the commercial interest of both the platform and the
supplier to conclude a transaction on the platform where they both
benefit from such a transaction by way of a commission and a
profitable sale, respectively. This results from the fact that a platform
and the suppliers thereon are normally in a vertical relation to one
another, where the former provides a sales channel for the latter,
enabling the latter to reach more customers more effectively, etc. This
author would posit that in cases where the vertical relation between the
platform and the supplier entirely holds, so that the platform is merely
providing a service to the supplier (e.g. a sales channel), which the
supplier uses for reaching its customers to provide its
products/services, the platforms should continue to be held to be agents
stipulates that throughout the duration of an agency relationship, an agent has a duty to refrain
from competing with the principal. However, the proposal departs from the stipulation in the
remainder of Section 8.04, according to which the agent also has a duty to refrain from taking
action on behalf or otherwise assisting the principal’s competitors; see accompanying text to
infra note 356.
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under the single economic entity doctrine as they are in a competitively
neutral position in relation to their suppliers.
By contrast, where the relation between the platform and the
supplier turns from a vertical into a horizontal one, then the agency rule
under the single economic entity doctrine should be modified because
in this case, commercial alignment is replaced with commercial
adversity and competitive neutrality is replaced with competitive
rivalry: the parties become competitors on the relevant market.
Platforms that are in a position where their interests are commercially
adverse to the interests of the suppliers in that the platform is also a
competitor of the supplier on the relevant market (through activities it
carries out for her own account) should not be able to make use of the
agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine in relation to
restrictions of competition on that market. In such situations, not only
does the platform become a competitor to the supplier and can conclude
a contract for its own benefit instead of for the benefit of the supplier
(i.e. its duties as agent conflict with its own interests), but it also has an
automatic cost advantage in comparison to the same supplier because
it does not have to bear the commission due on every transaction
completed by the supplier on the platform. Thus, in situations where
“competitive neutrality” no longer holds, the platform and the supplier
should no longer be deemed part of a single economic entity, and the
single economic entity doctrine should be (re)interpreted to
accommodate this exception to the agency rule in relation to platforms.
The implication of this (re)interpretation would be that those
agreements between platforms and suppliers that restrict competition
on the relevant market would be subject to the full application of the
prohibition of Article 101 where the platform competes with the
suppliers in question on the relevant market.
This (re)interpretation is not only in line with the principles of
agency found in different areas of law, according to which the most
specific fiduciary duty of an agent is “not to make a profit at h[er]
principal’s expense,” but also with the implicit reasoning underlying
the treatment of certain separate entities as part of the same economic
entity in competition law.347 In fact, the rules concerning agency in
these other areas of law and the operation of the agency rule in
347. BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 6-042. See accompanying text to supra
note 143.
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competition law demonstrate remarkable similarity in essence. Despite
this not having been acknowledged in the competition law
jurisprudence, soft law or commentary, as noted above,348 the centrality
of risk-taking on the relevant market for a finding of agency (or lack
thereof) suggests that once the agent adopts a course of conduct taking
risks on the relevant product/services market (where it is appointed to
facilitate transactions between the principal and third parties), and
thereby puts herself in a position of competition with the principal, then
she should no longer be deemed to constitute part of the same economic
entity as the principal. In such a scenario, what agency law denotes to
be “commercial interest alignment” reflecting the fiduciary nature of
the agency relationship is replaced with “commercial adversity.”349 For
competition law purposes, this corresponds to a state of “competitive
neutrality” being replaced with “competitive rivalry.” Thus, in such
circumstances where agency law would likely find a lack of agency,
competition law should also find a lack of agency with the outcome
that the single economic entity doctrine does not apply to the entities
in question where there is no “competitive neutrality.” Where there is
competition between two parties on the relevant market in that the
agent can, as a market actor in her own right, affect competition on that
market, the rationale underlying the single economic entity doctrine
should be deemed to no longer hold, and thus, the doctrine should not
be applicable.
It is noteworthy that this conflict of interest between platforms
and their suppliers has recently not only gained attention from
competition authorities around the world exploring its compatibility
with competition law, but also led to outright bans of platforms’ ability
to sell on their own marketplace in competition with their suppliers in
some jurisdictions.350 However, such an outright ban on platforms’
348. See accompanying text to supra note 143. The Verticals Guidelines may implicitly
acknowledge this in stating that an intermediary is generally considered to be an agent, inter
alia, where it “does not undertake other activities within the same product market required by
the principal.” Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶ 16(g). Unfortunately, it is unclear what the
Guidelines mean by referring to activities “required by the principal” because it is in the nature
of agency that the principal would require the agent to undertake activities on the relevant market
on his behalf.
349. For the agency law concepts, see text around supra note 53.
350. For example, Amazon is banned from selling its own products as a retailer on
Amazon Marketplace in India due to new e-commerce regulations; see, Sasha Fedorenko,
Amazon India Removes Products Over New Marketplace Regulation, TAMEBAY, Feb. 1, 2019,
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selling on their platforms alongside third-party suppliers can itself have
anticompetitive effects by leading to lower output and higher prices for
consumers.351 The (re)interpretation of the single economic entity
doctrine presented here is, thus, more appropriate from a competition
as well as a commercial perspective than such outright bans on the
platforms’ ability to sell on their own platform. This is because the
(re)interpretation proposed on the basis of “competitive neutrality”
enables a flexible application of competition law by reinterpreting its
scope of application in particular instances where conflicts of interest
actually matter in relation to competition, whilst allowing the business
model to continue to function as intended in all other aspects. The
policy revision in line with this finding in the European Union would
be for the EU Commission to include a provision in a revised EU
VBER and/or in the accompanying Guidelines to the effect that
platforms that compete with their suppliers on the relevant market in
relation to the products/services provided to third parties (i.e.
customers) will not be treated as agents of their suppliers in relation to
agreements which restrict, distort or prevent competition on that
market. This would make their agreements with their suppliers subject
to the full application of Article 101. Thus, a third exception should be
created in addition to the two exceptions already stipulated in the
Guidelines concerning when an agency agreement “exceptionally”
falls within the scope of the prohibition of Article 101.352 Such a
provision could read as follows: “an agency agreement will fall within
the scope of Article 101(1), even if the principal bears all the relevant
financial and commercial risks, where the agreement is between a
platform and a supplier, and the platform competes with the supplier
on the relevant market in relation to the products/services
sold/provided to third parties through the intermediation of the
platform.”
It is noteworthy that in an earlier judgment—outside the agency
context—clarifying the concept of “undertaking” for competition law
purposes, the CoJ referred to the fact of competition between the
persons participating together in a given agreement being impossible
https://tamebay.com/2019/02/amazon-india-removes-products.html
[https://perma.cc/G27FJGXN]. Regarding Bundeskartellamt’s investigation into Amazon, see supra note 21.
351. See Hovenkamp, supra note 21.
352. See Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35, ¶¶ 19-20 and accompanying text to supra
note 189 in relation to the existing two exceptions.
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as a sign of the persons’ not being considered to be separate
undertakings.353 This is strikingly similar to the position in US law
concerning the assessment of when two entities make up a single
economic entity. For example, in Siegel Transfer, the United States
Court of Appeals found that in the case of agents, whose only function
was to make arrangements for the transport of the putative principal’s
freight with authorized carriers, because these agents did not compete
with the putative principal and because they received commission from
the principal based on the loads they arranged for the company to
transport (which meant that the parties’ economic interests were
entirely congruent), there was a single economic entity.354 Indeed, the
US Supreme Court clarified in American Needle that in establishing
whether liability under Sherman Act, Section 1 (equivalent to Article
101) arises, the question is whether the agreement between parties
“deprives the market of actual or potential competition.”355 Thus,
(re)interpreting the single economic entity doctrine in line with the
competitive neutrality concept of this Article could potentially bring
the EU and US competition law treatment of platforms closer to one
another, which would be desirable due to the global nature of the
businesses of the platforms.356
It should be noted that the relevant conflict or alignment of
commercial interests and the position of “competitive neutrality”
should be established regarding the position of the platform in relation
to the one and the same principal (i.e. supplier), not in relation to the
platform and competing principals. It has to be accepted that the online
platform business model inevitably involves the platform’s acting for
353. Hydrotherm, supra note 119, ¶ 11.
354. Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1995). For
the argument that actors in a sharing economy arrangement pursue their own separate economic
interests and would not be protected by the single economic entity doctrine in the United States,
see Anderson & Huffman, supra note 11, at 900.
355. American Needle, supra note 6, at 197.
356. This is not to say that in their overall operation the US intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine and the EU single economic entity doctrine would become significantly aligned.
Indeed, the focus of the inquiry in the United States appears to be whether the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct in question deprives the market of actual or potential competition,
whilst the EU inquiry is focused on whether the entities in question can be deemed as separate
undertakings in relation to their competitive position on the market. Namely, the EU inquiry
does not conduct an assessment of the conduct in this initial step of establishing the existence of
separate undertakings, which only becomes possible if it is established that there are separate
undertakings. This is in contrast to the US position, which puts the emphasis on the capacity to
conspire, which necessitates an assessment of the conduct in terms of whether it can be deemed
as an instance of such conspiracy.
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different (and potentially competing) principals as is the case with more
traditional agents, such as estate agents. What matters for the purposes
of establishing that the platform is the agent of the supplier and that
subsequently, their restrictive agreement on the relevant market should
fall outside of competition law scrutiny is whether the platform
competes with that principal whose agreement is in question on the
relevant market (where products/services are provided to customers) in
relation to which the restriction of competition exists. After all, the
legal question is whether the platform is the agent of a given supplier
by being part of the same single economic entity as that supplier in the
context of the restrictive agreement on the relevant market with that
supplier. Consequently, the fact that the platform acts for numerous
principals at the same time is not prohibitive of a finding of agency, as
seen above also in agency law and in some competition cases and
Guidelines,357 and should not make a difference in relation to the
competitive neutrality assessment, either. The pertinent issue here is
whether the platform has operations on the relevant market concerning
the products/services provided to customers and concludes transactions
with customers for its own account in competition with the supplier,
for whom it simultaneously acts as an agent.
This is also how the GC’s findings in Minoan Lines should be
interpreted. In Minoan Lines, the GC considered a new factor for
determining whether there is a single economic entity in addition to the
factor of economic risk: whether the services provided by the
intermediary are exclusive.358 This is how the GC interpreted Suiker
Unie, which the GC took to mean that there is unlikely to be a single
economic entity if, at the same time as it conducts business for the
account of its principal, the agent undertakes, as an independent dealer,
“a very considerable amount of business for its own account on the
market for the product or service in question.”359 However, taken in
consideration alongside agency law, the conflict in such a situation is
better explained as an issue of commercial adversity or lack of
competitive neutrality rather than that of exclusivity, because it is not
so much about whether the agent acts exclusively for one principal or
357. See accompanying text to supra note 323. The proposition supported in this Section
is in line with common law principles of agency under which the principal should not have to
anticipate that an agent might wish to act for parties with opposed interests in the same
transaction; BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS, supra note 36, ¶ 6-015.
358. Case T-66/99, Minoan Lines SA v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5515, ¶ 126.
359. Minoan Lines, supra note 358, ¶ 128. See also voestalpine, supra note 182, ¶¶ 13941.
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not that determines the crux of the potential conflict of interest. It is
whether the agent itself is in a commercially adverse position (and thus
not in a competitively neutral position) with regard to the principal
irrespective of how many principals it acts for that creates a conflict of
interest. In other words, the conflict of interest in such a scenario would
continue to exist even if the agent acted exclusively for one principal,
but at the same time also conducted business for its own account and
its own benefit on the same, relevant market in competition with the
principal. Thus, it is the financial and commercial risk that the
intermediary undertakes on the relevant market, whereby it puts itself
in a position in which it can influence competition on that market and
compete with its principal, that (should) prevent(s) it from being an
agent. In that context, whether it acts exclusively for one principal or
not is neither here nor there, and thus, irrelevant.
Application of the criterion of competitive neutrality to the
platforms studied in this Article would rule out Amazon’s being an
agent of suppliers on Amazon Marketplace in cases where Amazon, the
retailer, competes with the third-party sellers on Amazon Marketplace,
selling its own products on the same, relevant market.360 The criterion
of competitive neutrality would also rule out Apple’s position as an
agent in relation to the App Store to the extent that Apple competes
with app developers through the provision of Apple apps in
competition with third-party developer apps on the same, relevant
market. All of the other platforms—and Amazon Marketplace and
Apple App Store to the extent that they do not compete with their
suppliers on the relevant market—would continue to qualify as agents
given their operations at the time writing.361 This is because currently,
none of the other platforms (Uber, eBay, Airbnb, Booking.com) are
active on the relevant product/services market where they facilitate
transactions between suppliers and customers. For example, Uber does
not operate its own vehicles to provide rides in competition with drivers

360. See the potential investigation into Amazon’s use of data from sellers in the context;
EU: Vestager opens probe into Amazon, supra note 21.
361. This approach would be preferable to, for example, the Bundeskartellamt’s position
which found Amazon Marketplace to be equivalent to a horizontal cartel because such a position
is a less nuanced approach than focusing on competitive neutrality. Amazon is not in a horizontal
relation to all third-party sellers on Marketplace because it does not sell the same products as all
of the third-party sellers. For the Bundeskartellamt position, see supra note 25.
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supplying their services on the platform.362 eBay does not have a retail
arm selling its own products on eBay. Airbnb does not own flats that it
rents out in competition with the landlords supplying their own
accommodation on the platform.363 Booking.com does not own any
hotels where it rents out rooms in competition with its hotel partners,
etc. In the same vein, Amazon Marketplace and Apple App Store do
not compete with their suppliers in relation to all the products/apps that
they facilitate the sale/licensing of on their platforms. Thus, in
transactions facilitated on these platforms between a supplier and a
customer, where the platform is not a competitor on the relevant
market, these platforms act as one with their suppliers in relation to
those transactions with third parties, and should continue to be covered
as agents under the single economic entity doctrine. Where the platform
is a competitor on the relevant market to the supplier for whom it also
facilitates transactions on the same relevant market, the agency rule
under the single economic entity doctrine should not apply, and any
restrictions of competition on the relevant market found in agreements
between such platforms and their suppliers should be subject to the full
application of the prohibition in Article 101.364
A relevant question here is whether this concept of competitive
neutrality should be limited to actual competition between the platform
362. Uber is reportedly testing self-driving cars. Advanced Technologies Group, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/info/atg/ [https://perma.cc/4NVE-LS9L](last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
When such self-driving cars start operating in competition with the services of drivers on the
Uber platform in relation to rides provided to customers, Uber would no longer be an agent of
the drivers on the relevant market.
363. But see Paris Martineau, Airbnb and Marriott Each Want What the Other Has,
WIRED (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/airbnb-marriott-each-want-what-otherhas/ [https://perma.cc/5UNJ-HQLW] (noting that Airbnb is in the process of entering the “hotel
market” in New York City through the conversion of commercial property into apartment-style
suites to be exclusively listed on Airbnb). When this happens, then Airbnb would become a
competitor to those landlords for whom it facilitates transactions on the platform, and could no
longer count as their agent on the relevant market.
364. See Comm’n’s approach on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of
Community competition law, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5 (detailing the European Commission’s
approach to market definition). The assessment of whether the platform competes with its
suppliers on the “relevant market” would need to be conducted on the basis of defining the
relevant market per the usual competition law assessment regarding market definition, i.e. in its
product, geographical, and temporal dimensions. Admittedly, this involves a case-by-case
analysis, but a competition assessment of any potentially restrictive agreement requires a caseby-case analysis of the allegedly infringing restriction/agreement with a view to establishing
whether the particular restriction/agreement takes place between separate undertakings, so this
does not add a particular complication to the requisite legal assessment.
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and the supplier, or, whether potential competition between them is
also sufficient to establish the absence of competitive neutrality. This
Article argues that the relevant competition is that of actual
competition, and not that of potential competition between the platform
and the supplier. This is because at the stage of establishing whether
two entities are part of a single economic entity and whether their
agreement falls within the scope of the prohibition of anticompetitive
agreements, one should not need to assess potential competition
between them, which would involve second-guessing the future
business conduct of the entities in question. Such prospective
assessments are normally reserved for assessment of conduct (e.g. in
merger control cases) and an application of the single economic entity
doctrine is more aptly conducted on a factual basis at the time of the
assessment in relation to the entities as they stand.365 Further, in cases
where the platform is not actually in competition with the suppliers on
the platform, there is no reason why the platform should not continue
to count as an agent unless and until it starts competing with the
suppliers because it is only then that there will be a relevant conflict of
commercial interests between the platform and (only) the suppliers
with whom the platform competes. The limited, relevant EU
Commission decisional practice on agency (none of which concerned
platforms) also suggests that a case-by-case assessment of actual
competition is what is required.
In Eirpage, the Commission held that “if one day” agents start
competing with their principals (i.e. they start offering the same
services for which they are agents in direct competition with the
principals), they could no longer act as agents.366 In another case,
namely, ARG/Unipart, the Commission found the same entity
(Unipart) to be an agent bearing no entrepreneurial risk when the entity
promoted the sales of the “principal” (Austin Rover Group) for account
of the latter and in consideration of a commission from the latter, but
to be an independent undertaking when it came to activities regarding
which each bore its own entrepreneurial risk.367 In this case, the two
undertakings in question were in competition with one another for the
365. In this respect, the EU and US treatment of when two entities are part of the same
undertaking differ. See supra note 356.
366. Case IV/32.737 – Eirpage, Comm’n Decision, 1991 O.J. (L 306) 22, ¶ 21. The
Comm’n also explicitly refers to the potential “conflict” in such a case. Id.
367. Case IV/31.914 – ARG/Unipart, Comm’n Decision, 1988 O.J. (L 45) 34, ¶¶ 26-27.
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provision of certain spare parts, and Unipart was selling Rover’s parts
for certain other spare others (for which it was the agent). Concerning
the activities of the latter type, the Commission found that Article 101
was not applicable because the “agent” bore no entrepreneurial risk.368
In contrast, the obligations imposed on Unipart in relation to spare parts
other than those Rover branded parts fell under the scope of Article 101
because for those activities, each entity bore its own entrepreneurial
risk and the obligations restricted the separate entities’ “scope for
competition.”369 This is notably similar to the position of Amazon on
Amazon Marketplace where Amazon, the retailer, may or may not
compete with third-party suppliers depending on the relevant product
range. The same goes for Apple in relation to App Store where Apple,
the app developer, may or may not compete with independent app
developers depending on the relevant apps. Thus, where platforms do
actually compete with their suppliers on the relevant market, they
should not count as agents, but they should continue to count as agents
on relevant markets where they do not actually compete with their
suppliers at the time of the competition law assessment.
In individual cases, the concept of competitive neutrality may
require an initial assessment of the nature of the platform business in
relation to the business of the suppliers, so as to establish whether the
platform is in competition with the supplier. In fact, to some degree,
the question of agency is closely related to the definition of the relevant
market and the activity in question in which the intermediary is
engaged because this determines whether the agent is in a vertical
relation to the supplier in the production chain, as discussed above.370
The positioning of the platform and the agent in this vertical chain is
also relevant to establishing who buys/receives what from whom. This
becomes particularly important, inter alia, to determine standing to sue
in private damages actions in jurisdictions such as the United States.
For example, if the activity of an intermediary in question is defined as
“distribution services to suppliers” (as opposed to the provision of the
supplied products to consumers) as was the position in Campos, then it
follows that the intermediary is more likely to be an agent than not.371
In Campos, Ticketmaster (a ticketing service company) had long-term
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶¶ 27, 33.
See accompanying text to supra note 350.
See Campos, supra note 31.
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exclusive contracts with almost every promoter of concerts in the
United States.372 The legal issue was whether consumers, who
purchased tickets from Ticketmaster, which distributed the tickets at
outlets, over the phone, at the venue, etc. to consumers and charged
consumers a fee for its distribution services, had standing to sue
Ticketmaster as “direct purchasers” for inflated, supracompetitive
fees.373 The consumers argued that they are the direct purchasers of the
ticket distribution services because they pay the service fees directly to
Ticketmaster.374 The United States Court of Appeals disagreed and
found that, despite such billing practices, consumers were not direct
purchasers because the ticket delivery services were an input in the
product that the venues sold to the public, which the venues were
unable to obtain in a competitive market, making the consumers’
dealings with Ticketmaster “derivative” and thus, indirect.375 Namely,
it was the venues and promoters to whom Ticketmaster provided a
service, and they consumed Ticketmaster’s service, which was the
distribution of tickets to consumers. This points out that in relation to
the product provided to consumers (i.e. third parties) on the “relevant
market,” Ticketmaster had no relevant operations because it provided
distribution services to the venues (not to consumers) and any tickets
that it sold to consumers, it sold them on behalf of the venues as their
agent. This is because the relevant market in relation to consumers
concerned tickets (i.e. consumers were “consuming” tickets, not ticket
distribution services), and on that relevant market, Ticketmaster was
only acting as the agent of the event promoters.376 The same legal issue

372. Id. at 1171.
373. Id. at 1169.
374. Id. at 1171.
375. Id. at 1171. Notably, the same Court also held that this indirect purchaser status does
not bar the consumers from seeking injunctive relief because the payment of the fees to
Ticketmaster establishes standing to pursue such a claim for monopolistic fees; id. 1172. But see
Pepper, supra note 31, at 4 n.1 (questioning the access to injunctive relief given the proximate
cause requirement which stipulates that under normal rules of construction, a plaintiff who is
not proximately harmed by a defendant’s unlawful conduct has no cause of action to sue the
defendant for any type of relief).
376. This distinction is made implicitly by the dissent in Campos where Sheppard Arnold,
J. argued that the consumers should have been able sue Ticketmaster for treble damages as direct
purchasers because the “monopoly product” at issue in the case was ticket distribution services,
not tickets, and Ticketmaster supplied that product directly to consumers; Campos, supra note
31, at 1174. Thus, he disagreed with the majority’s characterization of the distribution services
as being provided to venues, in indicating that it was the tickets that were being sold to
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of establishing who sells what to whom also lay at the heart of Apple
(iPhone), which the US Supreme Court decided to be one of Apple’s
selling apps as a “retailer” to iPhone owners, strikingly without
discussing the issue of agency or Campos at all.377 In its approach, the
Supreme Court did not adopt the position of the amicus curiae brief for
the United States, which had characterized Apple as providing
distribution services that were a necessary input for app developers’
sales of their apps to customers and that were provided directly to app
developers in line with Campos, with the consequence that consumers
could not sue Apple as indirect purchasers of that service.378 The
Supreme Court’s characterization of Apple as a “retailer” in an
arrangement where the subject matter of contracts is licensing of
software (which technically excludes any possibility of “resale” as
Apple does not and cannot “buy” a license from app developers to
“resell” the license to consumers) and where the price of the product in
question is not set by the “retailer” muddles the established conceptual
distinctions between different commercial distribution models
including retail and agency. In effect, it guts agency as a business
model by equating it to retail, a distribution model which operates on
completely different terms in relation to ownership, commercial risk,
etc.379 In not recognizing the possibility that Apple acts as the agent of
the app developers to whom it provides a service on the relevant market
in relation to app sales to consumers (rather than selling the apps as a
“retailer” on its own behalf), the Supreme Court essentially throws into
question the operating business model of all of the platforms studied in
consumers on behalf of the venues by Ticketmaster as the agent of the venues, rather than the
distribution services, which Sheppard Arnold, J. held to be provided directly to consumers.
377. Pepper, supra note 31. Had the US Supreme Court decided that Apple was the agent
of third-party app developers who supply their apps to consumers, this would have made the
consumers indirect purchasers with no standing against Apple. See the Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae in Apple Inc. v. Robert Pepper, et al No.17-204 in the US Supreme Court at
16-17 (internal quotations omitted) (“[a]lthough Apple acts as an intermediary or distributor, it
does not buy apps from app developers and then resell them to consumers at prices of its
choosing . . . [i]nstead, it acts as an agent for the developers, completing sales on the developers
behalf at prices the developers set . . . and [t]hat difference is critical to the proper application
of Illinois Brick rule”).
378. See Brief for the United States, supra note 377, 19.
379. It appears that the Supreme Court deems agency to be a “retail” arrangement based
on a “commission-pricing model.” Pepper, supra note 31, at 8. The Dissent appears to accept
that it is the app developers from whom the consumers bought the apps, which can be interpreted
to suggest that the purchase was concluded through the agency of Apple, but the Dissent also
denotes Apple to be a “retailer.” Id. at 5 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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this work and of any other platforms which operate on similar business
models.380
The characterization of the relevant market and the evaluation of
who provides what to whom in the context of a platform is, indeed, a
thorny legal issue that has led to questionable approaches by different
authorities around the world. For example, in Flight Centre, the
Australian High Court adopted a somewhat puzzling interpretation of
the arrangement in place. In this case, Flight Centre—a travel agent
operating through shops, call centers and the internet—sold tickets on
behalf of airlines and in line with airlines’ tariffs, conditions of carriage
and instruction.381 The agent could not vary or modify any terms and
conditions, but it could sell tickets to consumers at the price which it
determined.382 With each sale, Flight Centre created a contractual
relationship between the customer and the airline.383 The agent had no
proprietary rights to tickets and was remunerated by “at-source”
commission for each ticket sold.384 The commission was a percentage
of the published fare, which was a fare fixed by the airline for the
relevant seat on the relevant flight.385 If Flight Centre sold a ticket
above this fare, it would keep the difference between the published fare
and the actual fare as well as the commission.386 Flight Centre was free
under the agency agreement to sell or not to sell an international airline
ticket of any airline and to sell any ticket to any customer at any
price.387 Thus, Flight Centre was operating under an agency model for

380. Because the class action in Apple (iPhone) litigation does not concern, for example,
an agreement concerning the price of the apps as agreed between the app developers and Apple,
but rather the allegedly supracompetitive commission that Apple charges to app developers
(resulting from monopolizing the distribution of apps), the concept of competitive neutrality has
no direct application. Had the action concerned app prices, the application of competitive
neutrality—assuming that the EU single economic entity doctrine applies—would mean that for
apps where Apple competes with the third-party app developers, such restrictions of competition
concerning, e.g. the price level, would be brought under the scope of application of art. 101. For
apps where Apple does not compete with third-party app developers with its own apps, the single
economic entity doctrine would apply and restrictions of competition including those on price
would fall outside the scope of application of art. 101.
381. Flight Centre, supra note 16, ¶ 10.
382. Id.
383. Id. ¶ 22.
384. Id. ¶¶11-12.
385. Id. ¶12.
386. Id.
387. Id. ¶ 34.
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competing principals (i.e. airlines) and had some pricing freedom in
relation to the fares.
The substantive question on appeal was whether Flight Centre
was in competition with three airlines when it attempted to induce each
airline to agree not to discount the price at which that airline offered
international airline tickets directly to customers.388 The majority
opinion held that the critical question of whether Flight Centre
competed with the airlines depended on two considerations: namely,
that Flight Centre could not only decide to sell or not sell an airline’s
tickets, and also to set its own price for the tickets; and that Flight
Centre was not constrained in its authority to prefer its own interests
over those of the airlines.389 The latter point is clearly, directly relevant
to the inquiry of “competitive neutrality” as discussed in this Section.
The High Court remarked that “[w]hen Flight Centre sold an
international airline ticket to a customer, the airline whose ticket was
sold did not.”390 Chief Justice French, dissenting, noted that “[t]he
proposition that an agent and a principal, both selling the services of
the principal, compete with each other in a market for the sale of those
services does not command ready assent.”391 Making reference to the
EU doctrine of single economic entity, Chief Justice French took issue
with the majority’s finding that an agent and the principal can be in
competition with one another irrespective of whether the agent is an
integral part of the other entity or not (although such a finding would
388. Id. ¶ 25. Whether or not Flight Centre was “in competition” with the airlines whose
tickets it sold was fundamental for this case as the relevant part of the Trade Practices Act
expressly required this for applicability.
389. Id. ¶ 89. However, if Flight Centre’s agreement with airlines did not allow it to set
the price, such a ban might have contravened other parts of competition law such as the
prohibition against resale price maintenance. Having said that, such price freedom does bring
the agent closer to a retailer than an agent by giving it pricing freedom. Indeed, in such agency
cases, who has pricing freedom appears to be a central issue. Yet, one needs to distinguish
between true pricing freedom as in a usual retail arrangement and pricing freedom where the
agent can forego (some of) the commission (i.e. its remuneration) that it can normally charge on
top a fare initially fixed by the principal, which is different to the situation of a retailer.
390. Id. ¶ 90.
391. Id. ¶ 15. The court below, namely the Full Court of Australia, had also found on
appeal that a travel agent selling airline tickets does not compete with the airlines in a market
for distribution and booking services; Flight Centre Ltd. v Australian Competition & Consumer
Comm’n [2015] FCAFC 104 (Austl.) ¶ 8. This followed from the fact that the travel agent
supplied any booking services as an “agent” of the airlines on behalf of the airlines; id. ¶ 154.
Consequently, the agent’s attempts to induce the airlines into a price fixing agreement was not
an anticompetitive agreement. Id. ¶182.
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indeed be sufficient for that conclusion).392 Thus, whereas the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission found that the
agency relationship between Flight Centre and the airlines did not
defeat the proposition that Flight Centre supplied a service to
consumers in competition with the airlines, Chief Justice French
concluded that what Flight Centre did in selling a ticket was properly
regarded as the action of the airline itself.393 According to Chief Justice
French’s dissenting opinion, there is “no ‘market’ for the supply of the
tickets of a particular carrier” and Flight Centre was not in competition
with the airlines for which it sold tickets on any relevant market.394 In
contrast, Justices Kiefel and Gageler opined that Flight Centre was in
competition with each airline on a market for the supply, to customers,
of contractual rights to international air carriage.395 They found that this
was the case despite Flight Centre’s supplying on that market as agent
for each airline.396 Justice Nettle examined the issue of competition
from the perspective of the consumer and found that an airline ticket
sold by Flight Centre on behalf of an airline would, in most respects,
be identical to an airline ticket sold by the airline, which connotes high
degree of substitutability, and therefore, competition between tickets
sold by the airline and the agent.397
With all respect to the majority in Flight Centre, it is difficult to
see how “[w]hen Flight Centre sold an international airline ticket to a
customer, the airline whose ticket was sold did not.”398 This is literally
392. Flight Centre, supra note 16, ¶ 19.
393. Id. ¶ 21.
394. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24.
395. Id. ¶ 26. They distinguished this market from the market for supplies of carriage
services. Thus, they found that the market was the one for international airline tickets, but they
held this market to be a market for “contractual rights” to carriage services and not a market for
carriage services. Id. ¶ 92. With all respect to the majority, such a market for airline tickets that
is separate from air travel services is a rather artificial way of constructing the market since
passengers are not purchasing “tickets” per se, but air travel services where the ticket simply
confirms the purchase of air travel services; there is no separate demand for airline tickets
outside of a demand for air travel services unless, for example, the market concerns collecting
airline tickets as memorabilia, etc.
396. Id. ¶ 26.
397. Id. ¶ 127.
398. Id. ¶ 90. See also a merger decision in which the Comm’n appears to agree that travel
websites offering flights are substitutes for airlines’ own websites; Case COMP/M.6163 –
Axa/Permira/Opodo/Go Voyages/Edreams, Comm’n Decision, C(2011) 3913 final (May 30,
2011), ¶¶ 26-28. Interestingly, in HRS the Bundeskartellamt found that “[t]he website of hotels
offering real-time booking are not part of the same product market as hotel portals,” and that the
hotel websites are not substitutes for hotel portals since the former do not offer the same bundles
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counterfactual because every time Flight Centre sold an international
airline ticket to a customer, a ticket of that airline was sold: the airline
did sell a ticket, just not through its proprietary sales channels. The
“high degree of substitutability” between the tickets sold by Flight
Centre and the airlines results from the fact that they are identical, and
one and the same thing. More importantly, what the majority may have
confused is the difference between two relationships. First, the
relationship between a principal and an agent who have a conflict of
commercial interest and are not in a competitively neutral position (i.e.
they compete with one another on the same, relevant market) where
they are both selling the same (or competing) products. In such a
scenario, the agent has a choice to make a sale either on her own behalf
and for her own profit, or on behalf of the principal and for the
principal’s profit.
Second, the relationship between an agent and a principal both of
whom are selling only the product of the principal. In such a scenario,
the benefit of the transaction to the principal differs depending on who
made the sale because the direct sales channel is less costly to the
principal (i.e. the principal makes a greater profit if he sells the product
directly, due to not paying any commission to the agent).
Commercially, the second relationship still involves the principal
making a profitable sale irrespective of whether the sale was concluded
by the agent on his behalf or by the principal himself. In the context of
a particular sale of a particular ticket of a particular airline, the
commercial interests of Flight Centre and the airline are still aligned:
they both make a profit when the sale takes place. In contrast, the first
relationship involves a situation where, indeed, when the agent sells for
her own benefit a product that competes with the principal’s, the
principal loses the opportunity to enter into that profitable transaction
and, incurs the opportunity cost of that profitable transaction. Although
it is clear that in the first relationship, the two entities are in competition
with one another because either one or the other realizes the gains from
trade, in the second relationship the item being sold is literally the same
and only the method of sale differs (and the issue is that of distribution
of profits between the principal and the agent). Thus, it is difficult to
argue that in the second relationship the principal and the agent are in
of services as hotel portals; HRS, supra note 11, ¶ 88. See also the Bundeskartellamt’s similar
findings in Booking.com, supra note 11, ¶ 143.
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competition with another for the sale of the very same thing. The only
scope of unconstrained “authority to prefer its own interests over those
of the airlines” that Flight Centre might have had relates to its own
interests in relation to its agency business;399 it cannot have preferred
its own interests over those of the airlines in the sale of airline tickets
since Flight Centre does not operate its own airline. In relation to the
platforms studied in this Article, Flight Centre is commercially in a
very different situation to, for example, Amazon Marketplace where
Amazon, the retailer, and third-party sellers may compete with one
another to sell the same/competing products to the same group of
customers. Therefore, the dissenting opinion in Flight Centre was
correct in finding that Flight Centre was an agent of the airlines and not
in competition with them. Applying the findings and normative
suggestions of the current Article, this position of “competitive
neutrality” would have required the application of the agency rule
under the single economic entity doctrine in the European Union with
the outcome that restrictions of competition in the separate vertical
agreements between Flight Centre and individual airlines concerning
ultimately the pricing of the product on the relevant market would not
be scrutinized under Article 101.400 This is because in relation to the
product sold to third parties on the relevant market (i.e. airline tickets),
Flight Centre was in a competitively neutral position with its principals
and their interests were aligned in aiming to make a sale. Indeed, in
some of the US cases examined in Flight Centre, US courts also found
that similarly situated travel agents were agents of the airlines, which
the majority of the Australian High Court clearly did not follow despite
considering them as potential precedents.401
399. Flight Centre, supra note 16, ¶ 89.
400. This is to be contrasted with a scenario where Flight Centre tries to facilitate collusion
between airlines in coordinating the applicable price reductions. In that case, where Flight Centre
essentially would be attempting to orchestrate a horizontal restriction of competition between
airlines in getting them to agree not to discount in concert, the conduct in question would no
longer be the vertical arrangement between a given airline and Flight Centre which can benefit
from the single economic entity doctrine, but a horizontal restriction of competition, which falls
outside the scope of the single economic entity doctrine and this Article’s inquiry. See
accompanying text to supra note 190 in relation to facilitation of collusion.
401. For example, in Ill. Corp. Travel, the US Court of Appeals held that a travel agent
was an agent of an airline as distinct from a reseller of the airline’s tickets (and consequently,
the airline’s prohibition of agent’s discounts to consumers was not caught by the per se
prohibition of price fixing). Ill. Corp. Travel, Inc., Mctravel Travelservices v. Am. Airlines, 806
F2d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1986). Similarly, in American Airlines, supra note 323, at 752 the Seventh
Circuit did not accept the existence of two separate markets for air travel (one for the
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What Apple (iPhone), Flight Centre and Campos demonstrate is
that it is important to identify the nature of the platform business in
relation to the business of the supplier when determining the
competitive positioning of the platform and supplier with regard to one
another and the relevant market on which they may be competing.
Under the concept of “competitive neutrality” developed in this Article,
the competitive position that has to be neutral relates to competition on
the relevant market concerning the products/services provided to third
parties, and, not competition on the market concerning, for example,
the agency services of the platform, which it provides to the suppliers,
in competition with, for example, other platforms. In the case of Flight
Centre, therefore, the relevant market would have been that of air travel
tickets and not airline ticket distribution services in deciding whether
Flight Centre was part of the same undertaking as an airline in relation
to airline ticket sales to consumers. In the case of Campos, the relevant
market would have been that of event tickets (rather than that of
distribution services), which was the product provided to consumers by
Ticketmaster. In the context of Apple (iPhone), the relevant market
would be that of apps rather than app distribution services, regarding
which competitive neutrality would be assessed.
In sum, despite no explicit acknowledgement to this effect in any
area of law studied, the concepts of agency in different areas of law
including competition law are built on a remarkably similar foundation,
namely that of alignment of commercial interests which implies a
position of competitive neutrality between the principal and the agent.
Although in the vast majority of the platforms studied, there is, indeed,
such alignment of commercial interests and competitive neutrality
between the platform and the supplier in relation to transactions
facilitated on the relevant market, there are also important instances
where this does not hold. In such circumstances where the commercial
interests of the platform and supplier are no longer aligned because the
platform is not in a competitively neutral position in relation to its
supplier on the relevant market for the products/services supplied to
third parties, this Article proposes a (re)interpretation of the single
economic entity doctrine so that such platforms do not benefit from the
agency rule to the extent that their agreements contain restrictions of
competition on the relevant market. This Section has demonstrated that
transportation and one for the ticketing service) on very similar facts to Flight Centre, supra
note 16, in holding that the relationship between travel agent and an airline was one of genuine
agency.
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such a (re)interpretation is necessary and justified on the basis of the
principles underlying agency in different areas of the law studied, as
well as the single economic entity doctrine in competition law.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article explored two related questions regarding the legal
characterization of platforms that facilitate transactions: first, whether
they are agents of the suppliers for whom they facilitate transactions
with third parties; and second, whether competition law should apply
to their agreements with their suppliers that contain clauses, which
restrict competition on the relevant market concerning the
products/services provided to third parties. This Article found, after
studying concepts of agency in different areas of law including
competition law, and the relevant terms and conditions of six different
platforms—Uber, Amazon Marketplace, eBay, Booking.com, Apple
App Store, and Airbnb—that these platforms are, as a matter of positive
law, on balance, agents of their suppliers. The implication of this
finding in EU competition law and in any competition law modelled on
that of the European Union is that agreements between these platforms
and their suppliers which contain restrictions of competition on the
relevant market cannot be scrutinized under the prohibition of
anticompetitive agreements due to the single economic entity doctrine.
The doctrine treats agreements between agents and their principals as
taking place within one and the same undertaking, which renders
Article 101 inapplicable following the requirement that the agreement
takes place between separate undertakings for the provision to be
applicable. This implies that terms which restrict competition on the
relevant market by, for example, fixing prices or restricting output,
cannot be scrutinized as anticompetitive agreements. Thus, there is a
potentially significant platform gap in the application of competition
law to agreements between platforms and suppliers. Establishing that
platforms are agents of their suppliers as the law currently stands and
the existence of the consequent gap in the scope of competition law
application to platform agreements is the first contribution of this
Article.
The finding of agency as regards the relation between platforms
and suppliers is in line with the operation of agency as a delegation
model established in different areas of law, despite this not having been
recognized as such in the competition law jurisprudence, soft law or
commentary. This Article has demonstrated that, in fact, the underlying
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principles of the agency relationship are more or less the same in all the
areas of law studied including EU competition law. This is important
because it means that where competition law has not established
general principles determining whether a given business arrangement
between two parties is one of agency, it can make use of the relevant
principles established in these other areas of law. The similarity of the
fundamental principles of agency across different areas of law is also
important because it makes it possible to adopt a common legal
characterization of platforms, which would align with the concepts of
agency in different areas of law, all of which may be applicable to the
practices of the same platforms in different disputes.
The identification of the gap in the application of EU competition
law to platforms’ agreements with their suppliers leads to a subsequent
question, which this Article has explored. Given the ubiquity of the
platform model and the growing importance of e-commerce in the
digital economy, the immunization of potentially substantial
restrictions of competition from scrutiny by competition law requires a
normative assessment. Namely, it becomes necessary to undertake a
normative assessment of whether the identified platform gap should be
filled, and if so, how. In this normative aspect, the Article has found
that the gap should be filled, but only in relation to one type of platform
arrangement: where the platform in question not only facilitates
transactions on behalf of its suppliers, but also competes with those
suppliers on the relevant market where the products/services of the
suppliers are sold/provided to third parties. This is because all of the
areas of law studied place great emphasis on the alignment of
commercial interests between the agent and the principal, and such
alignment lies at the heart of an agency arrangement where the duties
and the interests of the agent are expected not to be in conflict as a
result of the fiduciary nature of the relationship. As competition law
currently does not explicitly recognize this factor in its assessment of
agency relations, but relies on risk-taking, which this Article has
identified to be a factor that implicitly requires a position of competitive
alignment between the agent and the principal, the Article has
developed a concept of competitive neutrality to inform a
(re)interpretation of the agency rule under the single economic entity
doctrine. This concept of “competitive neutrality” aligns the
competition law assessment of agency with the assessment of agency
found in different areas of law, and facilitates a general, principled
understanding of agency under the single economic entity doctrine, and
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in particular its application to platforms, which currently does not exist.
In the context of platforms, the concept of competitive neutrality
reflects the fact that platforms are normally in a vertical relation to their
suppliers in the production chain where they provide a service as an
input for the suppliers’ business, for example, in the form of a
distribution or sales channel. Where the competitive positioning
between the platform and suppliers turns into a horizontal relationship
because the platform starts competing with its suppliers for whom it
simultaneously acts for as an agent, this goes fundamentally against the
existence of a position of agency. In such circumstances, by
participating in the relevant market as an economic actor in its own
right, the intermediary also takes risks and places itself in a position in
which it can affect competition on the market. Thus, where competitive
neutrality is replaced with competitive rivalry between the platform
and the suppliers on the relevant market, it is not possible to justify why
the platform and suppliers should count as one and the same entity on
the relevant market in relation to contracts negotiated/concluded with
third parties. Consequently, this Article proposed a (re)interpretation of
the single economic entity doctrine so that the agency rule does not
apply to platforms that not only facilitate transactions for their
suppliers, but also compete with their suppliers on the relevant market.
In the context of the rules applicable in the European Union, this Article
has proposed a revision of the EU Verticals Block Exemption
Regulation and/or the accompanying Guidelines to include a provision
to the effect that vertical agreements between platforms and suppliers,
which contain restrictions of competition on the relevant market for the
products/services provided to third parties cannot benefit from the
agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine, to the extent that
the platform competes with the suppliers on that market.402 Such a
clause can read as follows: “an agency agreement will fall within the
scope of Article 101(1), even if the principal bears all the relevant
financial and commercial risks, where the agreement is between a
platform and a supplier, and the platform competes with the supplier
on the relevant market in relation to the products/services
sold/provided to third parties through the intermediation of the
platform.”
The findings of this Article are important for the correct legal
treatment of platforms in different areas of law and in different
402. VBER, supra note 14; Verticals Guidelines, supra note 35.
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jurisdictions, not least because of the growing importance of ecommerce in the economy and the widespread adoption of the platform
model. As demonstrated throughout the paper, different jurisdictions
and different areas of law within the same jurisdiction (e.g.
commercial, employment, tax, competition laws) are already
approaching the same legal question of how to legally characterize
what a platform is in significantly different ways. This is unfortunate
because it can lead to legal and business uncertainty to the detriment of
economic growth and technological development. It can also lead to
undesirable fragmentation in the legal treatment of different businesses
that despite operating in different business sectors adopt essentially the
same model of operation, as demonstrated by the similarity of the
contracts of the platforms studied in this Article. The similarity of the
standard contracts also demonstrates that agency is the business model
of platforms across the board and is not a type of arrangement adopted
by some platforms to conceal their real operation method.
Acknowledging this would go a long way in ensuring that the law does
not penalize legitimately adopted business models in treating them as
if they were fundamentally different arrangements. It would also ensure
that the law’s treatment of potentially anticompetitive outcomes does
not depend on the form of the business model adopted by a given
undertaking because it is only after accepting the arrangement for what
it is, the law can respond effectively to the effects of the undesirable
aspects of that arrangement.403 Where technology and the use of
technology develop at speeds with which the legal system cannot keep
up, there is a danger that the law will either become irrelevant or an
impediment to the commercial use of technology that can benefit
society. This Article has demonstrated in the context of some of the
most popular platforms that that danger is real when it comes to the
legal characterization of platforms and the implications thereof for
competition law. This requires speedy adaptation of some of the
existing concepts and rules of competition law, such as the single
economic entity doctrine and the agency rule thereunder, regarding
which this Article has set forth a means for (re)interpretation.

403. This is most interestingly demonstrated by the majority and the Dissenting Opinion
in Pepper, supra note 31, at 8-9, both of which use practically the same facts from a hypothetical
business arrangement to argue that agreeing with the other opinion’s assessment would be
putting form over substance. See id.
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